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"We assume that the government consumption variable measures expenditures that do
not directly a⁄ect productivity but that entail distortions of private decisions. These distor-
tions can re￿ect the government activities themselves and also involve the adverse e⁄ects from
the associated public ￿nance." Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala i Mart￿n (1995). Economic
Growth. MIT press.
"Theoretical analyses of the impact of intergovernmental grants on public expenditures
have run either implicitly or explicitly in terms of the familiar theory of individual choice [...]
it is clear that one can concoct particular instances in which a process of collective decision
making will lead to results which are at variance with the conclusions which follow from the
model of individual choice." David F. Bradford and Wallance E. Oates, (1971). Towards a
Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants. The American Economic Review, volume
61, number 2.
This thesis has the title "The distribution of Public Expenditure in Europe". It is com-
posed of three chapters and focuses on the reaction of the economy to changes in the pattern
of public spending. Our baseline is to investigate the two related principles introduced above:
namely the distortions introduced by public expenditure decisions and the contributory role
in these distortions of the di⁄erences in the decision making processes of di⁄erent levels of
public administration.
In the ￿rst chapter we explore the validity of the statement by Barro and Sala i Martin.
It aims to ￿ll the gap between the empirical and theoretical literatures by considering the
distortions on private decisions induced by the distribution of public expenditure, ignored in
most of previous empirical studies about the allocation of public expenditure. Usually, the
analyses have looked at the alterations provoked by the distribution of public expenditure on
growth or labor productivity, regardless of the mechanism through which these alterations
were produced. We discriminate between the impact of the distribution of public expenditure
on factor productivity and that on the markets for productive factors.
A broader interpretation of the assumption of Barro and Sala i Martin will lead us to
the second and third chapters. Decisions about public expenditure made by certain levels
of government a⁄ect not only private decisions but also the behavior of other levels of the
public administration. Traditionally this phenomenon has been considered in a descending
direction, i.e., decisions made by a more general level of public administration a⁄ect those
made by another level closer to the citizen.




It is here where the di⁄erences in the decision making processes among levels of admin-
istrations described by Bradford and Oates play a key role. Bradford and Oates use their
statement to justify the di⁄erences between allocating grants to private households or pub-
lic bodies, but it can be easily extended to analyze the heterogeneous behavior of di⁄erent
levels of the public administration regarding public spending. We investigate in the second
and third chapters how transfers of funds and ￿scal autonomy to lower levels of the public
administration may have an impact on the distribution of public expenditure and, therefore,
also indirectly on the distortions of private decisions described previously.
The thesis has a focus on the allocation of public expenditure in European countries.
The common denominator of all three papers is that they use models for panel data. In this
framework panel data models have many advantages in comparison to time series modelling,
since it allows for the inclusion of more observations for a shorter period of time taking into
account relatively well the heterogeneity of the di⁄erent countries.
More speci￿cally, the ￿rst chapter constructs and estimates a panel data model to analyze
the e⁄ects that the distribution of public expenditure among several categories may have on
economic growth. We propose the use of three alternative dependent variables as a way to
discriminate e⁄ects on growth through productivity from those that come through alterations
in the markets of production factors. We consider two alternative classi￿cations of public
expenditure and we also introduce a dynamic ARDL model, instead of the static framework
traditional in this literature. Using data for 15 European countries from 1971 to 1998 we
￿nd that Education, Health, Social Security and public Capital signi￿cantly a⁄ect economic
growth through di⁄erent channels. While public capital can be seen to distort the markets of
production factors, the other three categories of expenditure seem to alter the productivity
of factors. In particular, Education produces a positive impact while in the categories Health
and Social Security seems to induce a certain level of over-spending.
The second paper analyzes the e⁄ects that ￿scal decentralization may have on the eco-
nomic distribution of public expenditures. Economic theory has traditionally explained ￿scal
decentralization by arguing that heterogeneous individuals get more utility from public goods
provided by a closer level of government since it can tailor public spending to local tastes.
In this paper we check to what extent decentralization may produce also alterations to the
economic distribution of public expenditure. The estimations are based on a model in which
the utility of the representative agent from current public expenditure depends on the dis-
tance to the level of the administration that provides it, in contrast to public expenditure




on capital. Spain after the Constitution of 1978 is a good example of ￿scal decentralization
from central to regional governments, with the particular feature that this decentralization
process has not been homogeneous among regions, since some regions have made use of some
historical rights reinstituted with the Constitution. Using data from the seventeen Spanish
regions (1984-2003) we test the hypothesis that decentralized economies could experience
a higher share of current expenditure in the budget of the public administrations, in con-
trast to public investment. We show that ￿scal decentralization is a crucial determinant of
the share of the public budget devoted to capital. This result may have important policy
implications, especially regarding the relationship that public investment might have with
economic growth.
The third chapter assesses the e⁄ects of European Union cohesion policy in the behavior
of public expenditure of member countries. One third of the European Union budget is
devoted to Structural Actions, with the aim of enhancing economic growth in less developed
areas. The EU distributes Cohesion and Structural funds through the mechanism of "match-
ing grants", that are paid conditional on a certain level of expenditure by local authorities on
certain projects to which the European Commission gives priority. Existing studies with US
data are reasonably sceptical about this kind of policies, since very often the grants received
crowd-out part of the local public expenditure on the areas in which the grants are allocated.
This is the ￿rst study that tries to measure the so-called "￿ ypaper e⁄ect" of the European
Cohesion policy, through looking at the response on public investment to the introduction
of the EU Structural Funds, more precisely to the European Regional Development Fund
and the Cohesion Fund, which are those devoted to ￿nancing strategic public infrastructure.
Our results are reasonably optimistic. Using annual data from ￿fteen member countries,
from 1993 to 2005, we conclude that there is no evidence of total crowding-out and that
public investment in the member countries makes up around 60% of the increase in EU
funds. In a sensitivity analysis with data from Spanish regions the results reveal that the
implementation of the Cohesion Policy might also encourage investment at other levels of
public administration .
In summary, comparing the results obtained in the three chapters with those in the
related literature, some general conclusions emerge: ￿rst, the distribution of public expendi-
ture matters for growth. The functional allocation is important, but also the proportion of
public investment to public consumption as well as the allocation among levels of the public
administration. We have identi￿ed some categories in which there may exist situations of
over-spending or under-spending that could retard economic growth in Europe. In addition,




the processes of ￿scal decentralization and distribution of grants are a good example of the
impact of the decision-making processes in public expenditure distribution. The grants sys-
tem introduced with the European Cohesion Policy seems to be designed to enhance public
investment in certain regions, and works reasonably well. In contrast, the process of ￿scal
decentralization analyzed was a political transmission of ￿scal autonomy with no economic
objective. In this case, the proportion of public investment decreases dramatically, probably
as a consequence of a better ￿t of sub-national levels of government to population￿ s tastes.
These results may give new insights in the ￿elds of economic theory and political economy
as well as guiding the relevant policy debates.










THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN EUROPE
1.1 Introduction
The European Union agenda for growth as set out in the Council of Lisbon in 2000 puts
emphasis on the need to enhance economic growth through policies that a⁄ect labor produc-
tivity.1 Almost none of the objectives set with this purpose are related to the composition of
the public budget.2 Nearing the deadline of 2010, the economy does not seem to be behaving
as well as expected3 and the question arises of what else should be done in the area of ￿scal
regulation that could stimulate growth. We argue that the absence of regulation concerning
the expenditure of expenditure of the member states may have played an important role in
this lack of success.
The di¢ culties that previous ￿scal rules had introduced in the relationship between the
Commission and the member states4 may have motivated the absence of measures concerning
public expenditure in the Lisbon Agenda. Moreover, no clear indication about the optimal
policies to be taken has been given by the economic literature either. Although several
studies have revealed the important role played by the allocation of public expenditure on
productivity growth, their many empirical drawbacks have led researchers to be sceptical
about the results.
Growth regressions have been used to evaluate the impact of the distribution of public
expenditure on growth. Since the ￿rst attempts in the late eighties, the estimations have
1This is a goal developed as a response to the decline in productivity growth in EU countries relative to
the US since the mid-ninetees.
2The only measures related to the budget distribution concern taxation and a control over the expenditure
on R&D activities, which are monitored by the European Commission. See Sapir (2003) for a detailed
description of the Agenda.
3For example, the target of 3% of GDP devoted to Research and Development seems already unreachable.
See Criscuolo (2007)
4As described by Alesina and Perotti (2004) in their analysis of the evolution of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP).
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been reasonably re￿ned. The existence of a large number of studies has allowed the ￿nding
of some consensus on the control variables that should be included in these regressions. The
availability of better data has motivated the change from the linear regressions to the use
of panels that also exploit the time dimension. The ￿ndings of Kneller et al (1999) has
revealed the importance of taking into account the budget constraint of the government
when regressing growth on ￿scal variables to make a correct interpretation of the results
obtained. The possible endogeneity of ￿scal variables with growth has also been addressed
from several perspectives.
But there remain some doubts about the correct speci￿cation of a panel data model that
describes the e⁄ect of ￿scal variables on growth. Traditionally, with the aim of accounting
for long-term impact and to concentrate the business cycle e⁄ects, the dependent variable,
GDP growth, has been included as a forward-looking moving-average.5 Levine and Renelt
(1992) and more recently Bleaney et al (2001) have revealed the volatility of the results to
the process of averaging and evidence the necessity of ￿nding another methodology that
make results more stable. Since them several attempts have tried to establish such a new
framework: Basanini and Scarpetta (2001) and Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) consider
the possibility that the poor precision in the results is due to the necessity of discriminating
between short-term and long-term e⁄ects of ￿scal variables on growth. For their purpose
they propose two di⁄erent frameworks: Basanini and Scarpetta (2001) rely on the use of the
Pooled Mean Group Estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) while Romero de Avila
and Strauch (2003) base their analysis on the cointegration relations among the variables in
levels in the framework proposed by Jones (1995).
However, the volatility of the results, criticised strongly by Levine and Renelt (1992),
does not imply that the problem necessarily lies with not discriminating between the short
term and the long term e⁄ects. As proposed by Gupta et al (2005), the problem could lie in
the fact that the moving-average process for the dependent variable does not take properly
into account the dynamic nature of growth regressions. The omission of dynamic relations
among the variables could thus lead to biased estimations.
In this paper we use a dynamic panel data model, which has not been previously used,
to explore the problem of whether reallocating public expenditure in Europe could promote
economic growth. More precisely, we estimate an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
model, with lags in the dependent and explanatory variables. We judge that ignoring those
5Usually averaging over 5 years




dynamics could be an important source of bias. In fact, we show that the use of the same
data to estimate the equivalent static model yields signi￿cantly di⁄erent results. We estimate
our dynamic model using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This
estimator deals with one of the main shortcomings that may appear in regressions relating
growth to public expenditure: the possibility that some of the explanatory variables could be
endogenous. After having estimated the coe¢ cients from the ARDL model, we can compute
long-run coe¢ cients from them, by assuming that the economy is at its steady state and all
the variables grow at a constant rate.
The paper also sheds light on another unexplored issue and introduces a new question to
this strand of the literature. Our proposal is based on the developments of economic theory.
The ￿rst attempts to introduce public expenditure in general equilibrium models have tra-
ditionally relied on the assumption that public expenditure a⁄ects economic growth through
productivity. But more recent developments also consider the existence of distortionary
public spending, that a⁄ect the supply and demand of both production factors, capital and
labor. Unlike economic theory, empirical studies have not traditionally paid attention to the
way in which public expenditure may have a⁄ected economic growth6. Previous work tries
to explore the question whether reallocation of public expenditure may a⁄ect growth, but it
does not infer whether it does so by a⁄ecting the production factor markets or by altering
their productivity.
By using three di⁄erent alternative dependent variables, we are able to know more about
the channel through which each category of public expenditure may a⁄ect growth. The
comparison between the e⁄ects of reallocating public expenditure on GDP growth, labor
productivity and multifactor productivity will help us to discriminate whether the e⁄ects
come from alterations in the labor market, in the private capital goods market or in the
productivity of the factors.
We also want to carry our analysis a little further and analyze how the disaggregation
of data of public expenditure may a⁄ect the results of ￿scal policy studies. Following the
classi￿cation made by the IMF, two ways of disaggregating public spending are generally
accepted. The ￿rst one is the distinction between public capital expenditure and public cur-
rent spending. The second one is the so-called ·functional classi￿cation￿ , that distinguishes
6with the notable exception of some studies based on simultaneous equation models (Mitze (2007), Fan
et al. (2000), Alesina et al. (1993)). These studies, however, do not focus their attention in the distribution
of public expenditure and, therefore, do not include disaggregated ￿scal data.
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categories according to their ￿nal use (education, health, etc.). Both of them have been used
interchangeably to analyze changes in ￿scal policy. We check the sensitivity of our results
to the two methods of disaggregation.
Using yearly data from 17 European countries for the period 1971-1998, obtained mainly
from the Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, edited by the IMF, we ￿nd a signi￿cant
positive impact of education spending on growth. We also ￿nd a negative impact of health
and social security expenditures, re￿ ecting, probably, that the level of public expenditure on
these categories may be above its economically optimal level. The functional categories of
public expenditure considered a⁄ect economic growth mainly by altering multifactor produc-
tivity, since we are able to estimate a similar value for the coe¢ cient when we regress either
GDP growth, labor productivity growth or TFP growth on those variables. We also ￿nd a
negative impact of public capital expenditure on growth, but in this case the mechanism is
di⁄erent, since the growth-retarding e⁄ect is caused by the crowding-out e⁄ect from public
to private investment. This is revealed by the signi￿cant di⁄erences in the estimations when
we use TFP growth as the dependent variable instead of GDP growth.
Section 1.2 presents an introduction to the inclusion of policy in￿ uences on growth,
section 1.3 includes a literature review, section 1.4 describes the variables and data sources,
section 1.5 introduces the methodology used and describes the results and ￿nally section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Overview of policy in￿ uences on economic growth
The traditional fully-exogenous growth models have been shown not to replicate stylized
macroeconomic facts. Many extensions from the Neoclassical growth model are able to allow
for government policy to a⁄ect the short-term growth rate, and even the level of growth in the
long-term path by letting the e¢ ciency of the economy to be related to institutional settings.
Endogenous growth models are also able to replicate the in￿ uence of policy on growth, very
often linking the contribution of the public sector to the process of productivity growth.
Public policy may intervene, not only via productivity growth but also in the process
of accumulation of physical and human capital. A policy which may have positive e⁄ects
on productivity growth may also at the same time have a negative e⁄ect on the supply of
physical or human capital, for example. Increases in the rate of accumulation of physical
capital may lead in a neoclassical growth model to a transitional period of increased output
GONZÁLEZ ALEGRE, Juan (2008), The Distribution of Public Expenditure in Europe 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/22381.2. OVERVIEW OF POLICY INFLUENCES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 5
growth, while endogeous growth models allow for more permanent e⁄ects on the steady state
growth rate. Romer (1986) also introduces externalities to capital whereby private returns
to scale may be disminishing, social return- relating for example to some externality on labor
productivity induced by the new capital- can be increasing. Is this case the government has
incentives to in￿ uence the rate of investment in physical capital either directly or by a⁄ecting
incentives to invest in the private sector. The role of human capital can be analogous to
that of physical capital. Advances in technological progress often have a strong link with
education. Education may contribute not only via increases in the skill of the workforce but
may also reinforce innovation processes.
Economic theory has considered several channels through which public policy may a⁄ect
economic growth rates. Many recent studies examine the way in which the public sector
may in￿ uence growth via research and development. Technological development is at least
partially an endogenous process, that may be monitored by the government either by direct
provision and funding but also through indirect measures that a⁄ect private sector R&D.
An important issue to be considered is whether the relationship between public and private
Research and Development expenditure is one of complementarity or substitution. Fagerberg
(1987) models technological progress as the outcome of intentional R&D activities pursuing
pro￿ts, while Jones and Williams (1998) outline several forms of negative spillover, such that
social returns to R&D can be lower than private returns.
Several theories have also suggested the bene￿ts that the openness to international
trade of a country may have for its economy (Coe and Helpman (1995), Ben-David and
Kimhi(2004)), via economies of scale, via exposure to competition and via the di⁄usion of
knowledge. Trade may also be endogenous to the process of growth. Moreover, small coun-
tries are by default more exposed to foreign trade. This is the reason why many of the trade
indicators used in estimations are usually adjusted for country size.
Monetary policy is also a key framework for the public sector to a⁄ect the economy.
The main channel of relation is the e⁄ect that in￿ ation may have on investment. The e⁄ect
is direct, because it increases the cost of investment projects7, and may also be indirect
since the increase of uncertainty provoked by high levels of in￿ ation may also a⁄ect private
investment (Barro (1980))
7See De Gregorio (1993) and Jones and Manuelli (1993), although previous results suggest the contrary
relation (Tobin (1965))
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Finally, ￿scal policy, which is the object of this study, has also been suggested as an im-
portant determinant of growth. We focus our analysis on public expenditure policy, although
taxation and de￿cits may also a⁄ect growth. Taxes could distort incentives and change de-
cisions about the allocation of resources (Barro and Sala i Martin (1992), Mendoza and
Tesar (1998)). In fact the possible ways of taxation may be often classi￿ed as distortionary
and non-distortionary depending on their impact on private decisions. High de￿cits have
also often been linked to slowdowns in growth, with the traditional argument of increasing
crowding-out e⁄ects on the private sector.
1.2.1 Neoclassical growth with public expenditure
In this subsection we will extend the simplest model of endogenous growth to assess
several ways in which public expenditure could a⁄ect economic growth. Economic theory
has considered several channels through which public expenditure may a⁄ect growth. In
particular, public expenditure may a⁄ect the productivity of the private factors or the process
of accumulation of private capital. It may also have an impact on human capital or could
be considered a consumption good entering in the utility function. We include all these
alternative types of public expenditure in an otherwise standard AK model.
Traditionally, growth regressions have not paid attention to the channel through which
public expenditure a⁄ects growth. Nevertheless, this information can be extremely useful for
the policy maker as well as in understanding the mechanisms of public expenditure. Previous
estimations have relied on the assumption of public expenditure as a separate input in the
production function.8 This would imply that the impact of public expenditure on economic
growth would be equivalent to that on multifactor productivity.9 The theoretical framework
that we develop here aims to introduce the use of alternative dependent variables (labour
productivity and total factor productivity) as a way to identify and discriminate several
types of public expenditure.
Let us assume an economy in which there are four types of public expenditure in an
extended version of the AK model, which are represented by a productivity-enhancing type
of public expenditure, (G1), a capital-enhancing type of public expenditure, (G2), a labour-
enhancing type of public expenditure (G3), and a publicly provided consumption good (G4)
8See Devarajan et al. (1996) and Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003), for example.
9There is a large literature about the shortcomings and the modi￿cations that should be made to the
Solow residual so as it represents productivity more accurately. It is not the aim of this paper to enter this
discussion. A good description of state of the art can be found in Hulten (2000).
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Since the proposals by Aschauer (1989) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), public
expenditure modelled as a separate input in the production function has been used very often
in economic theory. We will assume a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to
scale over all inputs. In this framework, considering public expenditure as a separate input
in the production function is equivalent to incorporating it as a part of the technological
constraint that determines total factor productivity:10







We assume constant returns to scale11 over the private inputs.12 If labor and private
capital markets were not a⁄ected by public expenditure, the equilibrium amounts of both
factors of production remain constant to alterations on public expenditure. That means
that the e⁄ect of G1 on labor productivity growth and total factor productivity growth is
similar to the impact on production growth. The use of these three alternative dependent
variables, as proposed in this paper, would make no sense if there were no other e⁄ect of
public expenditure on growth. The coe¢ cient to be estimated would be ￿1 on each case.
The capital-enhancing type of public expenditure (G2) responds to the cost-function
approach of public expenditure proposed by several authors13 to the problems introduced
by the inclusion of public investment as a separate argument in the production function,
as in G1, which may violate the standard marginal productivity theory. Demetriades and
Mamuneas (2004) study the reaction of output towards a type of public expenditure that
a⁄ects the cost function of the private sector . In our case, we will make use of the simplest
way of a⁄ecting the price of public capital, by considering G2 to be a subsidy to the purchase
of private capital, as proposed by Devarajan et al. (1998). Taking to be s a parameter lying
in the interval (0,1) representing the non-subsidized share of private capital, the subsided
private capital paid through the capital-enhancing type of public expenditure will be:14
10We can either consider G1 as a separate input or as a determinant of A. This last option is more general
since it allows for a negative impact of public expenditure on productivity, which seems counterintuitive if
public expenditure is considered as an input. However, empirical evidence (De la Fuente (1997)) suggests
that public expenditure could also induce negative e⁄ects in productivity growth.
11Aschauer (1989) also consider the case in which the congestion e⁄ects make the assumption of increasing
returns inappropiate and alternatively assumes constant returns over all inputs. In fact Devarajan, Swaroop
and Zou (1996), use it to claim that there is an optimal share of distributing public expenditure among
the di⁄erent possible categories of expenditure that maximices growth. It would not introduce, however,
relevant variations on our analysis here.
12￿ + ￿ = 1; ￿;￿ > 0:
13A complete motivation may be found in Romp and de Haan (2007).
14The introduction of this type of public expenditure usually responds to rigidities in the capital markets:
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G2t = (1 ￿ st)Kt
G3 will be the labour-enhancing type of public expenditure that will be able to a⁄ect
the labor market. Corsetti and Roubini (1996) include a very complete proposal of how
the impact of public expenditure on human capital could be modelled, while Van der Ploeg
(2006) includes public employment as a determinant of private labor supply. Following
Agenor (2007), we assume that the labor supply of the economy15 depends not only on the
level of population of the country and the wage rate, but also on the purchase by the public
administration of some goods and services, such as education or health (G3), that enhances








where N t is the total population of the country at time t and wt is the level of wages
at time t. Wages are determined as in a market equilibrium, as the point in which marginal
product and marginal cost of labor are identical. G3 re￿ ects the direct impact that economic
theory admits that public expenditure may have on the behavior of the labor market. Certain
types of public expenditure may provide incentives for the entry of additional labor in the
economy (for example, appropriate education or health systems). But we could also ￿nd some
other form of public expenditure that withdraws labor supply from the market,16 either per
se (expenditure in culture or recreation could increase the value of leisure), or by using an
important amount of labor supply to provide the public services (as described in Agenor
(2007)).
We ￿nally assume that part of the public budget may be devoted to a fourth type of
public expenditure represented by a consumption good, that does not enter in the production
function but instead augments the utility of the population. An in￿nitely-lived representative
Demetriadis and Mamuneas (2004) consider adjustment costs; Moreno et al. (2003) assume short term
rigidities; and Devarajan et al. (1998) instead introduce it as a response to the existence of a positive
externality attached to the subsidized capital. Our model assumes that public expenditure on G2 incentives
private investment, although the situation could also be the opposite.
15Our view is slightly di⁄erent, since Agenor (2007) considers also that only a constant portion of the
population is educated and a separate labor market for the teachers that provide this education (equivalent
to our G2).
16Alesina et al. (2002) presents evidence of the negative impact of public wages expenditure on private
investment and pro￿ts, that could support the existence of a negative impact on labor supply of some types
of public expenditures.
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household in this economy would therefore maximize the discounted stream of future utility









where Ct represents the amount of the private consumption good purchased by the
representative consumer in period t, while G4;t is the publicly provided consumption good,
decided by the government.17 The inclusion of public expenditure in the utility function of
the representative consumer will have consequences on the savings rate and, therefore, in
the growth path of private capital. As long as a certain level of complementarity exists,
an increase in public consumption enhances the marginal utility of the private consumption
goods, which would lead consumers to increase their consumption and, therefore, alter also
their pattern of investment. On the other hand, if we assume that both consumption goods,
private and public consumption, are perfect substitutes, an increase in public consumption
could lead to a decrease on the demand for the private consumption good, enhancing private
investment. In either of these cases, the outcome of our model about the long-term neutrality
of publicly provided consumtion goods would remain unaltered.
The public administration decides on G1; G2, G3 and G4 and ￿nances public expenditure
levying a tax on production with a constant tax rate ￿: It is not the purpose of this paper
to solve the optimal ￿scal policy to be run by the government since our estimations do
not assume that governments set taxes and expenditures optimally.18 We introduce a tax
on consumption, aware that in this framework it does not introduce any distortion on the
results, with the purpose of setting up a model in which public expenditure is, at least
partially, ￿nanced by tax revenues.19
17We have chosen the inclusion of the publicly provided consumption good directly in the household￿ s
utility based on Turnovsky (1999), and Baier and Glomm (2001) since certain degree of complementariry
is desired.Other authors prefer to assume public consumption to be additively separable from private con-
sumption (Cassou and Lansing (2004)) as in fact we do for simplicity in the second and third chapter of this
thesis. For the sake of our analysis here, however, the inclusion of G4 only makes sense under a more general
framework in which there is complementarity between the private consumption good and the public good.
18Complete theoretical predictions about optimal ￿scal policy may be consulted in Corsetti and Roubini
(1996) for a general framework, Werning (2007) for a model with heterogeneous agents, and Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) for an overlaping generations model.
19An income tax or a tax on corporate pro￿t would introduce alterations on the propensity of the repre-
sentative agent to save and consume. Afonso and Gonzalez Alegre (2007) includes in addition an analysis of
the e⁄ects of several types of taxation in which it is shown how in this framework a consumption-tax do not
a⁄ect production in the long-term in contrast to labor-income and pro￿ts taxation.
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￿Ct = G1;t + G2;t + G3;t + G4;t + Ht
where H t is the budget surplus (de￿cit) in period t. We have to take into account the
behavior of the representative agent towards ￿scal policy in order to work out the impact of
the ￿scal variables on production and productivity growth. The representative household,
takes the decision of the government as exogenous, owns the technology, and distributes its
income between private consumption and purchase of private capital for the next period. We
also assume, for simplicity, total depreciation of private capital and the publicly provided
input. That yields the following budget constraint:
Yt = (1 + ￿)Ct + st+1Kt+1 (1.4)
The Euler equation that results from the representative household maximizing the utility














We are going to see now how the relationship of production, labor productivity and
multifactor productivity with our four types of public expenditure is not identical among
them. From equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.5) we can derive the impact of all three types of



















20Capital letters denote variables in levels while small letters are growth rates, following the standard
notation.
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￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿
(1.9)
where ￿ = (1+￿)(1￿￿)￿￿￿: The derivative
@yt
@g4;t￿1 has identical value to
@yt
@g4;t but with
opposite sign. This means that public consumption, unlike expenditure on G1, G2 or G3;can
only provoke a sustainable impact on growth when the change is permanent. Otherwise it
will produce a current impact of growth that will be counterbalanced in the next period
when the level of public consumption returns to its previous level.


































is the growth rate of labor productivity. The coe¢ cients for G1;G2
and G4 are almost identical to those derived in the equations for production. They are
only slightly smaller because of the decrease in the numerator induced by the indirect e⁄ect
that those types of public expenditure have on labor supply via wages. But the coe¢ cient
attached to the labor-enhancing type of expenditure, G3, has opposite sign. This happens
because if G3 is able to increment production by increasing the labor supply available in the
economy, decreasing returns to scale of a single factor on the production function will impose
this productivity loss. Therefore we could identify a labor-enhancing public expenditure if
we estimate opposite signs when regressing production and labor productivity growth on
this variable.
Finally, the regression of TFP on G2, G3 and G4 should yield insigni￿cant coe¢ cients,
while the e⁄ect of G1 is still ￿1: The productivity enhancing type of public expenditure may
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be thus easily identi￿ed since it is the only one that have a signi￿cative impact on TFP. The
value of the coe¢ cient that the describes the e⁄ect of G1 on TFP should also be very close
to the coe¢ cients relative to production and labor productivity. There are small di⁄erences
among them depending on the value of the elasticities of substitutions of capital and labor.
The reason for this is the indirect impact that G1 has on factor markets because of the
changes on the marginal productivities of capital and labor induced by a larger production.
The following table summarizes the set up of our model:
Those relations assume values for the parameters that ensure a positive impact on current production of current expenditure,
namely, J1>0, 0 > st > 1 J3>0 and 0 > θ > 1.
no effect no effect no effect + TFP
only short time eff. - + + Labour Prod.









Those relations assume values for the parameters that ensure a positive impact on current production of current expenditure,
namely, J1>0, 0 > st > 1 J3>0 and 0 > θ > 1.
no effect no effect no effect + TFP
only short time eff. - + + Labour Prod.









Table1: Types of public expenditure and their relation with alternative measures of growth
This brief analysis will serve us to give a better interpretation of the coe¢ cients estimated
in section 1.5, and help us to infer which types of public expenditure are more related to
the G1;G2, G3 and G4 described here. A good example of such inference are the positive
coe¢ cients associated to education in table 6. One may expect that education increases
the productivity of the population. But we could also be concerned about the fact that
public education could also withdraw an important amount of population from the labor
market -acting like G3 with a negative sign-, which could imply a growth-retarding e⁄ect.
Our results reject that last possibility and con￿rm that public instruction has a signi￿cant
positive impact on growth through enhancing productivity.
1.3 Literature review: Estimating the impact of public expenditures
The e⁄ects of government spending on growth have been the subject of many empirical
studies. Although some of these studies (Ram (1986)) are based on time series studies, the
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most used approach has been use the analysis of cross country data. Two pioneering studies
in this vein are those by Barro (1991) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). They highlight the
relation of ￿scal structure with growth as well as try to identify which of the ways of spending
public funds encourages growth They also look at other economic variables that indirectly
a⁄ects growth. Barro (1991) uses a static equation on 98 countries and introduces a great
variety of variables. He estimates 23 possible equations using White￿ s heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) replicate the work by Barro (1991)
introducing a broader variety of ￿scal variables. They also introduce the use of cross-country
time series data to estimate a panel data model.
The results concerning ￿scal variables are still quite variable among the di⁄erent stud-
ies. Levine and Renelt (1992) in fact present evidence on the non-robustness of the results
presented by the empirical growth literature, and the sensitivity of the results to changes in
the conditioning set of variables. Miller and Russek (1997), using a panel of annual data for
39 countries, show that the e⁄ect on growth of changes in expenditure depends signi￿cantly
on the way this change on expenditure is ￿nanced.
A ￿rst attempt to answer the critics was made by Devarajan et al. (1996), making
use of economic theory to claim that the e⁄ect on growth induced by some kinds of public
expenditure may depend on the initial level of expenditure. That is probably one of the
reasons why subsequent work did not include developed and developing countries in the
same panel, which had been quite a common practice in previous studies. Indeed, the use of
a more homogeneous panel country sample seems to be a more adequate approach.
Kneller et al. (1999) showed that most of the previous research had ignored the gov-
ernment budget constraint thereby introducing a signi￿cant bias into the regression of the
coe¢ cients. The government budget constraint implies that the estimated coe¢ cient of each
￿scal element within a growth regression will depend on how it is ￿nanced. The omission
of elements of the budget of the government introduces implicit assumptions about the ￿-
nancing of the variables included (it will be necessary to omit one variable to avoid perfect
collinearity). They compare the results from their ￿xed-e⁄ects linear model estimated by
OLS, with those from an instrumental variable estimation to conclude that the results of
the OLS estimation were not caused by the endogeneity of the variables. But they also ￿nd
that the results are sensitive to the 5-year averaging that they apply to the data to control
for the business cycle. This result is reinforced in Bleaney et al (2001), while Odedokun
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(2001) uses 5-year moving averages for estimating a panel data model for 103 countries clas-
si￿ed in four groups, arguing that it is also an e⁄ective way to control for the endogeneity
of the explanatory variables. He also sets up a ￿xed-e⁄ects model estimated using White￿ s
heteroskedasticity-consistent technique.
The ￿ndings in Kneller et al. (1999) will be taken into account in the subsequent studies.
Bose et al (2003) in a panel of thirty developing countries use decade-averaged data for the
seventies and the eighties. They estimate their linear equation using seemingly-unrelated
regression, that allows for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the error term. They
also compare their results to those obtained using three-stage least squares to check for
endogeneity as well as to expand the set of regressors to control for the e⁄ect of monetary
policy or degree of openness. Robustness checks are performed, but the main weakness of
their results is the small amount of data used to run the estimations, as well as, again, the
year averaging technique.
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) instead argue that the use of data averaging implies a
loss of information that such studies cannot a⁄ord. The lack of synchronicity in country
business cycles does not purge ￿ve-years average from cyclical in￿ uences. They use the
Pooled Mean Group Estimator that distinguishes between short and long-run e⁄ects. The
main shortcoming of the use of this technique is the large number of coe¢ cients to be
estimated with a relatively small set of data.
Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) and Tomljanovich (2004) also estimate short-term
and long-term e⁄ects of the ￿scal variables on growth in the same equation, but using a
di⁄erent approach, which is based on Jones (1995). The method relies on the speci￿cation
of an equation based on an AK model with non-stationary ￿scal variables (in levels) to dis-
criminate the long-term e⁄ect on growth from the short term e⁄ect attached to the variables
in ￿rst di⁄erences.
Gupta et al. (2005) set up a dynamic equation instead of data averaging to de￿ne
long-term relationships. This article also contains an interesting study of the di⁄erent speci-
￿cations that the equation could take, and a comparison between the results that should be
obtained using di⁄erent estimation methods. They ￿nd that the results are quite robust to
those changes.
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1.3.1 Main Results
Traditionally, the dependent variables chosen to study the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on
growth has been GDP growth in real and per capita terms. Some studies (see table 1), how-
ever, use an indicator of productivity such a total factor productivity or labor productivity
(Cellini (1997), Englander and Gurney (1994) among others). The use of alternative de-
pendent variables could a⁄ect the results of the estimates corresponding public expenditure,
as we have just described in section 1.2. Regarding the control variables, the signi￿cance of
demographic and labor force variables may also change among our three di⁄erent speci￿ca-
tions.
The ￿rst level of disaggregation of public expenditure, on an economic basis, is to break
it into just current and capital expenditure. Barro (1998) ￿nds that growth is inversely
related to the share of government consumption in GDP, the relation with the share of
capital expenditure is insigni￿cant. The ￿rst result has been broadly con￿rmed by posterior
studies, however the implications of the share of capital expenditure to economic growth seem
to depend on the set of countries in which the regression is run. The excess of expenditure
on an a priori productive category of expenditure may make it unproductive. The relation
seems to be insigni￿cant or negative for developed countries while there is a positive relation
of the share of capital expenditure with growth in developing countries.21
When public expenditure is disaggregated according to its function, the results are usu-
ally dependent also basically on the level of current expenditure of the set of countries. There
seems to exists an excess of expenditure in Health for the high income countries, that would
retard growth. The level of expenditure on infrastructure on transport an communication
seems to be rather low in developing countries according to Kneller,et al (1999) and Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) and negative or insigni￿cant for developed countries (Odedokun (2001),
Bose (2003)).
The relation of expenditure on Defense with growth is quite controversial. Devarajan et
al. (1996) ￿nd a negative relation of defense expenditure and growth for developing countries.
However Barro (1991) classi￿es defense as a productive category of expenditure because it
helps to protect property rights (Barro￿ s work includes 98 countries, both developed and
developing), and Bose et al. (2003) ￿nd a weak positive signi￿cant association between
defense expenditure and growth. Aschauer (1988), who studies the relation of di⁄erent
21See Devarajan et al. (1996), Odedokun (2001), Bose et al. (2003)
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types of public expenditure on productivity, concludes that public expenditure on defense
has a weak association with productivity movements.
The ￿nancing of public spending, as explained above, becomes a complementary study to
the computation of optimal levels of spending. There is a huge literature also trying to de￿ne
the e⁄ects on private behavior of alterations on the levels of taxation (Stokey and Rebelo
(1995), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Jones and Manuelli (1993)). Given optimal levels of
taxation, the counterpart to alterations of government spending is the budget balance. There
are some recent studies trying to identify the role of the de￿cit on economic growth. Perotti
(1999) shows that consolidations tends to be expansionary when the debt is high. Other
studies (Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Von Hagen and Strauch,
(2001)) show how the e⁄ect of a ￿scal impulse is dependent on public budget composition.
So, cuts in transfers and wages for example tend to cause and expansion while cuts in public
investment tend to be contractionary. Baldacci et al. (2001) perform an empirical study of
the impact of initial conditions on the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy.
A third issue of interest is the nexus between the composition of ￿scal de￿cit ￿nancing
and growth. The e⁄ect that ￿scal consolidations may have in private investment also in-
directly a⁄ect economic growth, by altering aggregate demand and money variables (Khan
and Senhadji (2001), Sarel (1996)). Gupta et al. (2005) show for a group of developing
countries the desirability that de￿cits are ￿nanced by external debt. The e⁄ects of changes
on in￿ ation and public spending are expected however to be quite diverse from developing
to developed countries.
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1.4 Statistical Data and Descriptive Analysis
1.4.1 Data
As described earlier, the main goal of the present study is to analyze the implications
on growth of ￿scal policy in Europe, in particular regarding expenditure composition and
budget balance of the government. Data for the variables where obtained mainly from two
sources: the Government Financial Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) published annually by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Development Indicators CD-Rom network.
The empirical analysis uses annual data on 17 European countries22 from 1970 to 1998,
with some gaps,23 depending on the availability of the data. The choice of the countries source
of data has been made by trying to include only countries that share structural economic
homogeneity in Europe. For this reason we have omitted countries whose economies are or
have recently passed through structural changes due to political reasons, like those belonging
to the Soviet Union. This is motivated by the results found by Miller and Russek (1997) in
which they show that the inclusion of heterogeneous economies with high di⁄erences in their
level of development in a unique sample may lead to unprecise estimates.
As introduced above, this study uses three alternative dependent variables: per capita
GDP growth, labor productivity growth and total factor productivity growth. The measure
for GDP has been extracted from the World Development Indicators database elaborated
by the World Bank, expressed in constant local currency units at market prices. Labor
productivity growth has been computed from the variable real GDP per worker growth
in PPP, obtained from the Penn World Table elaborated by the Center for International
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). Finally the data for TFP have
been kindly provided by the International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA).
22Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
23The econometric methods used here can be easily accomodated to the estimation of unbalanced panel
data, under the assumption of lack of serial correlation and the existence of a minimal number of continuous
time period observations for each unit.
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* Historical Government Finance Statistics CD-rom (1972-1989 and Government Finance Statistics
CD-rom (1990-1998) International Monetary Fund. The data are also available in the Government
finance statistics yearbook
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Table 3: Description of variables and data sources
Regarding the expenditure side of ￿scal variables, we will use the functional classi￿ca-
tion from our main source of data, which is the Government Financial Statistics Yearbook
(GFSY) published annually by the International Monetary Fund. This classi￿cation divide
the expenditure into fourteen main categories, of which ￿ve are treated as an homogeneous
group (Economic a⁄airs and services). We have also obtained from the GFSY the data for
the variables concerning the government￿ s revenue which are included to take into account
the government￿ s budget constraint. Alternatively we also consider the classi￿cation that
discriminates between capital and current public expenditure. The data in the GFSY are
expressed in constant local currency and have been transformed into percentages of the GDP
and into percentages of total public expenditure.
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We have also considered some variables that have often been included in previous studies
as conditioning on growth regressions. Levine and Renelt (1992) identify the investment
share of GDP , the initial level of GDP per capita, the initial secondary school enrollment
rate and the average annual rate of population growth as variables that always need to be
included in the regression. Instead of the investment share of GDP, we will consider a measure
of private investment (as done by Bose et al. (2003)) to avoid a possible multicollinearity
problem with any expenditure variable. We consider the labor force growth rate rather
than a population indicator to control for labor supply variations. The terms of trade has
been included in some other studies. All these variables have been obtained from the World
Development Indicators. (See table 3)
The main shortcoming that may be found in those data is that they only cover the op-
erations of central governments. The volume of expenditure of regional governments may
be quite signi￿cant in some cases and for some categories of expenditure like health or ed-
ucation that are often run by regional governments. Nevertheless, Devarajan et al. (1996)
￿nd that the di⁄erences between the coe¢ cients obtained using the data for the general
consolidated government and those obtained using only central government expenditure sta-
tistically insigni￿cant in a regression quite similar to the one presented in this paper. We
explore further the relationship of decentralization with public expenditure distribution in
the second chapter of this thesis.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
1.4.2 Fiscal policy and growth: bivariate analysis
In table 5 we report simple correlations of the variables which are the main objective
of interest of the study with the three alternative dependent variables: GDP growth, labor
force growth and Total Factor Productivity . Correlation coe¢ cients are calculated using
the Spearman rank correlation formula to avoid the e⁄ects of outliers.
There is a signi￿cant association between de￿cit, expenditure composition and growth
consistent with previous ￿ndings. The result that stronger budget balances are positively
associated with per capita growth is not new. Regarding the composition of public expendi-
ture, capital spending has traditionally been thought as a source of economic growth, while
current expenditure is considered as less favorable for economic development.
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Regarding functional categories of expenditure, Defense, Social Security and Economics
A⁄airs and Services are also found to be related to GDP growth.
.
Bilateral correlation   * Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval




























































































Bilateral correlation   * Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval




























































































Table 5: Bivariate correlations (variables expresed as percentage of GDP)
These preliminary results are consistent with other consulted in previous literature, that
show balanced budgets and investment in transport (included in Economic A⁄airs and Ser-
vices) as being consistently correlated with growth. However, for Social Security and Defense
there does not exist such unanimity, especially concerning Defense as detailed below.
1.5 Econometric Analysis
1.5.1 The econometric models
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The growth equations can be derived from a growth model built around a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. If countries were at their steady state, or if deviations from
the steady state were random, growth equations would depend on the relationship between
steady￿ state output and its determinants. Under the hypothesis that ￿scal variables have an
in￿ uence on long term growth, we include them in a regression of GDP, labor productivity or
TFP growth rates on variables that the literature has identi￿ed as determinants for economic
growth.
The equation relating disaggregated public expenditure and output growth has been
traditionally speci￿ed as a static relation. Sometimes it can be thought of a "quasi-dynamic"
approach, from the fact that many authors have chosen to substitute the dependent variable
for a 5-year forward moving average of GDP growth, with the aim of purging out the business
cycle e⁄ects.
Growth relationships are dynamic in nature, as growth in a given period is not uncorre-
lated with past growth trends. Parameter estimates based on a static ￿xed-e⁄ects estimator
are biased and inconsistent if the true model is not static, even when the error terms are not
serially correlated. For that reason we propose a panel data model that includes unobserved
country speci￿c e⁄ects and allowing for the existence of lagged values of the variables. Only
Gupta et al (2005) introduce a lag of the dependent variable in an alternative speci￿cation
to the speci￿cation they propose. However, no lags of explanatory variables are considered.
We want to allow for the possibility that the variations of past ￿scal variables may still a⁄ect
current variations in growth. Specially regarding some kinds of public expenditures, it seems
plausible to consider that the e⁄ects of some policies may take some time to appear.
In addition to the variables that are the object of study, some other variables that may
a⁄ect output growth must be included in the estimated equation. The dynamic speci￿cation
of this equation to be estimated from panel data can be expressed as an ARDL model:






jfiscali;t￿j + ￿iotherit + "it (1.14)
for i = 1;2;:::;N; t = 1;2;:::;T:
The estimate of such models is done using the method proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). The GMM estimate also controls for endogeneity by using the lagged values of the
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levels of the endogenous and the predetermined variables as instruments. It is necessary to
test for the validity of the instruments as well as the presence of serial correlation in the
residuals once the equation has been estimated.
Estimates made by the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure are made by the one step
procedure, since the two step procedure has been found to lead to biased downward standard
errors for small samples. They also develop a one step robust procedure for the cases in
which heteroskedasticity exists. There is no need to use the robust estimator in this study
due to the characteristics of the data ( furthermore, the gains in precision of the two steps
procedure are more relevant also in the presence of heteroskedasticity). The Sargan test of
over identifying restrictions over-rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity with the one
step procedure, which will not be an drawback in our case since our data are not suspected
of heteroskedasticity and in any case the Sargan test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
Long-run relationships between the variables may be easily derived from the estimation
of equation (1.14). An economy on its steady state is assumed to show a constant rate of
growth,and therefore identical values for the variables over time. Imposing this condition we











Standard errors for coe¢ cients obtained with this procedure may be easily computed
using Stata. They are computed applying a delta method. A general discussion of this
method can be found in Wooldridge (2002)
As we have previously justi￿ed, we want to discriminate e⁄ects on economic growth
through changes in production factors markets from e⁄ects through changes in productivity
by considering three alternative dependent variables: GDP per capita growth, labor pro-
ductivity growth and total factor productivity growth. Labor productivity is the fraction of
production for worker. We shall expect that when a ￿scal variable induces an e⁄ect on GDP
growth through altering the equilibria levels of labor supply, such an e⁄ect would dissappear,
or even be reversed because of the decreasing returns to a single production factor, when
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we regress labor productivity on that ￿scal variable. The same reasoning would serve us to
unmask simultaneous alterations from the same variable: one variable could for example en-
hance growth through productivity and simultaneously push down the supply of labor force,
which could explain why we ￿nd an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient when we regress GDP growth on
this variable.
Total factor productivity is a measure that indicates the part of growth in production
that has not been induced by the alteration of the levels of both production factors. Initially
computed as the Solow residual, there exists an extensive literature about re￿nements to be
made on its computation as well as on its shortcomings.24 By using TFP as a dependent
variable, we estimate the e⁄ects that our variables of interest may induce in economic growth
independently of the alterations on the production factors, i.e. exclusively through changes
on productivity.
Simultaneously, we will consider two di⁄erent speci￿cations of the models, as suggested
in Gupta et al. (2005). Recalling the results by Kneller et al. (1999) described in the
literature review, it is necessary to take into account the government budget constraint to
make a correct interpretation of the coe¢ cients. In Model A, ￿scal variables will be measured
as a share of GDP omitting the variable that represents the ￿scal balance (surplus). The
purpose is to capture the e⁄ects of a particular expenditure categories assuming increases or
decreases on government de￿cit as the source of ￿nancing . In Model B the ￿scal variables
are also measured as a percentage of GDP but we exclude from the government budget the
variable tax revenues. The assumption in this model is therefore, that any possible change
in public expenditure would be ￿nanced by altering the level of tax revenues, keeping the
level of de￿cit and the other ￿scal variables constant.
The description of each of the two alternative speci￿cations are:
Model A: Public de￿cit as source of ￿nance:






jfiscali;t￿j + ￿iotherit + "it (1.16)
where yi;t is the growth rate of real GDP per worker; otherit is a vector of non￿scal
variables often included in other similar regressions consulted in the relevant literature; and
24We have included data collected from the International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA)
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fiscalit is a vector of ￿scal variables, the e⁄ect of the composition of the budget on GDP is
the target of this study. These variables are measured in percentage of GDP and include the
main categories of expenditure and revenue considered by the IMF. In order to avoid perfect
collinearity among regressors, as explained above, the budget balance, represented by the
omitted variable surplus, is not included. The coe¢ cient accompanying expenditure variables
will represent then, the e⁄ect on the dependent of increasing the amount of spending in the
variable, ￿nanced by an increase in the de￿cit, or a decrease in the surplus. The coe¢ cients
associated with revenue variables have a similar interpretation, with the only di⁄erence that
an increase on a revenue variable would imply a decrease of de￿cit instead.
Model B: Tax revenues as source of ￿nance:






jfisci;t￿j + ￿iotherit + "it (1.17)
where yi;t and otherlt are de￿ned as before, while fisci;t￿j is a vector of ￿scal variables,
as well as before, included with the aim of studying the e⁄ects of the composition of public
expenditure on growth, but taking into account also the e⁄ect of the budget balance and
omitting tax revenues instead. The interpretation of the coe¢ cient associated with the ex-
penditure variables now changes. These coe¢ cients are now relative to the revenues. This
means that they represent the e⁄ect on the dependent variable of a change in the public
expenditure variable corresponding to the coe¢ cient, ￿nanced by an equivalent change in
tax revenues. The coe¢ cient accompanying the variable surplus represents the convenience
of reducing the de￿cit, under the implicit assumption that this would be ￿nanced by the
omitted variable, tax reveneues.
1.5.2 Baseline regressions
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of estimating equations (1.16) and (1.17) with GDP
growth, labour productivity growth and TFP growth as the dependent variables. The results
shown are the long-term coe¢ cients computed from those obtained applying equation (1.15)
after estimating equation (1.14) using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). In practice, we have included two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of the
￿scal variables and private investment. The other two explanatory variables, Terms of trade
and labor force growth, have only been included in levels.
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Table 6 present the results concerning functional categories of public expenditure. Model
A, in columns [1] to [3], assumes that the coe¢ cients attached to public expenditure are
associated to public de￿cit as a source of ￿nance, while model B, in columns [4] to [6]
assumes that the source of ￿nance of additional public expenditure would come from extra
tax-revenues.
The divergence attached to the variable "General Public Services" may reveal precisely
that an increase of public expenditure on this category could be harmful for economic growth
depending on the alterations that this increase would include in the public budget. Moreover,
the fact that the coe¢ cient is not signi￿cantly negative in the regression in which TFP is
the dependent variable and that the coe¢ cients estimated in columns [1] and [2] are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other, suggest that the growth-retarding e⁄ect would come
through alterations in the market for private capital. This type of public expenditure has a
behavior equivalent to the G2 described in section 1.2 with a negative coe¢ cient associated
to it, representative of the so-called "crowding-out" e⁄ect of public expenditure on private
capital.
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Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.
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Table 6: Functional categories of Expenditure. Long-term coe¢ cients.
Nevertheless, we do not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences among the results of
columns [1] to [3] for the rest of categories of public expenditure. For "Defense" , "Housing"
and "Economic A⁄airs" we cannot show any signi￿cant relation with growth, labor produc-
tivity or total factor productivity. As for "Recreation", its negative relation with TFP is
unclear.
Regarding education, our results suggest a positive correlation of the variable with
growth. The larger absolute value and signi￿cance levels of the second and mostly third
columns suggest that education could behave slightly as a consumption good (G4) that re-
tards private investment. But clearly its main role is to increase productivity, behaving like
g1 in section 1.2, and having an overall positive impact on economic growth because of its
impact on multifactor productivity.
There seems to exist a situation of overspending in Health and Social Security policies,
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for the period and countries considered.25 Both types of public expenditure a⁄ect negatively
TFP and therefore, economic growth. They are equivalent to G1 in section 2 with a negative
coe¢ cient attached to it. In the case of "Health" we can see in addition that the coe¢ cients
in columns [2] and [5] are larger in absolute value. This could be due to the fact that this
kind of expenditure could also behave slightly like G3, encouraging small changes in labor
supply. But this e⁄ect would be expected to be much weaker than the negative impact on
productivity.
The di⁄erences between the estimations of models A and B are not dramatic. The
negative coe¢ cients estimated for "tax revenues" in model A together with the one estimated
"General Public Services" make us think that ￿nancing extra expenditure by enlarging public
de￿cit might be slightly more harmful than using taxes instead.
Table 7 show the results for the estimation of models A and B respectively when public
expenditure is disaggregated according to its economic nature, between public capital expen-
diture and public current expenditure. Again we show the long-term coe¢ cients computed
from the dynamic model, in which we have included two lags of the dependent variable and
one lag of the ￿scal variables and private investment:
25This possibility have been addressed by the speci￿c literature about health expenditure (Nixon (2000),
Atun and Fitzpatrick (2005), Suhrcke et al (2006)) and have been focus of the attention of the European
Commission (Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection (2005))
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Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.




































*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval



















































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.




































*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval



















































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table 7: Economic categories of expenditure. Long-term coe¢ cients.
From table 7 we can infer that actually public expenditure is not completely optimally
allocated either if we consider its economic classi￿cation. So, decreasing capital spending to
￿nance a higher share in current expenditure or disminishing tax revenues or public de￿cit
seems to represent an incentive to promote economic growth. The level of capital expenditure
is above its optimal.
The negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient associated with the share of capital expenditure
on GDP may seem against the standard hypothesis, but the comparison of the coe¢ cients
estimated in the three columns are informative about what could be the explanation for
this e⁄ect. According to columns [3] and [6], public capital expenditure does not a⁄ect
TFP signi￿cantly, i.e. the actual level of public capital expenditure is not harmful for the
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productivity of the private factors. But the coe¢ cients estimated in columns [1] , [2], [4]
and [5] are negative and almost identical. This suggests that public capital expenditure
could behave like G2 with a negative sign, acting as a disincentive to private investment
.This crowding-out e⁄ect from public to private capital is the origin of the negative impact
of public capital expenditure on economic growth.
We ￿nd no signi￿cant coe¢ cient attached to current expenditure. Tax revenues, accord-
ing to tables 6 and 7 seems to be slightly growth retarding. The negative coe¢ cient attached
to private investment estimated in equation [3] in all tables is a natural consequence of the
way in which TFP is computed.
We also include in our tables the outcome of some tests on the validity of the model
estimated. The wald test of joint signi￿cance for all the variables entered in x (i.e. a test of
the null hypothesis that their estimated coe¢ cients are all zero. In all cases, we can easily
reject the null.26 The Sargant test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying
restrictions are valid. The Arellano and Bond (1991) test of second order autocorrelation
cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation in all cases for reasonable con￿dence intervals.
For simplicity we do not report here the equivalent test for autocorrelation of order one
since ￿rst-order autocorrelation does not represent a problem for the validity of this GMM
estimator.
The following table links the results reported in tables with the theoretical framework
introduced in section 2. According to the comparison of the estimates in columns (1) to (3)
and (4) to (5) for each variable, we can attach the behavior of our ￿scal variables to the
types of public expenditure described in section 2 and summarized in table 1:
Current
expenditure
Capital Exp. (-) Economic
Categories






















Capital Exp. (-) Economic
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Table 8: The theoretical interpretation of the estimates.
26The critical values for a 99 percent con￿dence interval are 10.20 and 41.64 for the Chi-Square distribution
with 23 degrees of freedom, and 3.05 and 24.72 for the distribution with 11 degrees of freedom. See Bond
and Windmeijer (2002) for more about the accuracy of the one-step Wald tests for GMM estimators in panel
data models.
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Health, for example, presents a negative estimator in all cases. Therefore, according to
table 1, its behavior is more similar to the productivity-enhancing type of public expenditure.
For some categories it is not possible to match the estimates with only one of the types of
public expenditure described in section 2, but they could replicate the behavior of more of
one of them simultaneously. It is the case of public services, whose negative estimates in the
regressions for GDP and labour productivity suggest the behavior of the capital enhancing
type of public expenditure. But the estimates are not identical in columns (1) and (2). This
di⁄erence could mean that this variable is simultaneously behaving as the labour enhancing
type of public expenditure, although the e⁄ect seems weaker.
The relationships that identify some public expenditure variables with the comsumption
type of public expenditure (G4) are only visible in the short-run. Therefore, we can only
observe them in the dynamic model estimated according to equation (1.14) but not in the
long-run coe¢ cients estimated according to equation (1.15) and reported in tables [6] and
[7]. We observe signi￿cant coe¢ cient in the current period and in the lagged period with
similar absolute value but oposite sign for the three categories included in table [8]: "Public
Order and Defence", "Social Security" and "Current expenditure".
1.5.2.1 The importance of the dynamics and comparison with previous results
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix III show the results of the equivalent estimations if
we had considered the variables only in levels. Their conclusions are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the dynamic speci￿cation that we propose. Education would be an obstacle for growth
in the static counterpart of model A, while we have estimated a positive coe¢ cient, the
coe¢ cients associated to Health and Social Security are insigni￿cant instead of negative,
and they estimate a negative correlation of growth with current expenditure, and not with
capital.
These divergences could partly explain the di⁄erences between our analysis and previous
studies. If there exist dynamic relations between the dependent an explanatory variables, we
should expect biased estimations from the static speci￿cations modelled in previous studies.
The di⁄erences in the data sources and time periods, apart from the use of quite hetero-
geneous models and methodology to estimate the e⁄ects of public expenditure on economic
growth, may also be the origin of heterogeneous conclusions. Out of the six studies that
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we describe in the following table to compare with our results, only three of them include a
dataset of developed countries that could be easily compared to our 17 European countries
(Cashin (1995), Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (1999) and the subsection devoted to devel-
oped countries in Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996)). The other three include a dataset of
developing countries from which we might expect di⁄erent relations between ￿scal variables
and growth. However these three studies use the more recent techniques that have been
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Table 9: Summary of previous comparable results.
The coe¢ cients estimated for Education are smaller than the value "1.582" estimated
by Bose et al. (2003) for a set of developing countries and higher than "0.305" estimated by
Odedokun (2001) for developed countries. Devarajan et al. (1996) report a negative coe¢ -
cient for education in the application of their model to a subset of 21 developed countries.
27Table [9] includes a summary of the main results on these studies that could be compared to our
coe¢ cients estimates in tables [6] and [7]. Explanatory variables are expresed on share over GDP unless
speci￿ed.
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They go further and identify University education as the main responsible for this negative
coe¢ cient. In general, the results in Devarajan et al (1996) contradict most of the literature
and our results here. We suspect that the reason for this may be the mispeci￿cation of the
model because of the omission on variables included in the budget constraint, as suggested
by Kneller et al. (1999). We also consider that their Fixed-E⁄ects and OLS estimation
methods ignore the dynamic behavior of the variables that we introduce in this study.
The negative relationship between health expenditure and economic growth in developed
countries has been previously found by Odedokun (2001). Devarajan et al (1996) are not
able to ￿nd a negative coe¢ cient attached to Health in their subset of developed countries.
On the contrary, they ￿nd in a more disaggregated analysis that public expenditure devoted
to hospitals have a positive impact on growth in contrast to the rest of health expenditure.
In contrast with the negative relationship of "Health" and "Social Security and Welfare"
with growth, there is no coincidence of our results with some of the literature on the e⁄ects of
"Economic A⁄airs and Services". This category could be included in what Kneller, Bleaney
and Gemmell (1999) grouped with the denomination of ￿ productive expenditure￿ , for which
them they also ￿nd a positive correlation with growth. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) ￿nd a
signi￿cant positive e⁄ect for expenditure on Transport and Communication on growth. The
category Transport and Communications is one of the subcategories into which "Economic
A⁄airs" is divided and it usually represents around half the amount of the whole category.
On the contrary, we agree with some other studies (Devarajan et al. (1996), Bose et al.
(2003)) who also ￿nd an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient attached to this category of expenditure.
The relation of expenditure to "Defense" with growth is quite weak. Devarajan, Swaroop
and Zou (1996) ￿nd a negative relation of defense expenditure and growth for developing
countries. We have described in the literature review the controversy that exists in the
literature about the nature of this kind of expenditure.
The negative coe¢ cient attached to public capital expenditure contradicts every pre-
vious estimation apart from the results of Odedokun (2001).28 In any case, our estimated
coe¢ cient is larger in absolute value. This is the main di⁄erence obtained with our dynamic
speci￿cation of the model in contrast to all previous studies, based on static relations. We
28also Devarajan et al. (1996) ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient associated to the share of capital
expenditure on total public expenditure, for their sample of developing countries. They estimate the coe¢ -
cient ￿ -0.045 ￿ , although their unit of measure is capital expenditure over total expenditure. Ours instead is
the share of capital expenditure over GDP.




claim there might exists a bias from ignoring dynamics that could lead to underestimate the
"crowding-out" e⁄ect introduced by public capital expenditure, and thus we identify as the
main factor explaining this result.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper sought to shed light on the relationship between public expenditure com-
position, and economic growth in a set of European countries and put into discussion the
necessity of reallocating composition of public expenditure as it may be important for in-
creasing economic growth and productivity.
The lack of coincidence between previous results is one of the main shortcomings of
this literature. We claim the reason of that disagreement maybe that most previous studies
ignore the dynamic nature of growth relations while setting their economic models, and that
may lead them to arrow biased conclusions. We show that, for our dataset, dynamics are a
crucial determinant of the results.
We have also tried to include a new topic of discussion in the literature. So far, empirical
studies have not compared the e⁄ects of their regressions on di⁄erent dependent variables
related to growth. We claim that by doing so, we may be able to identify the source of the
distortion that the di⁄erent categories of public expenditure may induce. In particular, the
discrimination of the e⁄ects on GDP, labor productivity and total factor productivity will
help us to understand whether public expenditure induces changes on the agents interacting
in the factor markets that will translate to a di⁄erent growth rate, or whether it a⁄ects the
productivity of those factors.
Fiscal adjustment by cutting expenditure in selected categories, mainly "Health" and
"Social Security", in favor of other categories more productive or for a reduction of tax
revenues would a⁄ect positively economic growth. Regarding the economic classi￿cation of
public spending, capital expenditure should be a⁄ected by some ￿scal policy. Rather than
simply disminishing the share of public expenditure devoted to capital, e⁄orts should focus
on eliminating the crowding-out e⁄ects that public capital may induce in the private capital
markets.
The inclusion of sub-national levels of public expenditure, as well as a better speci￿cation
of the origin of tax revenues would be an interesting extension to be done in the future.
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1.7 Appendix I. The strategy of the EU to enhance growth
On 23 and 24 March 2000, an Extraordinary European Council in Lisbon set up a new
strategic objective for the European Union. The goal to be reached in ten years is de￿ned as:
"making the Union the most dynamic, competitive sustainable knowledge-based economy,
enjoying full employment and strengthened economic and social cohesion". After an initial
phase of de￿ning policy objectives and drafting policy reforms, some quantitative targets
were decided subsequently at the 2002 Barcelona European Council (Commission of the
European Communities (2002)).
The Lisbon process is the response of the policy makers to the fact that the EU was
placed for the ￿rst time in decades, on a trend productivity growth path which is lower than
that of the US, with the cross-over point occurring in the mid-1990￿ s. The situation some
years before was that of a productivity growth rate one point over that of the US (2.5 and
1.5 per cent respectively for the beginning of the 1990￿ s, approximately), and has turned
around in ￿ve years to situate the US one per cent over the EU.29
The European Commission developed a package of more than 100 highly varied indicators
covering economic, social and evironmental indicators. The Commission has also agreed on a
shortlist of 14 indicators.30 Public spending is around 40% GDP in average in the European
Union. Curiously, the measures taken by member states to reach the Lisbon objectives rarely
a⁄ect the way in which the public ￿nances of the members should evolve over time. Some
policies to harmonize certain types of taxation,31 the target of reaching the minimum level
R&D expenditure (public and private) to 3% of GDP and the inclusion of speci￿c goals to
improve the e¢ ciency of the Education system, constitute probably the closest in￿ uence
that the Lisbon directives may have on Public Expenditure policies.
The lack of directives that a⁄ect the rest of the composition of the public expenditure
of the member countries as well as its ￿nancing could be a response to the recent weakness
of the surveillance system of the Stability Growth Pact, con￿rmed on 2003 with the decision
of the Council to include a modi￿cation that would avoid to France and Germany of facing
29See Hishow (2005) for further details on the productivity gap between the US and Europe
30The 14 structural indicators on the list include: GDP per capita, labor productivity, employment rate,
employment rate of older workers, education attainment, R&D spending, business investment, comparative
price levels, poverty rate, long-term unemployment, dispersion of regional employment rates, greenhouse gas
emissions, energy intensity and volume of transport.
31"Lisbon" Directives number 4, 5, 25, 43, 46 and 71.
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sanctions for excess of de￿cit. Alesina and Perotti (2004), also identify other bureaucratic
sources of ine¢ ciencies in the decision making of the EU that could explain this situation.
In an analysis of the performance of the objectives of the Lisbon process (Deniset al.
(2005)), the EU Commission put in evidence that those objectives are still far to be reached
in terms of growth. Labor productivity growth rates continue to decline in the EU, despite
having relatively high investment rates. This situation may suggest that the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital is declining, possibly because of overinvestment in certain traditional
sectors and in areas yielding less returns, while the levels of investment may be still too low
in a range of the newer, high productivity growth industries. Simultaneously, the same study
underlines the great share of public to private R&D investment in the EU, in comparison
to the same share for the US economy. They suggest that the returns from private R&D
investment is higher than those from the public one, and may reinforce the idea that the
objectives regarding public investment (on R&D) included in the Lisbon process could be
re￿ned.
But this is not the only pessimistic evaluation on the performance of the Lisbon indi-
cators. As at 2005, it was already widely accepted that the objectives ￿xed in 2000 were
no longer available (Angermann et al. (2005)), the Commission decided then to propose
some changes to the Lisbon strategy, in order to focus the e⁄orts on growth and jobs. These
changes also implied that Member States should produce and implement a national reform
programme. Despite the concern of the European Commission about the quality and sustain-
ability of public ￿nances as a means to increasing their contribution to growth potential,32
again no speci￿c measures about the composition of the public budget of the Member States
were included in the reform of the Lisbon process.
In ￿gures 1.7 and 1.7 we show the evolution, immediately before and after the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon Strategy, of the main categories of public expenditure for selected
groups of countries in our sample. Those are expressed as percentages of total expendi-
ture and GDP respectively. The data have been obtained from Eurostat.33 The data have
been grouped into ￿ve groups: ￿rstly, we consider the three larger countries in the sample,
Germany, France and the UK, and secondly, we group the 13 remaining countries in two
categories: a group of ￿ve Structural Funds￿receivers, with lower per capita income and
32Re￿ ected in the document Directorate-General for Economic and Financial A⁄airs (2004).
33These data are not exactly comparable to the data used for the regressions in this paper, since the
functional classi￿cation of public expenditure made by Eurostat di⁄ers slightly from the one considered by
the IMF in the Government Financial Statistics used as the datasource in this paper.
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a the remaining 8 non Structural Funds￿receivers, with slightly higher income. We have
chosen this criteria in the basis of the similar behavior of public expenditure.
Full sample      SF receivers
Non SF receivers       Germany



















































































































Data  include subnational levels of public administration. Structural Funds (SF)
receivers are  Greece Ireland, Italy, Portugal  and  Spain  while no n  Structural
Funds  receivers  are  the  remaining:  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Fi nland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Source: Eurostat.
Figure A.1: The composition of public expenditure as % of total expenditure.
We do not observe dramatic changes in the pattern of public expenditure with the
introduction of the Lisbon Strategy. However some changes may be mentioned, although
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with the suspicion that some of the movements may have been induced by the business cycle.
Firstly we could mention the general decrease that public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
has su⁄ered for all groups. This decrease may have been induced by the loss of importance
in the public budget of the categories "General Public Services", "Economic A⁄airs", and
partially "Social Protection", which is one of the main components of the budget and has
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Figure A.2: The composition of Public Expenditure as % of GDP
The decrease in the importance of public expenditure in Social Security is the only ￿ pos-
itive￿measure if we take into account the results shown in section 1.5. Public expenditure
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in "Health" has increased except for the group of non SF perceivers. "Education" has expe-
rienced a signi￿cant increase only for the group of SF perceivers, while the rest of countries
have maintained it at stable levels despite the recommendation of previous studies mentioned
in section 1.3 of increasing public expenditure in education to enhance growth.
Finally, regarding the economic classi￿cation of public expenditure, public investment,
represented by gross ￿xed capital formation, has decreased its share on GDP signi￿cantly
for all countries from the year 1998 onwards. Around 2003 this decrease has stopped, and
even been reversed, but only the group of SF receivers has been able to reach stheir previous
levels.
To sum up, it seems that public bodies in member countries have not taken very much
into account the role of the composition of public expenditure in the group of measures estab-
lished to enhance productivity growth in the framework of the Lisbon process. The results
shown in some studies suggested a positive correlation of Education and public investment
with economic growth and a negative in￿ uence of public expenditure in social security. We
have re￿ned the estimation of those relationships by including a dynamic model in this paper.
Given that the Lisbon Strategy did not include speci￿c measures regarding the allocation of
public expenditure, there has been no reaction of the public budget in European countries
to accommodate these ￿nding.
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1.8 Appendix II. Variable description
Data for 1972 except for countries with missing data for that year. In that case, we used the data for  the closer year available. Numbers in
cursive denote the variables expressed as percentage over GDP. The category General Public Services includes expenditure classified as “
Other Expenditures” .
12.60% 1.68% 10.92% 2.31% 0.04% 0.07% 4.91% 1.26% 0.53% 1.90% 0.82%
100% 13.33% 86.67% 18.37% 0.31% 0.54% 38.96% 10.00% 4.22% 15.11% 6.47% Switzerl.
30.21% 1.50% 28.71% 6.11% 0.20% 2.24% 9.82% 3.72% 3.00% 2.92% 2.07%
100% 4.96% 95.04% 20.21% 0.67% 7.41% 32.52% 12.31% 9.92% 9.67% 6.85% Norway
32.31% 2.52% 29.79% 3.58% 0.07% 0.56% 8.00% 3.94% 0.86% 5.40% 2.61%
100% 7.80% 92.20% 11.09% 0.23% 1.75% 24.76% 12.19% 2.65% 16.72% 8.08% UK
26.74% 2.82% 23.93% 2.83% 0.18% 0.40% 11.43% 0.95% 3.96% 3.34% 2.49%
100% 10.54% 89.46% 10.57% 0.69% 1.51% 42.75% 3.57% 14.83% 12.51% 9.31% Sweden
18.76% 2.87% 15.76% 3.28% 0.25% 0.38% 8.96% 0.18% 1.56% 1.22% 0.97%
100% 10.54% 89.46% 10.91% 0.48% 3.72% 26.81% 4.43% 10.67% 13.29% 22.03% Portugal
27.50% 3.41% 24.10% 3.00% 0.13% 1.02% 7.37% 1.22% 2.94% 3.66% 6.06%
100% 15.41% 84.59% 17.49% 1.31% 2.02% 47.77% 0.94% 8.29% 6.52% 5.19% Spain
41.21% 3.07% 38.14% 3.76% 0.30% 0.81% 14.89% 4.98% 6.25% 3.90% 6.32%
100% 7.46% 92.54% 9.13% 0.73% 1.96% 36.12% 12.08% 15.16% 9.47% 15.34% Nether.
29.29% 4.06% 25.23% 5.12% 0.39% 0.48% 13.69% 0.63% 2.56% 0.68% 2.68%
100% 13.85% 86.15% 17.49% 1.34% 1.66% 46.75% 2.16% 8.74% 2.31% 9.16% Luxemb.
29.60% 2.55% 27.05% 5.45% 0.30% 0.73% 12.52% 4.01% 4.75% 1.86% 4.50%
100% 8.60% 91.40% 18.41% 1.03% 2.47% 42.30% 13.54% 16.06% 6.27% 15.20% Italy
48.87% 4.20% 44.67% 9.01% 0.18% 2.05% 11.46% 6.72% 5.57% 1.66% 3.55%
100% 8.59% 91.41% 18.44% 0.37% 4.20% 23.46% 13.75% 11.39% 3.40% 7.26% Ireland
24.50% 6.51% 17.87% 6.25% 0.46% 0.83% 6.66% 1.81% 2.22% 3.64% 1.39%
100% 26.69% 73.31% 25.50% 1.90% 3.39% 27.20% 7.38% 9.07% 14.86% 5.67% Greece
22.07% 2.16% 20.41% 2.50% 0.09% 0.06% 10.29% 3.86% 0.32% 2.74% 1.12%
100% 9.56% 90.44% 11.31% 0.39% 0.26% 46.62% 17.47% 1.47% 12.43% 5.06% Germany
35.55% 2.26% 33.28% 3.38% 0.24% 1.13% 14.51% 5.33% 3.52% 2.69% 2.46%
100% 6.37% 93.63% 9.50% 0.67% 3.17% 40.83% 14.99% 9.89% 7.58% 6.91% France
23.62% 3.78% 19.84% 6.58% 0.23% 0.27% 6.44% 2.51% 3.63% 1.43% 1.88%
100% 16.00% 84.00% 27.88% 0.97% 1.16% 27.28% 10.63% 15.35% 6.07% 7.94% Finland
31.53% 2.12% 29.40% 3.57% 0.76% 0.48% 12.65% 3.17% 5.06% 2.29% 2.70%
100% 6.73% 93.27% 11.34% 2.40% 1.51% 40.11% 10.04% 16.04% 7.25% 8.58% Denmark
39.42% 4.74% 34.67% 7.45% 0.30% 0.57% 15.58% 0.58% 6.12% 2.63% 6.18%
100% 12.03% 87.97% 18.91% 0.76% 1.45% 39.54% 1.47% 15.53% 6.68% 15.66% Belgium
28.50% 2.94% 25.55% 3.19% 0.26% 1.10% 14.23% 2.88% 2.91% 1.83% 2.10%






















Data for 1972 except for countries with missing data for that year. In that case, we used the data for  the closer year available. Numbers in
cursive denote the variables expressed as percentage over GDP. The category General Public Services includes expenditure classified as “
Other Expenditures” .
12.60% 1.68% 10.92% 2.31% 0.04% 0.07% 4.91% 1.26% 0.53% 1.90% 0.82%
100% 13.33% 86.67% 18.37% 0.31% 0.54% 38.96% 10.00% 4.22% 15.11% 6.47% Switzerl.
30.21% 1.50% 28.71% 6.11% 0.20% 2.24% 9.82% 3.72% 3.00% 2.92% 2.07%
100% 4.96% 95.04% 20.21% 0.67% 7.41% 32.52% 12.31% 9.92% 9.67% 6.85% Norway
32.31% 2.52% 29.79% 3.58% 0.07% 0.56% 8.00% 3.94% 0.86% 5.40% 2.61%
100% 7.80% 92.20% 11.09% 0.23% 1.75% 24.76% 12.19% 2.65% 16.72% 8.08% UK
26.74% 2.82% 23.93% 2.83% 0.18% 0.40% 11.43% 0.95% 3.96% 3.34% 2.49%
100% 10.54% 89.46% 10.57% 0.69% 1.51% 42.75% 3.57% 14.83% 12.51% 9.31% Sweden
18.76% 2.87% 15.76% 3.28% 0.25% 0.38% 8.96% 0.18% 1.56% 1.22% 0.97%
100% 10.54% 89.46% 10.91% 0.48% 3.72% 26.81% 4.43% 10.67% 13.29% 22.03% Portugal
27.50% 3.41% 24.10% 3.00% 0.13% 1.02% 7.37% 1.22% 2.94% 3.66% 6.06%
100% 15.41% 84.59% 17.49% 1.31% 2.02% 47.77% 0.94% 8.29% 6.52% 5.19% Spain
41.21% 3.07% 38.14% 3.76% 0.30% 0.81% 14.89% 4.98% 6.25% 3.90% 6.32%
100% 7.46% 92.54% 9.13% 0.73% 1.96% 36.12% 12.08% 15.16% 9.47% 15.34% Nether.
29.29% 4.06% 25.23% 5.12% 0.39% 0.48% 13.69% 0.63% 2.56% 0.68% 2.68%
100% 13.85% 86.15% 17.49% 1.34% 1.66% 46.75% 2.16% 8.74% 2.31% 9.16% Luxemb.
29.60% 2.55% 27.05% 5.45% 0.30% 0.73% 12.52% 4.01% 4.75% 1.86% 4.50%
100% 8.60% 91.40% 18.41% 1.03% 2.47% 42.30% 13.54% 16.06% 6.27% 15.20% Italy
48.87% 4.20% 44.67% 9.01% 0.18% 2.05% 11.46% 6.72% 5.57% 1.66% 3.55%
100% 8.59% 91.41% 18.44% 0.37% 4.20% 23.46% 13.75% 11.39% 3.40% 7.26% Ireland
24.50% 6.51% 17.87% 6.25% 0.46% 0.83% 6.66% 1.81% 2.22% 3.64% 1.39%
100% 26.69% 73.31% 25.50% 1.90% 3.39% 27.20% 7.38% 9.07% 14.86% 5.67% Greece
22.07% 2.16% 20.41% 2.50% 0.09% 0.06% 10.29% 3.86% 0.32% 2.74% 1.12%
100% 9.56% 90.44% 11.31% 0.39% 0.26% 46.62% 17.47% 1.47% 12.43% 5.06% Germany
35.55% 2.26% 33.28% 3.38% 0.24% 1.13% 14.51% 5.33% 3.52% 2.69% 2.46%
100% 6.37% 93.63% 9.50% 0.67% 3.17% 40.83% 14.99% 9.89% 7.58% 6.91% France
23.62% 3.78% 19.84% 6.58% 0.23% 0.27% 6.44% 2.51% 3.63% 1.43% 1.88%
100% 16.00% 84.00% 27.88% 0.97% 1.16% 27.28% 10.63% 15.35% 6.07% 7.94% Finland
31.53% 2.12% 29.40% 3.57% 0.76% 0.48% 12.65% 3.17% 5.06% 2.29% 2.70%
100% 6.73% 93.27% 11.34% 2.40% 1.51% 40.11% 10.04% 16.04% 7.25% 8.58% Denmark
39.42% 4.74% 34.67% 7.45% 0.30% 0.57% 15.58% 0.58% 6.12% 2.63% 6.18%
100% 12.03% 87.97% 18.91% 0.76% 1.45% 39.54% 1.47% 15.53% 6.68% 15.66% Belgium
28.50% 2.94% 25.55% 3.19% 0.26% 1.10% 14.23% 2.88% 2.91% 1.83% 2.10%






















Table A1: Disaggregated Public Expenditure for every country at the beginning of the
sample-period
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Data for 1998 except for countries with missing data for that year. In that case, we used the data for  the closer year available. Numbers in cursive
denote the variables expressed as percentage over GDP. The category General Public Services includes expenditure classified as “Other
Expenditures” .
27.54% 1.18% 26.36% 3.33% 0.12% 0.19% 13.43% 5.46% 0.63% 1.50% 2.87%
100% 4.27% 95.73% 12.10% 0.43% 0.69% 48.78% 19.84% 2.30% 5.43% 10.43% Switzerl.
36.41% 1.84% 34.57% 4.40% 0.44% 0.19% 14.21% 1.73% 2.47% 2.33% 11.38%
100% 5.04% 94.96% 12.08% 1.20% 0.52% 39.03% 4.76% 6.79% 6.39% 31.26% Norway
36.52% 1.38% 35.13% 1.53% 0.17% 0.80% 13.21% 5.53% 1.46% 3.84% 9.97%
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Data for 1998 except for countries with missing data for that year. In that case, we used the data for  the closer year available. Numbers in cursive
denote the variables expressed as percentage over GDP. The category General Public Services includes expenditure classified as “Other
Expenditures” .
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Table A2: Disaggregated Public Expenditure for every country at the end of the
sample-period
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*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval
*** Significant at 1 percent confident interval
Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
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*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval
*** Significant at 1 percent confident interval
Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:


































































































































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table A3: Functional categories of expenditure. Static Model. Fixed-E⁄ects coe¢ cients.
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Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.



























*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval
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Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.



























*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval

























































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table A4: Economic categories of expenditure. Static Model. Fixed-E⁄ects coe¢ cients.
1.10 Appendix IV Estimation using variables in First-Di⁄erences.
Gupta et al. (2005) propose the estimation of the growth equation including variables
in ￿rst-di⁄erences to check the persintance of the relationships between the variables in the
long-run. Tables A5 and A6 present the equivalent long-term coe¢ cients presented in Tables
6 and 7 when the variables are included in ￿rst-di⁄erences. They estimated less signi￿cative
coe¢ cients in comparison to the equations estimated in levels and our results seem to present
a similar pattern.
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277 259 277 279 261 279 Observations
*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval
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(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)


















277 259 277 279 261 279 Observations
*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval


















































































































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table A5: Functional Categories of Public Expenditure: Long-term coe¢ cients. Variables
in ￿rst-di⁄erences.
In comparison cith table 6, in table A5 we can see weaker evidence of the impact of the
public expenditure variable. Still, the signi￿cance of expenditure in "Health" and "Social
Security" is persistent to the estimation of the model in ￿rst-di⁄erences. In the contrary,
the coe¢ cients attached to "Education" are not statistically signi￿cant, in contrast to the
model in levels.
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Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.
313 295 313 315 297 315 Observations
*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval




















































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Model B:
Fiscal variables as % over GDP
Model A:
Fiscal variables as  % over total exp.
313 295 313 315 297 315 Observations
*Significant at 10 percent confident interval
** Significant at 5 percent confident interval




















































































TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr. TFP gr LABpr gr. GDPpc gr.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table A6: Economic Categories of Public Expenditure: Long-term coe¢ cients. Variables in
￿rst-di⁄erences.
The coe¢ cients shown in Table A6 also present some slight di⁄erences in comparison
to the equivalent presented in Table 7. The level of signi￿cance of the variable object of
the study, public and capital expenditure, are weaker except those estimated in model B
attached to current expenditure. The negative impact of tax revenues, instead, seems more
evident in this case, reinforcing the suggestion presented in Table 6 about importance of this
variable in determining production growth.




DECENTRALIZATION AND THE COMPOSITION OF
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN
2.1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralization has changed the vertical distribution of governmental authority in
a great number of countries in the last two decades. Power and revenue are shifting downward
in processes that very often respond to both political factors and political economy arguments
on the e¢ cient allocation of the provision of public goods. Although economic theory has
proposed several hypothesis that may explain the origin and impact of decentralization on
economic welfare and growth, the existence of empirical studies analyzing the impact of ￿scal
decentralization is still very limited, and there is a relative lack of empirical evidence about
the allocative e¢ ciency reached with these processes.
The main di¢ culty is to clearly identify the channels through which ￿scal decentralization
leads to e¢ ciency. The economic justi￿cation for whether the allocation of a part of public
resources should depend on a decentralized system has to be built on assumptions that
create ine¢ ciencies for the centralized counterpart. It turns out to be di¢ cult to ￿nd such
ine¢ ciencies in a world in which all agents have perfect access to information. Economic
theory has traditionally focused on di⁄erences either in perceived utility from public goods
provided by di⁄erent levels of government or in the bene￿t and costs between local and
central governments regarding certain projects.
That has led to the development of sophisticated models that capture the e⁄ect of de-
centralization on economic growth -some of them also linking centralization to the level of
public expenditure-,1. In response to the theory, many empirical studies have tried to suggest
the existence of a relationship between decentralization and growth as a direct or indirect
relation.2 The results are not very conclusive. The link between the level of ￿scal decentral-
ization and economic growth and with the level of total public expenditure does not reveal
1Panizza (1999), Sanz and Velazquez (2002).
2Oates (1993), through better development of the markets (Weingast (1995)) or through macroeconomic
stability (Mart￿nez-Vazquez and McNab (2005).
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clear causal relationships from the ￿rst to the other two, although developed countries tend
to have higher levels of public spending as well as more decentralized institutions.
Following the analysis in our ￿rst chapter which has looked at the importance of the
composition of public expenditure to achieve optimal rates of growth, we propose to analyze
the link from decentralization policy to economic growth through the composition of public
expenditure. And for this purpose we make use of the two traditional hypotheses that
have been used more frequently to explain decentralization: ￿rst, the provision of public
goods by a level of the public administration closer to the citizen yields higher utility since it
tailors more closely its preferences; and secondly, the decentralized provision of public goods,
although less e¢ cient, is more costly than centralized provision because of the multiplication
of the administrative costs and the economies of scale. Our contribution relies on the fact
that this behavior may not a⁄ect all kinds of public goods identically, but some categories
are more sensitive to the level of decentralization because of their nature. More precisely,
we split public expenditure into public investment and public current expenditure, claiming
that public current expenditure would experience the two aforementioned e⁄ects of the cost
and utility of decentralized provision of public goods, while public investment would not be
a⁄ected by decentralization.
With the purpose of relating decentralization to the distribution of public expenditure
and the later to economic growth, we use a version of the neoclassical growth model in which
the demand of public goods by the population depends on the distance to the jurisdiction that
provides them. Unlike previous attempts to link the impact of ￿scal decentralization on pub-
lic expenditure using a distance-sensitive utility function (Arze et al. (2005), Panizza(1999)),
we construct a general equilibrium framework that identi￿es an optimal level of decentral-
ization. The reaction of public expenditure to changes in the level of decentralization will
be able to reveal whether an economy is above or below the optimal and, therefore, will
allow the policy maker to draw conclusions about the gains on e¢ ciency induced by the
decentralization process.
The traditional empirical approach to testing the e⁄ects of ￿scal decentralization has
been the test of a panel data model from country-level data. However, in our framework the
response of public expenditure to economic decentralization depends on the initial conditions
of the country, and the inclusion of heterogeneous economies in the same panel could lead to
imprecise estimates. Devarajan et. al (1996) prove how the estimations of growth regressions
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on ￿scal variable are very dependent to the inclusion of developed and developing countries
in the same panel . We use instead with regional data from a period in which a set of regions
have experienced an asymmetric decentralization process.
Since the acceptance of the Constitution of 1978, Spain has experienced a gradual process
of ￿scal decentralization. Public spending has increased from less than 30% of GDP in 1976
to more that 50% today. The central government has passed from controlling almost 80% of
this public spending before the democratization of Spain to controlling approximately 50% of
the public budget. Molero (2001) describes how this decentralization policy has had a much
greater e⁄ect on the regional level of the government rather than the local one. Using data
from the Spanish regions, we test the hypothesis that the economic distribution of public
spending is sensitive to the level of decentralization. In particular, looking at the distribution
between public current expenditure and public capital, we are able to show that there exists
a clear relationship between them that implies that the share of public capital expenditure
decreases with decentralization.
According to our distance-sensitive agent model, the fact that the level of public in-
vestment decreases with decentralization may be an indicator of an excesive level of decen-
tralization , which could imply an obstacle for economic growth because of the increasing
cost of the decentralized provision of public goods. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 introduces a theoretical model that will help us to interpret the results of our
estimations. Section 4 describes the data and analyses the behaviour of public expenditure
variables in our sample. Section 5 present the methodology and describe the results and
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review. Empirical studies
Empirical studies about decentralization have traditionally focused their attention on its
impact on economic growth. In fact, the direct relationship between ￿scal decentralization
and growth has received a signi￿cant amount of attention in the empirical literature in recent
years. Of the studies on individual countries, Xie, Davoodi and Zou (1999) conclude for the
US an insigni￿cant e⁄ect of ￿scal decentralization on economic growth while for China,
Zhang and Zou (1998), using a panel data growth model with local level data from 1980 to
1992 for 28 provinces, ￿nd that the ￿scal decentralization policies taken on the 1980s did
not promote economic growth.




The cross-country studies do not seem to ￿nd a common answer to the question. Davoodi
and Zou (1998) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of ￿scal decentralization on economic growth for de-
veloping countries and no clear relationship for the developed countries, while Woller and
Phillips (1998) ￿nd no relationship for developing countries. Iimi (2004), using a narrower
set of data (from 1997 to 2001) for 51 countries ￿nds decentralization as instrumental for
economic growth. Thiessen (2003), using a panel of developed OEDC countries, concludes
that there is an optimal level of decentralization over which no additional gains are obtained
from decentralizing.
In the light of these results, some other empirical studies have tried to ￿nd the channel
through which ￿scal decentralization could a⁄ect economic growth. The impact that decen-
tralization could have on the level of in￿ ation has been found to be insigni￿cant (Treisman
(2000), Rodden and Wibbels (2002)). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005) examine the im-
pact that decentralization could have on macroeconomic stability ￿nding a positive relation
that would imply an indirect positive impact with economic growth. Other links have been
established between decentralization and the level of corruption (Fisman and Gatti (2000)
and the level of political participation (Huther and Shah (1998)).
Nevertheless, the literature about ￿scal decentralization has not traditionally looked at
its possible impact on the composition of public expenditures. This issue has only begun
to be addressed recently. Arze , Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005) model and test the
hypothesis that higher levels of ￿scal decentralization increase the shares of consumption
expenditures in the public budget (in particular, they refer to education and health expendi-
tures as publicly provided private goods). They estimate a model from a panel data set of 45
countries and 28 years and ￿nd strong evidence of the hypothesis, especially for developing
countries. Faguet (2004) analyses the e⁄ects of the process of decentralization in Bolivia at
the local level, and ￿nds that the functional composition of public expenditure changes with
decentralization to a more e¢ cient allocation. He looks at several functional categories of
expenditure and shows that the distribution of public expenditure is more adapted to local
needs after the decentralization process that this country experienced in 1994.
2.3 Theory
As commented above, in principle central government expenditure should be more pro-
ductive to local or regional governments so long as returns are at least slightly increasing. The




case of decentralized public expenditure -or decentralized levels of government in general-
should be justi￿ed by a counterbalancing source of e¢ ciency that imposes any advantage to
the regional or local authority in comparison to the central government.
Faguet (2004) describes a ￿rst theoretical approach to the problem made by Tiebout
in 1956, who develops a model in which heterogeneous individuals move costlessly among
localities that o⁄er di⁄erent levels of provision of a public good. The assumptions of perfect
population mobility and ￿xed government behavior seemed too unrealistic. Oates (1972)
modelled a central government that produces a common level of public good for all localities
while local government can tailor public spending to local tastes, in a world with heterogene-
ity in tastes and spillovers. Oates· justi￿cation of the existence of decentralized countries
depends largely on the assumption of uniform provision of public goods by the central gov-
ernment.
This assumption has been relaxed recently with the introduction of voting rules for dis-
tributing expenditure. Lockwood (2002) only needs to assume equal cost sharing in a country
with heterogeneous individuals among regions to show that resources would be allocated in-
e¢ ciently in a centralized country. Besley and Coate (2003) reach a similar conclusion by
allowing for heterogeneity of tastes within a region, modelling public expenditure under
centralization as determined by a legislature of locally elected representatives. Rubinchich
(2005) also relies on the ine¢ ciency of voting rules and centralized taxation to model an
environment in which the central authority would ￿nd it more e¢ cient to allocate some
expenditure decisions to local governments. She proves that it is not necessary to have the
existence of asymmetry in policy tools or in information access available to di⁄erent levels of
government to model a strictly welfare improving environment under decentralization. The
con￿ ict created by the existence of heterogeneity among regions could be solved in a central-
ized system only by assuming the existence of a central planner. Nevertheless, under voting
rule to decide on public policy, the decentralized equilibrium may be welfare improving in
comparison to the centralized outcome of the voting rule.
Another strategy to face the problem has been proposed by Brueker (2005). He uses
an overlapping generations model to show that replacing a common tax-burden with head
tax burdens that di⁄er between younger and older citizens, who live in di⁄erent jurisdictions
where the public good ￿nanced by this tax would be provided at di⁄erent levels, alters
the economy￿ s level of saving enhancing economic growth. The result relies, of course, on
the existence of signi￿cative demographic di⁄erences among regions. Alesina and Spolaore




(1997) and Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999) use the heterogeneity of the population to
justify the necessity to compute the optimal number of countries or economic jurisdictions.
Panizza (1999) internalizes the selection of the optimal level of decentralization in a
model with distance-sensitive individuals and one public good. This optimal level depends
positively on taste heterogeneity, democracy, income per capita and country size. The intro-
duction of the level of democracy obeys his assumption that the central government utility
depends on a proportion of a central planner combined with a proportion of the outcome
from voting rules.
However, none of the above studies addresses the impact of ￿scal decentralization on the
composition of public expenditures. Two main approaches explore the problem.3 The ap-
proach developed by Faguet (2002,2004), assumes heterogeneous preferences among regions
that are accurately captured by local governments when distributing public expenditure,
while central government ascertains the exact preferences of locals with a given probability.
On the other hand, the central government has a cost advantage. Faguet (2004) describes
the relations between the parameters that make a decentralized system preferable, while in
Faguet (2002) the author develops a cooperative game in which the local government chooses
whether to relay information on local needs to the centre and bargains over the allocation
of public goods in a central assembly or remain decentralized.
The second approach, described in Arze et al (2005), is closer to our view here, since
they also extend the representative median-voter model described in Panizza (1999), with
a model that uses a distance-sensitive utility function to stand for the heterogeneity of the
individuals. The model assumes that individuals are uniformly distributed throughout the
country area and that the utility obtained from any given public good is decreasing in distance
to the middle of the country or the region that provides it. The two mentioned approaches,
however, include partial equilibrium frameworks in which the e⁄ects of the reallocation of
decentralized public expenditures on economic are ignored. With that purpose, we develop a
version of the AK model in discrete time with two types of public expenditure: consumption
and investment; two levels of the public administration: regional and central governments;
and exogenously determined tax and centralization rates under a distance sensitive utility
function for the public consumption good.
3There are also some interesting studies that analyse the demand of certain types of expenditure under
decentralization, among them Falch and Rattso (1997) and Gertham, Sogaard, Jonsson and Andersson
(1992).




2.3.1 The basic model: Assumptions and interpretation
The model developed in this section uses a distance-sensitive utility function to introduce
heterogeneity of tastes among individuals. In a model with two levels of public administra-
tion: national and regional governments, and two types of public goods: public consumption
(or public current expenditure) and public investment (or public capital expenditure), the
utility perceived by individuals from one type of public good -public consumption- will de-
pend on the distance of the consumer to the administration that provides it.
The inclusion in the utility function of a parameter that represents the distance of the
consumer to the provider of the public consumption good has two main implications: the
￿rst is that di⁄erent consumers will get -in general- di⁄erent utility from the public expen-
diture depending on their "distance" to the public administration.4 The second is that,
under the standard assumptions about uniformity of distribution of population and admin-
istrations that we describe ahead, consumers get higher utility from the public good when
it is provided by the regional governments instead of the central government. This second
implication creating an advantage towards decentralization that is usually counterbalanced
by assumptions about the economies of scale, in our case by the higher cost of providing the
public good by regional governments.
The distance-sensitiveness assumption have been previously introduced in the literature,
but so far authors have considered either only one type of public good (Panizza (1999),
Alesina and Spolaore (1997)) or two types of public goods to which consumers show identical
behavior regarding the sensitivity of their perceived utility to the distance of the jurisdiction
that provides it (Arze et al. (2005)).
In contrast to the model by Arze et al. (2005), who assume that one of the public goods
may exclusively be provided by the central government arguing that it is a pure public good
5, we split public expenditure into public investment and public consumption goods. As
long as citizens get utility from public consumption while public investment comes into the
4Uunless they are symmetrically situated at the same distance from the public administration
5The identi￿cation of a public good or a public expenditure type that may only be provided by central
government seems a bit problematic, with the exception of some particular activities like defence, weather
forecast or foreign policy. The data on public expenditure seem to con￿rm that there are almost no types of
public expenditure, according to the standard functional and economic classi￿cations, that show this pattern.
See Molero (2001) for a good description of functional and economic distribution of public expenditure in
our sample of Spanish regions.




production function of the economy, the distance sensitiveness of utility a⁄ects only the
amount of public expenditure devoted to consumption.
Unlike the previous papers, we include the distance-sensitiveness assumption in an ex-
tended version of the Solow model with a public sector and a ￿xed tax rate -similar to the
one that we will use in the next chapter to analyze the e⁄ect of public grants- with the
purpose of linking the reaction of public expenditure to the evolution of economic growth
and the behavior of private factors. That will serve us to link the impact of decentralization
on the composition of public expenditure with economic growth, under the assumption that
public capital expenditure comes into the production function of the economy.
It seems reasonable to us to assume that citizens are sensitive to the level of government
that provides public consumption but not public infrastructure. Basically, because public
investment is more likely to serve as a production good rather than a consumption good.6
But we also ￿nd quite straighforward that there must be an increase in the cost of the services
provided. that must re￿ ect the multiplication of administrative and ￿xed costs attached to
those public goods.
We consider a country with an in￿nitely lived representative median voter, whose pref-
erences depend on the amounts consumed of a private good and a publicly provided public
good. The decisions are taken separately, and the household cannot forecast the behavior of
the government while taking their own decisions.7 The households are also the owners of the
technology of the country, that produces according to a constant returns to scale production






6Our interpretation is that consumers are not sensitive to the level of administration that provides public
capital, in contrast to current expenditure. For example, in a public university the capital expenditure would
be represented by the buildings and the general equipment and the current expenditure would be the one
translated directly to the academic activities. We think that is in this one in which regional authorities can
perform better than the national government, since they are more sensitive and better informed about the
speci￿c educational needs of the region.
7We assume this for simplicity, since it is equivalent to assuming a model with public policy decided
by a representative consumer applying median voter theory, in which the utility function includes private
consumption and public services additively separable, in line with Agenor (2007), Ganelly and Tervala (2007)
and Van der Ploeg and Bovenberg (1994), among others. The alternative use of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function as in Turnovsky (1999) and Baier and Glomm (2001) would not introduce relevant modi￿cations to
our results here and would make the problem more cumbersome. Djajic and Maximilians (1987) includes an
interesting analysis of the implications of alternative assumption concerning the relationship between public
and private consumption in the utility function.




The representative consumer has to pay an exogenously determined income tax rate
and consumes and invests to maximize a logarihtmic utility function of the usual sort, as
described in Appendix I. The government is able to observe the behavior of the consumer, but
has the target of maximizing the utility received by the median voter from the consumption
of publicly provided public good, gc, whose perceived utility depends on the distance to the
middle of the jurisdiction that provides it. We assume an exogenous level of centralization,





where xic is the distance from individual "i" to the middle of the country and xij repre-
sents her distance to the middle of the region where she lives. The parameter ￿; (0 < ￿ < 1);
measures preference heterogeneity. Preferences become more homogeneous as ￿ approaches
to 0.
We assume population N uniformly distributed throughout a country with area A and
J regions. For the sake of simplicity we also assume that individuals who are closed to each
other in preferences as also closed to each other geographically. In other words, xic and
xij captures both, the geographical and the preference distance to the administration. We
also introduce the assumption that both levels of the government have to o⁄er the same
proportion of every type of public good.9
The type and quantity of each public good are decided democratically by the median
voter (medk;medg). With the purpose of avoiding problems related to simultaneous multi-
dimensional voting, we assume that individuals vote on one issue at a time and that they
have separable preferences.
Public spending is ￿nanced by an exogenously determined tax rate "￿" that is ￿xed over
time. It is also assumed that the number of voters is large enough so that the space can
8The the level of decentralization is therefore characterized as (1 ￿ ￿), to make the notation compatible
with previous models quoted here.
9This assumption greatly simpli￿es the structure of the model but may be thought of as a bit rigid. A
reason in favour of it may be that any functional level of competencies that a region may achieve usually
includes both current and capital expenditure (for example a region that has the competencies to run the
public health system would have to assume both current and capital expenditures attached to it). The main
point against the assumption is that not all the functional categories of expenditure have the same share of
current to capital expenditure. It is relatively compatible with our data (see ￿gure 3).




serve as a proxy for the voters, and the country size area is normalized to one. There is no





c;t + Gk;t+1 (2.3)
The price of public capital is normalized to one while the price of "g" depends nega-
tively on the level of decentralization. We derive in appendix I the maximization problem of
equation (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.3), that determines the demand of every in-
dividual and the equilibrium solution using median voter theory. The following propositions
characterizes the result:
Proposition 2.1 Given a su¢ ciently high level of centralization, ￿ > ￿
￿,10 a decentralization
process will increase the share of the public budget devoted to the capital good and decrease
the level of provision of the heterogeneous consumption good. The convergence to the new
equilibrium will enhance economic growth. However, from this point onwards, additional
decentralization would induce opposite reactions in the public budget decomposition and would
lead to lower growth rates of the economy.
The formal proof is in the Appendix, but the intuition is simple. The representative agent
obtains more utility from public consumption as the level of decentralization of the country,
(1 ￿ ￿); increases. That will increase the incentives to spend in public investment, since
present investment drives the future stream of public consumption through the production
function. Therefore, decentralization induces a substitution e⁄ect from public consumption
to public investment to come back to an equilibria in which the marginal gains of additional
units of both public expenditure items are equivalent.
This mechanism works only until a certain level of centralization, ￿
￿; is reached. That
is because the cost of the public consumption good also increases with decentralization
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consumption induced by additional level of decentralization overtakes the bene￿ts of the
higher perceived utility, and would push down the demand for capital since the consumption
good is becoming too costly. The e⁄ect on the budget constraint becomes more important
than the gains of utility induced by decentralization, and it will be necessary to increase the
share of public consumption in the budget to return to the equilibrium.
The implication of this proposition on the interpretation of the results described in
section 2.5 is straighforward. We estimate the response of the share of investment in the
public budget to additional levels of decentralization, and show that this relationship is
signi￿cantly negative. If the economies from which the data are collected follow a pattern
similar to the one described in our model, the economy would already be too decentralized,
and the loss on public investment induced by decentralization would lead to lower levels of
economic growth.
2.4 Data description and sources
2.4.1 Sources of data
The model is estimated for a balanced panel of the seventeen Spanish regions over the
period 1984-2003. The sample begins in 1984 because, although the ￿rst Statutes of Au-
tonomy were approved in 1979, 1984 was the ￿rst year in which all the regions started to
develop their full activity. We use data until 2003 due to data availability.
The two Autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla, have been excluded from the Sample.
This decision was taken based on three main reasons: First, the insigni￿cant size of these two
small cities in comparison with the other regions, second, because of the particular patterns
of behavior of their public bodies due to their di⁄erent political and ￿scal status; and ￿nally,
because of the di¢ culty of getting data from the period previous to their current Statute of
Autonomy, approved in 1995.
The main datasource for our variables of interest, disaggregated public expenditure for
the Spanish regions, is the yearbook "Presupuestos de las Comunidades y Ciudades Au-
tonomas" edited by the Ministry of Economy of Spain. Some of the data included in this
yearbook are also available online in the BADESPE database, elaborated by the "Instituto
de Estudios Fiscales".
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2.4.2 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to total public expenditure
of the Spanish regional governments. Previous empirical studies have used this ratio as an
explanatory of factor productivity (Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996)), but it has been
rarely used as a dependent variable to be explained (Diaz-Cayeros, McElwain, Romero and
Siewierski (2003), Sturm (2001)).
The use of a ratio allows us to observe the importance that governments give to capital
goods relative to consumption goods independently of changes in the volume of total expen-
diture induced by other factors. The main shortcoming is, precisely, the dependence on the
volume of total expenditure. The ratio may be sensitive to extraordinary changes on total
expenditure, for example, because of a readjustment to the public debt. We will see later (in
￿gure 3) that such a situation may appear for the central government in the year 1987, but
rarely may be considered for regional government, because of their lower level of autonomy
to run ￿nancial operations.
We also run alternative estimations using only data of public expenditure in social pub-
lic goods, according to the functional classi￿cation of public expenditure proposed by the
Spanish Ministry of Economics. The motivation to use these alternative data can be found
in Appendix II: the major part of the decentralization process is taken over precisely in com-
petencies that a⁄ect social public goods. In these alternative estimations, shown in tables
3b, 4b and 5b, the variable cap would represent ratio of capital to total public expenditure
in social public goods of the Spanish regional governments
The ratio is built from data on total regional public expenditure and public regional
capital expenditure, obtained from the BADESPE11 database, elaborated by the Instituto
de Estudios Fiscales (Fiscal Studies Institute), dependent on the Ministry of Economics of
Spain. This database contains economic data from the Spanish public sector, in particular
￿scal variables, such as taxes, other revenues or budget.
11http://www.estadief.meh.es/
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2.4.3 Explanatory variables
Choosing a variable that measures precisely the level of decentralization on ￿scal issues
may be quite controversial. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) describe how ideally a
panel data set of measures of ￿scal decentralization would be able to quantify the activities
of sub-national governments resulting from their independent decisions, which would mean,
for example, discriminating those expenditures that are under the e⁄ective control of the
central government as central government activities, even if they are carried out by other
levels of the public administration. This would mean that not only the relative volume of
public funds distributed by sub-national authorities determine how decentralized an economy
is; we should ideally also take into account the level of autonomy with which those funds are
managed.
Unfortunately, we cannot address these issues with the available data. The literature
has adopted the standard measure of ￿scal decentralization described by Oates (1972) based
on local or sub-national to total public expenditure ratio.12 It seems reasonable to assume
that the level of ￿scal autonomy is correlated to the share of public resources managed by a
regional government.
An interesting analysis of alternative de￿nitions of the decentralization variable, based on
the autonomy that sub-national levels of governments have over tax revenues, can be found
in Ebel and Yilmaz (2002). We have discarded the use of a decentralization measure based
on the revenue side of the budget as made by other authors.13 The main reason is that in our
set of regions the expenditure side of the budget accommodates better the implementation
of new competencies in regional governments, while the sources of revenues, especially tax
revenues, is more dependent on the subsequent reforms made to the ￿nancing system of the
regions. This issue is described further in the next two subsections.
The level of decentralization is built as the ratio of per capita regional expenditure to per
capita central government expenditure, also from the data of the yearbook "Presupuestos de
las Comunidades Autonomas", published by the "Instituto de Estudios Fiscales". Following
an identical procedure to that used with the dependent variable, we also construct a ratio
of ￿scal decentralization using data of public expenditure exclusively on social public goods.
The use of these alternative data will yield the results presented in tables 3b, 4b and 5b.
12This is used for example by Zhang and Zou (1998), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), Iimi (2004),
Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005), among others.
13De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) or Diaz-Cayeros, McElwain, Romero and Siewierski (2002), for
example
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These ratios require more disaggregated data. The variable "capsoc" is constructed as
the ratio of public capital expenditure on "Social Public Goods" to total public expenditure
on "Social Public Goods ", for every regional government. The variable "decsoc" is the
ratio of total public expenditure on "Social Public Goods" run by every regional government
to the equivalent value for the central government. Data for regional public expenditure are
obtained from the Yearbook "Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autonomas", edited by the
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance. Data for central government public expenditure
on "Social Public Goods " are obtained from the INE database.
We explain later how the rest of control variables in tables 3b, 4b and 5b remain
unaltered in comparison to the original estimation presented in tables 3, 4 and 5. The
decentralization ratio changes dramatically in comparison to the one used originally. This is
because the level of decentralization in policies regarding social policy, especially Education
and Health, is far larger that the average decentralization. Regional governments control
most of the public expenditure devoted to those policies, while the central government plays
a residual role.
INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística
IVIE: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ ómicas
INE Euro, current prices GDP incurrent prices percapita GDPpc GDP per capita
INE Persons Totalregionmidyear population pop population
INE Miles Euro, current
prices
capital expenditure run by central
government
cgcape central gov. capital exp
IVIE/INE Euro (c.p., base
1986)
Kstockpc capital stock per capita
Badespe/
INE
Fraction Ratio ofpercapita public expenditure run
by the regional government over per
capital public expenditure run by the
central government
dec fiscaldecentralization
Badespe Fraction (0-1) Ratio for regional government:    capital
expenditure over total expenditure.
cap capital share
Source Units Definition label Variable
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Table 1. Variable description and sources of data
The selection of the remaining control variables has been largely based on studies focused
on the determinants of public capital spending as well as on Mart￿nez VÆzquez and Mc Nab
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(2003), keeping in mind that all these studies use country data and some of the variables
that they include would not ￿t in our regional panel data (budget de￿cit or industrialized
country dummy, for example).
We include population and per capita GDP. Changes in population could be a deter-
minant of the necessities of public capital relative to publicly provided consumption goods.
It might also explain the possible scale e⁄ects existing in particular kinds of investment via
the marginal cost of additional users, in the case of "pure" public goods. Population has
been included as an approximation of labor force supply in many studies that examine the
productivity of public capital (Ramirez (1998) and Everaert and Heylen (2001)).
It may be expected that the productivity of public capital changes with the level of
production. In principle a less wealthy population is expected to have stronger preferences
for public investment, to supply the lack of or the minor productivity of private capital. GDP
per capita has been frequently used as a control to explain growth (Barro (1991), other ￿scal
variables (Kneller, Bleaney and Gemell (1999)) and it is used in all the studies consulted
identifying determinants of public capital expenditure.14 Both variables have been obtained
from the INE database.
In addition we include capital stock per capita and central government capital expen-
diture. The ￿rst controls for the necessities of more capital, since a region with a smaller
stock of capital is expected to have larger marginal returns to capital and, therefore, a higher
demand for public capital expenditure. Randolph, Bogetic and He￿ ey (1996) defend the in-
clusion of the actual stock of public infrastructure as a variable determining its current level
of spending. They ￿nd that their results are very sensitive to the alternative variables used
to measure the stock of infrastructure, since there is no inventory of stock of public capital
for their set of countries. This does not represent a problem for us, since we can count on
an inventory of public capital for the Spanish regions at constant prices.
Central government capital expenditure tries to control for the policy of the central
government regarding public capital, and the substitution e⁄ect that could induce to regions.
Data on total public capital stock in the Spanish region are available in the IVIE (Instituto
Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas) website. Data on central government capital
expenditure were obtained from the INE database.
14Sturm (2001), De Haan, Sturm and Sikken(1996), among others.
GONZÁLEZ ALEGRE, Juan (2008), The Distribution of Public Expenditure in Europe 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/22382.4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 62
.6145927 .0206426 .1294949 .2720935 340 cap
1.247196 .0502049 .2306555 .3569552 340 dec
20.38523 2.39098 4.057546 9.512318 340 GDPpc
7.606848 0.256753 2.009264 2.333307 340 pop
2.13685 0.7850 0.601462 1.379756 340 cgcape
28.6958 10.0384 4.099209 18.38654 340 kstockpc
28.7041 .3234 7.8335 7.0094 238 decsoc
.7687 .0454 .1712 .2612 239 capsoc
maximum minimum St. Deviation mean N
.6145927 .0206426 .1294949 .2720935 340 cap
1.247196 .0502049 .2306555 .3569552 340 dec
20.38523 2.39098 4.057546 9.512318 340 GDPpc
7.606848 0.256753 2.009264 2.333307 340 pop
2.13685 0.7850 0.601462 1.379756 340 cgcape
28.6958 10.0384 4.099209 18.38654 340 kstockpc
28.7041 .3234 7.8335 7.0094 238 decsoc
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maximum minimum St. Deviation mean N
Table 2: Summary Statistics
2.4.4 Evolution over time
The process of decentralization of public ￿nancing in Spain starts with the approval of
the Spanish Constitution of 1978. The national territory is divided into seventeen regions
or Autonomous Communities (NUTS 2 using the nomenclature proposed by the European
Commission) and two Autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla.
The level of competencies of the regions is not symmetric, and the process of constitution
of all the regional governments ￿nished in 1983. Simultaneous to this process of political
adaptation to the new Constitution, occurred the most important increase of public spending.
Total public spending moved to represent a 27.51% of GDP in 1976 to 44.10 % in 1985. This







1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Source: Molero (2001) Central Gov. Regions Local Gov.
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Figure 1: Shares of Public Expenditure by level of administration
The progressive decentralization of public expenditure that has been taking place in
Spain since the development of the regional governments is illustrated in Figure 1. This
process has a⁄ected mainly the regional level, since local public expenditure has only in-
creased its share over total expenditure 2.5 percentage points in ￿fteen years, while the
regional level has increased to 33.9 % of total public expenditure in 2000, compared to 1985
when it represented only 15.8 %.














































































Figure 2: Evolution of ￿scal decentralization.
Figure 2 shows the share of non-central government expenditure to total public expen-
diture in several countries.15 It shows that the process of decentralization that Spain has
su⁄ered is not a general pattern of behavior of the countries in its environment. The level of
this ratio has risen in the recent years to reach a situation comparable to federal countries
like the US or Germany.
We can see how the decrease in public investment in sub-national levels of the public
administration does not correspond to an international trend. We show in Figure 3 how some
15The data are accrual data extracted from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook database, elabo-
rated by the IMF. Consolidated central government expenditure includes public expenditure carried out by
the Social Security organism. The database does not provide data to compute the ratio before 1998.
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other countries have decreased their shares of sub-national public capital expenditure, but
not as much as Spain has done for this period. Many of them have, instead, increased their
shares of sub-national public capital expenditure. Although we cannot observe a perfect
correlation, more "centralized" countries tend to present a higher share of public investment
in comparison with less centralized ones. Unfortunately the GFSY database does not include
disaggregated data for the US.









































































Figure 3: Comparative evolution of the state and local share of public capital expenditure.
But this process has not been homogeneous. The reason is that the Spanish Constitution
discriminates the level of competencies of the di⁄erent regions. The Constitution considers
two groups. The ￿rst one is the so-called "historic nationalities"16 or regions with a high
level of competencies. Those regional governments have a higher level of independency. The
second group consists of the ten remaining regions17 (and the two autonomous cities) that
in principle assume a lower level of competencies.
In practice, the regions with high levels of competencies experienced a higher level of
decentralization in the beginning, but the di⁄erences have been reduced as long as the
decentralization process described above has been taking place. That can be seen in the
evolution of the ratio that we have chosen to measure the level of ￿scal decentralization.
16Andalusia, Canary Islands , Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre, Valencia and Basque Country.
17Aragon, Asturias, Baleares, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Le￿n, Extremadura, La Rioja,
Madrid and Murcia.
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Figure 4: Decentralization Measure
As described above, this ratio formed as a coe¢ cient of per capita public expenditures
between the regional and central government may present some weaknesses, for example, the
fact that it depends also on expenditure policies run by the central government.18 However,
for our purpose of intra-country analysis this does not represent a great problem, since the
denominator is common for all our regions.
The increase in the proportion of public spending run by regional movements has also
a⁄ected the distribution of public regional spending among the di⁄erent economic categories.
The regions have augmented the share of current spending, devoting a minor part of their
funds to increasing their stock of capital:
18For example, a great increase of Central Government Expenditure in 1987 due to ￿nancial operations
after the entrance of Spain in the EU has induced an ￿ abnormal￿decrease of the value of the ratio for all
regions in this year.
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Figure 5: Ratio Capital to Total Expenditure.
One might think that this situation could be induced by a certain reallocation of com-
petencies between the central and regional governments. However, it can be seen that the
Central Government has not increased its share of capital expenditure, but has, on the con-
trary, slightly decreased it. The fall in capital share of public expenditure is clearly more
relevant in the regions with low levels of competencies, which are also those that have un-
dergone a more profound process of decentralization. We want to prove in the paper that
this fall is a consequence of the process of decentralization.
The graphs in appendix II present a deeper analysis of the functional categories in which
the higher level of decentralization takes place, in other words, the areas in which regional
governments gain more power. The category "Social Public Goods" -using the nomenclature
of the functional classi￿cation used by the Spanish "Ministerio de Econom￿a y Hacienda"- is
the main area of decentralization for the regions with a low level of competencies as well as
the main component of the public budget. In 1994 it represented around 20% of the budget
of the regions with low levels of competencies and 55 % of the groups of more autonomous
regions, while in 2003 it represented more than 60% of the total budget in both groups.
This category includes the two groups of public policies that have experienced a substantial
change of competency from central to regional governments: Health and Education. The
graphs also reveal how simultaneously there has been a change in the share of capital and
current expenditure devoted to this category.
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Other functional categories that have experienced a signi￿cant level of decentralization
have been "Social Security and Promotion", "Economic regulation of Productive Sectors",
"General Public Services" and "Economic Public Goods". Among them, only the expen-
diture devoted to "General Public Services" has increased its share of capital expenditure
simultaneously to this decentralization process. It should also be noted that the per capita
level of expenditure for some of these categories is quite similar between regions with high
and low levels of competencies. Thus, there are some categories of expenditure in which
there were no signi￿cant di⁄erences on the level of competencies.
2.4.5 Sources of Revenues
Given the great heterogeneity of competencies that have been progressively assumed by
the di⁄erent regions, it has been necessary to develop a system able to be adapted to this
dynamic environment. The system provides multiple tools to compute the fair amount of
the public funds that should be allocated to every region, in proportion to the competencies
that it assumes. But the diversity of the Spanish system goes further than this, since two
regions have a particular regime of ￿nancing called "RØgimen Foral".
The system for the remaining 15 regions started to work regularly in 1987. Prior to that
date, the system was being progressively established and some of the transfers from the cen-
tral government were the result of a negotiation process between both levels of government.
From 1987 onwards, the general system is revised every ￿ve years to increase the power of
decisions to regions. Many of the rules to compute the ￿nance necessities that were set for
the ￿rst period (1987-1991) are still valid.
The di⁄erence introduced progressively is the source of this ￿nancing. Initially, most of
the funds were provided directly by the central government according to these rules (Partic-
ipation on the Revenues of the State or PRS). But the revisions for the periods 1992-1996
and, more particularly, 1997-2001 give some taxing power to the regions.
In the period 1992-1996, the collection of some taxes19 is transferred from the central
government to regions. In addition, regions perceive 15% directly from the income tax
collected by the central government. The amount collected is subtracted from their PRS,
which means that so far there is only a change of procedure, but not really of autonomy.
19The more important ones are taxes on wealth, gifts, inheritance and gamble.
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In the period 1997-2001 regions gained a limited normative capacity about the taxes that
they collect as well as over their own portion on the income tax, which moved from 15% to
30% (progressively for the regions with low level of competencies, as they assumed complete
competencies on education). They also obtained the capacity of issuing new taxes. From
2002 the system included a higher share of taxes collected by the central government, an
arrangement not to be revised after ￿ve years, but to be considered permanent.
This system is completed by some complementary sources of revenues. The Social Secu-
rity funds are collected by an autonomous organism20 that re-distributes them among regions
and central government according to their expenditure needs and competencies, to ￿nance
public expenditure in Health policies.
Navarra and Basque Country have a di⁄erent system as a consequence of some privi-
leges that existed previously to Franco￿ s dictatorship. The regional government in Navarra
and subregional levels of government in Vasc Country have the competence of collecting
practically all the taxes. They also have a limited normative capacity over them. They are
obliged to transfer to the central government an amount representing the cost of the services
provided in those regions. The computation of this volume depends on the cost of these
services, the population of both the region and the whole country, and also both GDP levels.
All the regions have a very limited capacity of incurring into budget de￿cit, which is
monitored by the central government. In appendix III we analyze the evolution of the
di⁄erent sources of income in the di⁄erent regions in the period 1986-2001. The data have
been collected from the database of the "Instituto de Estudios Fiscales".
2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Model Speci￿cation and Econometric Issues
In this section we test the hypothesis that decentralization a⁄ects the distribution of
public expenditure at the regional level. To do so, we estimate an equation in which the
dependent variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to total expenditure of the regional
government, and as explanatory variables we introduce the decentralization level . Two
alternative sets of control variables that could a⁄ect the composition of public expenditure
20Tesorer￿a General de la Seguridad Social.
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have also been included. The ￿rst set includes per capita stock of capital and the public
capital expenditure made by the central government. The second set also includes GDP per
capita and population as suggested in Arze et al. (2005).21
We have already de￿ned the dependent variable, cap, as the ratio of capital expenditure
to total public regional expenditures. The purpose is to check the impact that increases in
decentralization levels may have on the composition of public expenditure, and in particular
on the proportion of capital to current spending on regional governments. In terms of the
explanatory variables, our main interest lies in decentralization, dec, measured as the share
of per capita regional public expenditure to per capita total public expenditure. A matrix
X of control variables should include population, budget balance and GDP per capita:
capi;t = ￿i + ￿0 + ￿1deci;t + ￿2Xi;t + ui;t (2.4)
Some discussion has to be made on this speci￿cation, since the dependent variable is
a fraction constrained to lay in the interval (0,1). In such cases the literature very often
suggests the use of a logistic transformation. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) instead suggest
quasi-likelihood estimation methods for models in which the dependent variable is bounded.
Problems related to these models arise when it is possible to observe values closed to the
boundaries. Given that this is not the case of our variable, we do not consider it necessary
to apply any transformation to the model to deal with this issue.
The ￿0
is represent the individual speci￿c term. Some authors suggest the introduction
of a time-speci￿c e⁄ect,22 ￿
0
ts, intended to capture the e⁄ects of nationwide macroeconomic
￿ uctuation. In our speci￿c case the introduction of time dummies does not alter signi￿cantly
the results.23 The introduction of irrelevant variables would normally lead to a loss of
precision of the estimates. We report in Appendix IV the estimation of equation (2.4) with
time dummies.
21They also use a linear equation to estimate the e⁄ect of decentralization on the distribution of public
expenditure. We may underline two main di⁄erences with our study: the ￿rst is that they look at the
functional distribution of public expenditure, while we use the economic clasi￿cation. The second di⁄erence
is that we use regional-level data while do a cross-country analysis for 45 developed and developing countries.
22See, for example, Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005), Arze et al. (2005).
23They are generally not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The estimated values of the control variables
are quite close to the ones estimated in the model without time dummies, although the model with times
dummies arrows slightly higher standard errors.
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We report both ￿xed e⁄ect estimation and random e⁄ect estimation results of the AR
model for both sets of variables. The comparison and the accuracy of both estimations are
related to the (unobserved) individual e⁄ect ￿i: As Wooldridge (2002) points out, the dis-
cussion does not regard whether it should be properly viewed as a random variable or as a
parameter to be estimated, but the key issue involving ￿i is whether or not it is correlated
with the observed explanatory variables Xi;t and deci;t; t=1,2...T. Both estimation methods,
￿xed e⁄ects and random e⁄ects, assume strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables con-
ditioned on ￿i. But random e⁄ect methods assume in addition orthogonality between ￿i
and the explanatory variables, while for ￿xed e⁄ects analysis E(￿i=xi) is allowed to be any
function of xi:
We do not suspect endogeneity of any of the explanatory variables, but the presence of
correlation between the individual e⁄ect and any of them does not seem implausible. In
such a case, the random e⁄ects estimator would be inconsistent. On the other hand, when
the individual e⁄ect and the explanatory variables are in fact orthogonal, the ￿xed e⁄ects
methods impose additional restrictions on the coe¢ cients that would normally lead to larger
variances of the estimations. The Hausman (1978) test is able to o⁄er a conclusion about
the correlation between the individual e⁄ect and the explanatory variable from the di⁄erence
between the random e⁄ects and ￿xed e⁄ects estimates. The implementation of the Hausman
test in our speci￿c problem reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation
in all cases.
The random e⁄ects models are estimated using feasible GLS while the ￿xed e⁄ects models
are estimated using pooled OLS on the standard within transformation.24 Because of the
length of the sample and the nature of the variables, we suspect a priori that serial correlation
may be a problem. The Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) test statistics for
serial correlation suggest that the error term of the speci￿cation may be AR(1).25 The
autoregressive parameters reported are computed from the Durbin-Watson statistics.26
In columns [1] and [5] we report the feasible GLS estimation of the ￿rst di⁄erenced model.
The estimators on the ￿rst-di⁄erenced model may add some more valuable information. Its
24This consists of substracting from the original equation "yit = ￿i + xit + uit" the averaged equation
"￿ yi = ￿i + ￿ xi + ￿ ui " and yields ￿ y = ￿￿ xit + ￿ uit; where ￿ yit = yit ￿ T￿1￿T
t=1yit , ￿ xit = xit ￿ T￿1￿T
t=1xit and
￿ uit = uit ￿ T￿1￿T
t=1yit:
25The estimated statistic is 0.77 for the complete model and 0.76 for the model without population and
GDPpc as explanatory. See Baltagi (2005) for more details.
261 - dw/2, where dw is the Durbin-Watson d
statistic
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comparison to the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimation hinges on the assumptions about the idiosyncratic
errors, uit: In particular, the within estimation is more e¢ cient when the errors are serially
uncorrelated, while the ￿rst-di⁄erences estimator is more e¢ cient if uit follows a random
walk. In this case the truth is likely to lie somewhere in between. Wooldridge (2002) also
suggests that the comparison between both estimators may serve us to arrow conclusions
about the exogeneity of the explanatory variables, since in the presence of correlation between
xit and uit both estimators have di⁄erent probability limits.
But ￿rst di⁄erencing comes at a cost in precision. The process of ￿rst di⁄erencing the
model provokes an important increase in the variance of the estimated coe¢ cients, as well
as a small loss of observations.
The presence of serial correlation in the error term might be induced by the omission of
dynamics in the static model. We introduce a dynamic version of the model, which includes
one lag of the dependent variable to control for this possibility in columns [4] and [8]. In
fact, our results here suggest that this is quite a feasible situation. We have estimated the
coe¢ cients using the one-step version of the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). We rely on the one-step procedure rather than the two-step based on the ￿ndings
in Judson and Owen (1996) applied to the length of the cross-section and time dimensions
of our dataset27.
2.5.2 Estimation results
Table [3a] shows the results of estimating equation (2.4), using two alternative sets of
control variables and three possible estimation methods. Firstly we consider the linear ￿xed
e⁄ects regression including the ￿rst di⁄erences of the variables considered, later we set up an
AR model estimated by both random and ￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿nally we estimate a dynamic
model using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM:
27We are also aware of the developments made by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
to improve the e¢ ciency of the "di⁄erence GMM" estimator by introducing additional assumptions of no
correlation between the ￿xed-e⁄ects and the ￿rst di⁄erences of the instrumenting variables. The application
of this new estimator -called "system GMM"- to our problem here would introduce slight di⁄erences to our
results. Although these di⁄erences are not dramatic, we rely on the traditional "di⁄erence GMM" method
since we are not totally comfortable with the additional assumptions required for the "system GMM".
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0.2473 0.256 0.578 0.482 0.1861 0.344 Adj R2
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0.2473 0.256 0.578 0.482 0.1861 0.344 Adj R2



































































































8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
Table 3a: Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures
The results undoubtedly support the hypothesis that capital expenditure depends on the
level of decentralization. The coe¢ cients estimated for the variable "￿scal decentralization"
are negative and highly statistically signi￿cant in every model. The values for the coe¢ cients
vary from 0.08 to 0.14, which means that an increase in the level of decentralization of one
percentage point would induce a decrease on the ratio of capital to total regional public
expenditure of at least 0.08%. The sign and the signi￿cance of the e⁄ect seems quite clear.
In terms of our model described in section 2, that means that the level of decentralization of
Spain is above the critical point (1￿￿
￿) and additional decentralization would be ine¢ cient
due to the increasing costs of providing decentralized public goods and services.
Our results are not perfectly comparable to the study by Arze et al. (2005) since they use
as dependent variable a proxy for public consumption constructed as the fraction of public
education and health on total public expenditure.28 They estimate a value for the coe¢ cient
28Which obeys to a functional classi￿cation of public expenditure rather than the economic classi￿cation
that we use, discriminating current from capital expenditure. Public expenditure in those items also include
investment. They also use national data for a set of 45 developed and developing countries, while we are
using Spanish regional data.
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accompanying Dec from 0.24 to 0.38. They estimate an increase on public consumption
around 0.3% while we estimate a decrease on public capital expenditure around 0.12%, as
a response to the identical one-percentage point increase in decentralization measure. De
Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) reach a similar conclusion using a test on a panel of 22
OECD countries for the period 1980-1992, although their measure of ￿scal centralization is
based on tax collection, instead of the approach based on public expenditure.
The behavior of the control variables seems more sensitive to alterations in the method-
ology. The in￿ uence of the level of population on the dependent variable is insigni￿cant
except in the random e⁄ects model, thus rejecting the relevance of scale e⁄ects at this level.
One could also expect a negative coe¢ cient associated with the actual level of capital
stock per capita, as an indicator that governments closer to an optimal level of capital
start to deviate public spending funds from it. However, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant
e⁄ect. De Haan et al. (1996), with country level data, ￿nd public capital expenditure highly
correlated to private investment.29 We think that the little divergence between the results
from the ￿xed-e⁄ects and the random-e⁄ects models regarding the variables "Population"
and "Capital Stock per capita" in the extended version may be due to the failure of the
assumption of no correlation of the explanatory variable with the individual speci￿c e⁄ect,
necessary for the random-e⁄ects estimation.
The coe¢ cient attached to the public capital expenditure made by the central govern-
ment shows negative coe¢ cients with a poor level of signi￿cance. A negative relation would
be the re￿ ect of the fact that both types of public investment may not be complementary
but substitutes and therefore an increase in public capital expenditure by the central govern-
ment should push down that of regional governments. As for the GDPpc, we should expect
that poorer regions tend to spend a higher share of their budgets on capital, probably as a
re￿ ection of their intention to catch up the richer ones. But the conclusions are not clear,
since we ￿nd signi￿cant coe¢ cients only in the reduced version of the model.
An important question to answer regarding the validity of the results, concerns the func-
tional classi￿cation of public expenditure described in section 2.4 and appendix II. Decentral-
ization has mainly a⁄ected policies on Education and Health. In the functional classi￿cation
made by the Spanish authorities these functional categories of expenditure are included to-
gether under the denomination of "Social Public goods ". The fact that the decentralization
29They estimate a coe¢ cient of 0.076, de￿ning the dependent variable cap in a similar way to ours and
the explanatory variable private investment as its share on the GDP.
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process a⁄ects some categories more than others could be a source of distortion on the results
since some functional categories of expenditure are by nature more related to expenditure in
capital than others. As an example, we can check in the data described in appendix II that
public expenditure in economic public goods, which includes expenditure in "Transport and
Communication", implies a higher share of capital to current expenditure than, for example,
"Social Security" or "Social Public Goods ". For that reason we have estimated equation
(2.4), using data of regional public expenditure only on the category "Social Public Goods
". We present the data used for the construction of the variables equivalent to "cap" and
"soc" using only public expenditure on "Social Public Goods" under the lables "capsoc "
and "decsoc". These variables are introduced in the summary statistics in Table 2. The
coe¢ cients used as a dependent variable, capital to total expenditure, and as an explanatory
variable, decentralization measure are constructed from regional and national data regarding
only expenditure on "Social Public Goods", which at the end of the period considered counts
for more than a half of the total budget of the regional governments.
0.478 0.119 0.236 0.541 0.230 0.260 Adj R2
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Table 3b: Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures in Social Public
Goods.
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The results are again conclusive regarding the signi￿cance of the variable of interest
"Fiscal decentralization". However, from the comparison with the previous tables we can
observe how the absolute values of the coe¢ cients estimated are far smaller. The explana-
tion for this phenomenon is the di⁄erent sensitivity that the construction of this ratio has
using data only for "Social Public Goods" in comparison to the one used before with total
expenditure data. Fiscal decentralization is "more volatile", since the denominator of this
ratio, i.e. central government expenditure, is much smaller.
In the control variables we can observe also smaller levels of signi￿cance, especially
regarding the variables "Population" and "Central Government Capital Expenditure".
2.5.3 Robustness Check
Now we analyze the robustness of the results from the main regression shown in tables
[3a] and [3b] to some alterations in the data used. Firstly, we want to discriminate from
the results the e⁄ect that could have been induced by the existence of a common business
cycle. For that, we have computed the same estimations (tables [4a] and [4b]) substituting
the economic series by ￿ltered data using the Hodrick-Prescott method. In particular, we
apply the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter to the ratios cap and dec, which are the main object of
our interest. We also apply the ￿lter to the series central government capital expenditure,
capital stock per capita and GDP per capita, while the series population remain unaltered.
The ￿ndings using data on total public expenditure are shown in table [4a].30 The sig-
ni￿cance of the e⁄ects that decentralization has on public capital expenditure remain robust
to this alteration, although the absolute values of the coe¢ cients estimated are de￿nitely
di⁄erent as a consequence of the ￿ltering process.
30No dynamics have been considered for the ￿ltered data. We use the command xtabond2 for the GMM
estimation in columns (4) and (8) because xtabond does not allow for a completely static model.
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0.18 0.20 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.31 Adj R2
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Table 4a: Robustness check. Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures.
Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered data
The table estimated while using data of public expenditure on social public goods(Table
[4b]) is less conclusive. The coe¢ cients estimated for the variables of interest, dec, remain
negative but the level of signi￿cance varies among estimation methods and models. Also the
behaviour of the rest of control variables is less stable than in the case in which total public
expenditure is used.
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0.63 0.25 0.26 0.67 0.27 0.27 Adj R2
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Table 4b: Robustness check. Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures in
Social Public Goods. Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered data
In a second check we run the original regression using data only from those regions
classi￿ed as "with low level of competencies". As we described before, the regions with
"high levels of competencies" show a highly heterogenous ￿nancing system and assumption
of competencies, while for the ten remaining regions the rules were almost identical. In addi-
tion, this is the set of regions that have experienced a broader change in its decentralization
level. The results, described in table [5], support the original hypothesis of the paper that
decentralization has an e⁄ect on the level of public capital spending, although the levels of
signi￿cance for the set of control variables is poorer. The coe¢ cients estimated for ￿scal de-
centralization also show slightly poorer levels of signi￿cance. This could be a consequence of
the smaller number of observations that we use in this regression. The estimated coe¢ cients
are, however, a bit larger in absolute value than those from table [3].
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0.347 0.350 0.134 0.409 0.083 0.321 Adj R2
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Table 5a: Robustness check. Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures.
Regions with low level of competencies
In this case the results using data of public expenditure on social public goods are almost
identical to the ones obtained with the original variables including total public expenditures
and suggest that the level of decentralization is a key determinant of the propensity to invest
of the regional governments and that this pattern of behaviour could be even more evident
in the subset of regions in which decentralization has taken place in a later stage.
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Table 5b: Robustness check. Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures in
Social Public Goods. Regions with low level of competencies
2.6 Conclusions.
In this paper we examined the implications of public expenditure decentralization on the
economic distribution of the public budget, in particular, on the share of public capital to
current expenditures.
We ￿rst investigate this issue from a theoretical point of view, with the use of a distance-
sensitive representative agent model. We model a version of the AK model in discrete time,
with two types of public expenditure: public consumption and public investment; two levels
of the public administration: central and regional governments; and exogenously determined
tax-rate and decentralization level. The agent gets utility from private consumption as well
as from public consumption, being distance-sensitive towards the level of the administration
that provides the later. Public investment, in contrast, involve no utility for the agent, but
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comes in the production function of the economy as a separate factor. Regional administra-
tions have to pay a increasing cost of public decentralization as a result of the economies of
scale.
In this model, there is a critical point, under which decentralization induces higher levels
of public investment, enhancing economic growth. This happens as a result of the gains
on the utility resulting from the reduction of the distance from the consumer to the public
administration providing public consumption goods. But above this critical point the cost of
the decentralization provision of the consumption good is too high, and overcomes the gains
in the utility function. The level of public investment would decrease with additional decen-
tralization, pushing down economic growth. According to this framework, decentralization
would only be bene￿cial as long as it enhances public investment.
The Spanish economy has experienced one of the fastest processes of decentralization in
Europe since the arrival of democracy in 1978. This process has also been very peculiar,
since the development of the regional governments has been quite asymmetrical, and, even
now, some of them present signi￿cant di⁄erences in their levels of ￿scal autonomy. With
data from the Spanish economy, we test the hypothesis that decentralized regions spend a
higher share of their budget on current expenditure than centralized ones. The results are
very conclusive and robust to several sensitivity analyses that have been run to the original
equation: decentralization is a crucial factor to explain the share of public expenditure
devoted to capital. Decentralized regions devote a smaller share of their budget to public
capital, in contrast to public current expenditure.
Under the framework of our theoretical model, this result implies that the level of decen-
tralization in Spanish regions could be above the optimal and this situation could represent
an obstacle for economic growth.
2.7 Appendix I: Theroetical model
We consider an economy populated by a constant amount of in￿nitely lived households.
There are a private consumption and a public good from and two types of capital, private
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physical capital, k, and public infrastructure services, gk. Production can be devoted in-
distinctly to purchase any of the types of consumption or production factors. For the sake
of simplicity we do not include labour. Our economy will be driven by the Cobb-Douglas






Thus, production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors. There is total depre-
ciation in both inputs.





where ct represents private consumption in period t. The consumer ignores the present
and future decisions of the public government. He faces the budget constraint:
(1 ￿ ￿)Yt = Ct + Kt+1 (2.7)
The maximization problem yields the euler equation:
Ct+1
Ct
= ￿c = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
Yt+1
Kt+1
That we expect to be constant in the steady state.
The government has the target of maximizing the utility perceived by the median voter
from the publicly provided public good, gc, which follows a distance-sensitiveness pattern as
described in the utility function (2.6). We assume that the equilibrium amounts provided of
every good are decided according to the median voter theory.31 Given symmetric preferences,
the quantity preferred by the median voter is located a distance equal to the "median distance
31See Congleton (2002) for a good introduction to the topic and its controversies.
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to the median". For a country with area A, the central government would be situated in the
middle. That means that the maximum distance to it is A/2. Given that the individuals are
uniformly distributed , the median distance to the media is A/4. Analogously, for everyone
of the J regions the median distance to the median is A/J4.
Production is taxed at the constant rate ￿ 2 (0;1):The government distributes the public
budget among public consumption, Gc;t and public capital accumulation for next period,
Gk;t+1, taking into account that the relative price of public consumption depends positively
on the level of centralization, ￿; as described in the budget constraint (2.7). The government
maximizes the discounted present value of lifetime utility, (2.6), subject to technology, (2.5),
and the budget constraint (2.7). Let (1 ￿ ￿(￿xic + (1 ￿ ￿)xij)) > 0, xm
mc be the median
distance to the country median and xm
mj be the median distance to the region median. The
maximization problem yields the following euler equation:
Gc;t+1
Gc;t










This economy will converge immediately to an equilibria where all factors grow at a
constant rate ￿. We can work out the equations for the relative proportions of the production
factors used in equilibrium as well as the constant growth rate:
Kt = [A










As long as ￿>1, there is a constant rate of consumption growth and it is entirely in-
dependent of the level of capital stock per person. This will also imply that there are no
transitional dynamics in this model. Starting from any level of initial wealth, the econ-
omy will immediately start growing at a constant rate. We have to impose the additional
condition that A has to be large enough32 to ensure positive economic growth.
32A > ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)￿]￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿)](1￿￿)
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We are ready to analyze the outcome of an increase in ￿scal decentralization, i.e. a
decrease in the parameter ￿:d￿
d￿ will be positive as long as ￿ is smaller than ￿
￿33. That means
that, given a su¢ ciently high level of centralization, ￿ > ￿
￿, a decentralization process will
imply both an increase in the utility perceived by the consumer from the publicly provided
consumption good and in its relative price. The positive e⁄ect on utility is larger and if there
were no change in public investment the Euler equation would not hold anymore because the
marginal productivity of public capital would be too large in comparison to the consumption
path. Therefore, the decision planner will decide that a larger level of the public budget will
be devoted to the homogeneous public good (public investment) and a smaller share of the
budget is devoted to provision of the heterogeneous public good, Gc:
Once this economy is "too decentralized" and ￿ descends under ￿
￿, the negative e⁄ects
caused by the increasing costs of decentralization overcome the bene￿ts from a closer pro-
vision of public goods and both e⁄ects reverse. In that case, although the consumer still
perceive a bene￿t in the perceived utility from the public consumption good, the e⁄ect on
the price provokes that with the share of public expenditure devoted to Gc before decentral-
izing, the utility perceived from the amount resulting with the new relative prices would be
much lower and the decision maker has to move part of the public budget from investment
to consumption to converge to the new equilibrium
Private decisions and economic growth respond to the changes of public investment.
Therefore, an decentralization process will enlarge economic growth only if we are above
the critical level ￿
￿; and in the contrary, when the economy has already reached this level
of decentralization, additional increases in ￿ would retard economic growth. This happens
because in a more decentralized country there will be more utility for the individuals from the
consumption of heterogeneous public goods, this causing an important wealth e⁄ect making
the demand for public investment increase to the point in which marginal utility equals
the marginal bene￿t of investment. But decentralization comes at the cost of paying an
increasing price for the heterogeneous public good whose e⁄ect will at some point overcome
the bene￿ts in the utility function, making the increase on the demand of ·Gk· to die out
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2.8 Appendix II: The functional distribution of the decentralization process
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Figure A.1: Fuctional distribution of Public Expenditure
Data source: Presupuestos de las Comunidades Aut￿nomas. Several years.
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2.9 Appendix III: Evolution and sources of public regional revenues
The graphs show the di⁄erent nature of income between the two regions with "RØgimen
Foral" and the rest. The category tax revenues includes all the taxes whose control lies in
regional governments as well as the participation that they have in other taxes collected by
the central government. We can see how the revisions introduced for the period 1991-1996
and especially that of 1997-2001 have produced a great increase in tax income that has
substituted part of the Participation on the Revenues of the State (PRS).
Source: Self elaboration from the data on section 3.1
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Figure A.2: Sources of revenues: Regions with low level of competencies
The category Social Security and ordinary transfers includes basically two main compo-
nents. The ￿rst one is the translation of funds from the Social Security organism (Tesorer￿a
General de la Seguridad Social) to the regions to face the expenditure regarding social se-
curity (mainly Health34). The second main component is the PRS, which accounts for the
transfers from the central government to ￿nance the competencies assumed by the regions.
This is calculated according to economic, demographic and political variables and taking
into account the di⁄erent amount of competencies that the regions may assume (many of
them are assumed freely).
34The regions complete their expenditure in health policies with other complementary funds from the
central government (or deduced from the amount to be paid, in the case of Vasc Country and Navarra) given
that the amount provided by the Social Security cuotas is declared to be insu¢ cient.
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The category operations of intermediation counts for the transfers from central gov-
ernment and European Funds in which the regions are only the "link" between the funds
provider and their destination. Other revenues include a quite heterogeneous sources of
revenues, among them the Fund of Interterritorial Compensation (FCI)35 and public debt.36
Source: Self elaboration from the data on section 3.1
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Figure A.3: Sources of Revenues: Regions with high level of competencies (Ex. Navarra
and Basque Country)
Source: Self elaboration from the data on section 3.1
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35An incentive to develop the regions with lower production per capita. It is a fund provided to be invested
in activities that enhance growth.
36Ocasionally, the value of this category lies under zero, precisely because of the e⁄ect of the amortization
of public debt.
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Figure A.4: Sources of Revenues: Navarra and Basque Country
2.10 Appendix IV
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Table A.1: Estimated Coe¢ cients Composition of Public Expenditures. Time dummies




AN EVALUATION OF EU REGIONAL POLICY. DO
STRUCTURAL ACTIONS CROWD OUT PUBLIC
SPENDING?
3.1 Introduction
In the early seventies much was written about the e⁄ects of intergovernmental grants on
public expenditure. Transfers between di⁄erent governments -usually from upper to lower
levels of the public administration- became an oft-used tool often with the purpose of en-
hancing public expenditure in pre-determined areas (education, infrastructure, etc.). These
subsidies were usually given on the condition that they were invested in certain targeted
policies or programs. However, as long as the subsidized government was free to adminis-
ter the rest of its budget, these transfers could simply crowd out the resources previously
allocated in the subsidized areas to other alternative uses or to reduce tax revenues.
In fact, in a neoclassical model of local government, with fully informed agents and perfect
political competition, alterations to private income are perfectly substitutable by equivalent
alterations to public revenue. The result of giving a lump-sum grant to households or giving
it to public bodies would be identical. Governments receiving grants would increase their
public expenditure only because of a wealth e⁄ect, which would be identical to distributing
the grants homogeneously through the population. However, many empirical studies1 have
revealed that the grants provided by the US federal government have boosted state and local
public expenditure. These grants were shown not to crowd out totally public expenditure
in the policy areas in which they were introduced. Economic theory has responded to this
evidence through two main strands of research.
A ￿rst line of research analyzed the necessary conditions that make lump-sum public
grants boost public spending more than an equivalent increase in private income, i.e. the
1Weicher (1972) and Feldstein (1975) among others. Fisher (1982) includes a complete literature review.
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"￿ ypaper e⁄ect". The most standard explanations refer to the rigidities in the decision-
making process (Dougan and Kenyon (1988)). Pressure groups that perceive higher utility
from public spending than the average voter take advantage of the "￿scal illusion " induced
by a lump-sum subsidy. But alternative ways to explain the phenomenon have also emerged.
According to Hamilton (1983) and King (1984), the variations of the public expenditure
decisions could come as a response to changes in local socioeconomic characteristics induced
by the grants.
The second strand of the literature has been largely inspired by the work of Bradford and
Oates (1971), and tries to identify under which conditions public grants are more e⁄ective
in boosting public expenditure. In particular, this literature evaluates the use of matching-
grants, which provide a funding for a particular public good proportional to the level of
expenditure of the subsidized government in that public good. More recently, Chubb (1985)
and Melo (2002) have tried to model how in less popular policy areas lump-sum grants do
lead to local spending cuts that push the level of public expenditure down to its original
level. This makes the use of matching grants more advisable if the purpose is to push up
expenditure. As opposed to more popular policies areas: policy-makers would always ￿nd
incentives to enlarge public spending in those, making lump-sum grants also a valid tool to
reach the desired increase in spending.
We evaluate the e⁄ectiveness in enhancing public investment of the grants system es-
tablished under the European Structural Actions. The European Union began its Cohesion
policy in 1975 devoted to reducing the existing di⁄erences among the various regions and
promoting economic growth, especially in less favoured areas. It implemented a system of
matching grants through the Structural and Cohesion Funds, which were conceived to push
up public investments and expenditures in key areas for enhancing growth. The channel
through which the Funds try to push public investment up in those areas is by making
an EU contribution to certain projects conditional on a certain level of expenditure of the
member countries on those projects. The aim of this "matching" system is to prevent that
the share of public expenditure that would otherwise be devoted to certain kinds of pub-
lic investment from being deviated to a di⁄erent category of public expenditure after the
implementation of the grant.
Using panel data from 15 European countries for the period 1993-2005 we test the extent
to which these grants enhance public investment e⁄ectively. We use standard ￿xed-e⁄ects
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and random-e⁄ects estimation in a linear model with autocorrelated errors and the GMM
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator in a dynamic modi￿cation of the model that takes into
account the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. We repeat a similar analysis with
data from the Spanish regions (NUTS 2) to control whether the previously estimated e⁄ect
is homogeneous among levels of the public administration.
We estimate that only 60 percent of the increase in the Structural Funds received by the
subsidized government are used to increase public investment. The remaining 40 percent of
the transfer is crowded out towards other alternative uses, like public consumption.
Using an extended version of the AK model, we examine the link between matching
grants and public investment under neoclassical technology and an exogenously determined
tax rate. The model compares the e⁄ect on public investment of a matching grant policy
with that from an equivalent lump-sum transfer and shows how the e⁄ect of the matching
grant depends on the relative amount used of the subsidized capital
According to our theoretical model, the pattern estimated in our panel can be interpreted
as a relatively good performance of the matching process of the grants established by the
European Union. Taking into account the decision process that drives the allocation of
the Structural Funds, subsidized governments may take as given an important share of
the grants that they perceive, and their behavior towards those would be more likely to
consider them as lump-sum grants rather than matching-grants. This may happen because
the European Commission is not totally autonomous negotiating the investment projects in
which to invest the Funds. Instead, it must stick to the predetermined amount of Funds
agreed in the European Council.
Section 2 introduces a theoretical framework about matching grants, section 3 summa-
rizes the econometric techniques and modelling used in previous related studies, section 4
describes the European cohesion policy, section 5 introduces the variables and data used,
section 6 explains the model and interprets the results and section 7 concludes.
3.2 Theory on the e⁄ectiveness of public grants.
Bradford and Oates (1971) is the response to previous e⁄orts to ￿nd a common theory on
intergovernmental grants. They prove that under simple majority rule with ￿xed tax shares
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and a single public good, a matching grant will always lead to a larger public expenditure
than a lump-sum grant of the same amount. The key assumptions are the presence of an
individual decision-maker with preference patterns of the usual sort and a collective decision
made by simple majority rule. Gramlich and Galper (1973) develop the analysis further
by including in a model three di⁄erent types of grants,2 and a local government with a
very complete utility function that includes, among other factors, the level of current public
expenditures. They conclude that matching grants have a larger e⁄ect on public expenditure,
while the impact of closed-end lump sum transfers on public expenditure remains quite low.
Most subsequent work on intergovernmental grants has focused on exploring theoretical
explanations to explain why lump-sum grants to public bodies boost public expenditure
more than an equivalent increase in public wealth (￿ ypaper e⁄ect). These explanations
concentrate on complexities in the public policy process, agenda setting, ￿scal illusion, etc.
A good example is the setter model proposed by Romer and Rosenthal (1980), in which an
agent whose target is to maximize public expenditure takes part in the process of determining
the public budget. Hamilton￿ s (1986) explanation relies on the deadweight loss of welfare
created by increases in taxation. Borge (1995) develops the ￿scal illusion model of Wallace
Oates and shows that it unambiguously predicts a ￿ ypaper e⁄ect.3
However, for many years the conditions under which public grants boost a larger share
of public expenditure have been relatively unexplored. Chubb (1985) expands the interpre-
tation in Bradford and Oates (1971) by arguing that the implementation of matching or
lump-sum grants responds to the solution of a hierarchy principal-agent problem existing
between federal and state governments. Other studies, like Bahl and Duncombe (1988),
Bahl and Sjoquist (1990), and Deller and Walzer (1995), have focused their attention on the
persistence of the policies, by considering budgetary decision-making in a slightly longer-
term view. Grants revenue can be viewed as something more or less permanent. If a public
body can count on grant revenues for the long term, they will easily substitute their own
revenues. Alternatively, if aid is considered transitory, they will be less likely to substitute
other revenues and will serve better to their purpose of enlarging the public budget, using
these funds for one-time ventures.
Knight (2002) uses a bargaining model, based also on Bradford and Oates (1971, 1971b),
2Open-end matching grants, closed-end lump-sum transfers and closed-end categorical grants, that trans-
fers a limited amount of money to be used for a speci￿c program.
3Bailey and Connolly (1998) include a complete summary of theoretical explanations and critics of the
￿ ypaper e⁄ect in which they list 10 existing theoretical reasons that previous analyses have used to model
the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect.
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in which grants and public expenditure are the result of a two-stage process: the ￿rst (federal
budgetary stage), in which a federal legislature, with one representative from each state,
determines the distribution of grants across states from the federal budget, and a second stage
(state budgetary stage) in which state governments, taking ￿rst-stage intergovernmental
grant levels as given, allocate federal grants and private income between public and private
consumption. He shows that the allocation of grants is endogenous to the state￿ s preference
to increase its expenditure. This may be the reason why many estimations may upwardly
bias the public expenditure response to grants.
One of the more recent and outstanding contributions to the theory of intergovernmental
grants is the paper by Volden (2007). His model includes a game, solved through subgame
perfect equilibrium and backward induction, in which elected politicians in a national and
subnational governments compete with each other to claim credit for providing goods and
services in a given policy area. The politicians are seeking to represent the desires of their
constituency.
His more interesting ￿ndings regarding the response of public expenditure to federal
grants are, ￿rstly the dependence of the e⁄ect on the capacity of the recipient government
to e¢ ciently raise taxes, so that governments with greatest tax e¢ ciency would experience
higher crowding-out induced by the grant. Secondly, the donor government would increase
its grant size under some conditions (namely demand for the good) that also a⁄ect the
propensity to spend of the subnational government. This would give the appearance of a
smaller crowding-out e⁄ect, since the increase in the good provision would have occurred
without the grant. Identically, a decline in the tax e¢ ciency could provoke an opposite
reaction under which more of a crowding-out e⁄ect would be detected.
3.2.1 Matching grants in a simple model of neoclassical growth
We will use a version of the simplest neoclassical model of substained growth to see
the transition mechanism that drives the impact of matching grants to public investment
onto public expenditure . We have modi￿ed the so-called AK model, where the production
technology is linear in capital, including separately public capital in the production func-
tion. Since our interest is exclusively on the behavior of public expenditure, we assume an
exogenously determined ￿xed tax rate.
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Our purpose is to replicate the e⁄ects of the implementation of a matching grants system,
similar to the one established in the European Union through the Structural and Cohesion
Funds. The main target of these policies is to increase economic growth by enhancing public
investment. The choice of matching-grants instead of lump-sum grants has precisely the
purpose of making public investment more attractive in comparison to public consumption.
We consider a country with an in￿nitely lived representative median voter, whose pref-
erences depend on the amounts consumed of a private good and a publicly provided public
good. The decisions are taken separately, and the household cannot forecast the behavior
of the government while taking their own decisions. The households are also the owners
of the technology of the country, which produces according to a constant returns to scale






The model is developed in the Appendix.
The subsidizer, in our case the European Union￿ s structural policy, gives a matching
grant to selected types of public capital. The implementation of a matching grant would be
translated into the model as a decrease in the relative price of public capital, represented by
the parameter ￿ (￿ 2 (0:1)). The subsidizer would then share the cost of part of the purchase
of public capital (1￿￿)G while the remaining ￿G is still paid by the subsidized government
through its tax revenues.
In section 3.6 we estimate the response of total public investment to the introduction of
a grants system in the economy is given by the variation on total public investment after and
before the implementation of the grant, that is, the increment ￿G. If there is an increase
in public investment higher than the grant actually perceived we say that there is crowding-
in of public investment induced by the matching grant, while when the increase in public
investment is smaller than the grant we de￿ne it as crowding-out. The case in which there
is zero or a negative increment of public investment is called total crowding-out.
In the Appendix we are able to develop the consequences of the introduction of a
matching-grant in our particular framework, summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 3.1 In our model of neoclassical technology, a matching-grant to public capital
will always induce a crowding-in e⁄ect onto public investment:This means that there will be
a positive increase in ￿nal public investment higher than the amount granted as a reaction
to the transfer.
This result would imply that if the Structural Funds behave really as matching grant,
the coe¢ cient estimated in section 3.6 should be larger than one, because there will always
be crowding-in of public investment. We could admit the possibility that the Funds are not
really matching grants since, as we describe later in section 3.4, their amounts are negotiated
in the European Council every seven years and the subsidized States could take as given that
they will perceive then.
For this reason, we introduce in our model the possibility for the grants perceived through
the Structural Funds to behave as lump-sum grants rather than matching-grants. The joint
analysis of our estimations and the decision process described in section 4 may induce us
to be skeptical about whether the Structural Funds do actually work as matching grants or
as lump-sum transfers. Although they are designed as matching grants, the broad numbers
are the result of a bargaining process in the European Council. This means that subsidized
governments may take as given that they will receive at least a share of the Funds agreed
in the Council. Later on, it will be the work of the European Commission to negotiate
with these governments the particular projects and conditions under which the Funds will
be invested.
Therefore, we want to check in our model how lump-sum transfers of capital do a⁄ect
public expenditure. This is done in case C in the appendix, whose conclusions are reported
in proposition 2:
Proposition 3.2 In our economy with neoclassical technology and a ￿xed tax-rate, a lump-
sum transfer to the government from an external agent will induce a deviation of public
resources from public investment towards public consumption such that the government will
increase public consumption by a quantity higher than the transfer received. Therefore, there
will be a negative increase in ￿nal public investment as a reaction to the transfer.
According to this proposition, lump-sum transfers will induce a very strong crowding-out
e⁄ect on public investment. In fact, proposition 3 states that the estimated coe¢ cient ￿1 in
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equation (3.2) associated with a lump-sum grant should be negative4 since the crowding-out
e⁄ect would be larger than the grant transferred.
We expect the impact of the matching grants designed for the Structural Funds on
public investment to depend on the leeway of the European Commission to e⁄ectively decide
on the ￿nal amount of grants allocated according to the subsidized government￿ s behavior.
As long as governments take as given an important part of the transfers, they will treat
them as lump-sum transfers and these transfers will crowd out public investment. But if
the European commission also has some margin to decide particular investment projects to
be developed and the granted amount of money could ￿ uctuate according to the State￿ s
investment on these projects, the Funds will work as matching grants and they will crowd
in public investment.
Our real scenario could lie somewhere in between a system of lump-sum transfers and
matching grants. So, if we assume that a share ￿ of the increase on the Structural Funds is
considered as lump-sum transfers by the subsidized governments while the rest of it, (1￿￿);
is transferred according to a matching grant system, from equations (3.13) and (3.15) we get













where ￿L = ￿￿SF and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)G = (1 ￿ ￿)￿SF
The ￿rst term inside the brackets represents the crowding-in e⁄ect induced by the match-
ing grants, and is always larger than one, while the second term represents the crowding-out
e⁄ect induced by the lump-sum part of the funds, and is always negative. We have esti-
mated a coe¢ cient 0.6 for ￿1, therefore the Structural Funds are not understood as working
precisely as matching grants or lump-sum transfers, but rather as a combination of both
4While it is only necessary a coe¢ cient smaller than one for the existence of crowding-out
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depending on the extend to which subsidized governments treat them as unconditionally
given.
Finally we will brie￿ y discuss how some of the implications of this model match the
results estimated in section 6. Firstly, the level of public investment,
G1;t+G2;t
Yt ; depends
positively on the exogenous tax rate. We do not include tax rate among our explanatory
variables, but public consumption as an approximation of public expenditure. We estimate
a positive coe¢ cient associated with this variable which is perfectly consistent with this
theoretical model. Secondly, private capital in our model is endogenously determined, but if
any exogenous shock alters private capital, according to equation (3.11) in the Appendix, the
relative amounts of public investment would also decrease, which is also consistent with the
negative coe¢ cient estimated in section 3.6. Finally, our model predicts a negative reaction
of public investment towards exogenous changes in economic growth (due, for example, to
a change in the technology represented by A) which this time does not coincide with our
estimations since we are able to identify an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient attached to growth.
3.2.1.1 Extension: subsidized and non-subsidized public capital.
In the Appendix we also develop a version of the basic model with two types of public
capital. We want to see the role that the output elasticities of the public factors have on the
response to matching grants. Two types of public capital have been included to make the
model more intuitive, one of which has a larger output elasticity (￿1 > ￿2):
The implementation of the matching grant would be translated into the model, in a
similar way that in the basic model, as a decrease in the relative price of any of these two types
of public capital, represented either by the parameter ￿1 or ￿2 respectively (￿1,￿2 2 (0:1)).
The subsidizer would then share the cost of part of the purchase of public capital (1￿￿1)G1or
(1￿￿2)G2; while the remaining ￿1G1or ￿2G2 is still paid by the subsidized government through
its tax revenues.
To explore the importance of the elasticity of substitution of the subsidized type of public
capital on the crowding-in e⁄ect and on economic growth we compare in the appendix the
e⁄ects of two alternative grants to each type of public capital: in the ￿rst case with identical
rate of subsidy and in the second with identical cost for the subsidizer, yielding propositions
3 and 4:
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Proposition 3.3 The response of a public authority towards a matching grants policy on
certain kind public investment run by an external institution depends on the relative amount
of this kind of public investment used previously. The higher the output elasticity of this kind
of public investment with respect to the other production factors, the higher the increase in
public expenditure induced by the grant.
Proposition 3.4 The cost to the subsidizer of running a matching grant policy with the pur-
pose of reaching a predetermined increase of public investment does not depend on the output
elasticity of the subsidized type of public investment. However, the higher this elasticity of
the public investment, the higher the increase in economic growth induced by the reallocation
of factors.
Propositions 3 and 4 summarize the importance of the output elasticity (which indicates
also the relative amount of the factors used in equilibrium) on the response of public in-
vestment to the matching grants. Proposition 3 explains that the response of a certain type
of capital to a matching grant program will depend on its output elasticity (￿). Therefore,
the comparison of the reaction of public investment to di⁄erent matching-grant programmes
may serve the policy-maker to infer the properties of the subsidized capital: the higher the
response, the higher the ￿ associated with this type of capital.
Proposition 3 is useful for the policy maker to identify the type of capital with a higher
output elasticity, ￿ ; according to proposition 4, however, the impact of a matching-grants
policy on economic growth does not depend only on the amount of money invested, but also
on the elasticity of the subsidized capital. Therefore, to make grants more e¢ cient they
should be allocated to the type of capital with a higher coe¢ cient ￿; which is also the more
commonly used in equilibrium.
These two propositions can be used for an optimistic interpretation regarding the ca-
pacity that the policy maker may have to focus the target of the matching grants policy
on the types of public investment that will imply a larger e⁄ect on growth. As long as the
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policy maker must be able to observe the dynamics described in proposition 3 regarding the
response of the subsidized capital to the grant -in particular they know the coe¢ cient ￿-,
that, combined with our estimation here, would serve him to obtain conclusions about the
size of the crowding-out e⁄ect of the matching-grant policy5 on non-subsidized capital.
However, regarding the estimation made on this paper, we should expect the estimated
coe¢ cient ￿1in section 3.6 (equation (3.2)) to be independent of the ￿nal e⁄ect on economic
growth. According to proposition 4 the cost of running a matching grant policy, i.e. the
relationship between the subsidized amount and the response of public investment, does not
depend on the output elasticity of the subsidized capital. Since in principle we are not able
to observe the ￿nal e⁄ect on output growth, we cannot assess whether the subsidized capital
has been optimally targeted or not.
3.3 Modelling the E⁄ect of Grants on Public Expenditure
The earlier literature about the e⁄ects of grants policies on local and state expenditure
emerged in the early seventies, most of them using data from the several federal grant pro-
grams implemented in the US to boost economic growth in less developed States and areas.
During this decade, a great number of studies, probably encouraged by the ￿ndings presented
by Bradford and Oates (1971), examined the extent to which additional grants receipts were
associated with greater government expenditure. These studies generally relied on taking
cross-sectional variations in grants to be exogenous to the level of public expenditure which
they a⁄ect. We recall here the study by Gramlich and Galper (1973) in which they estimated
an e⁄ect of a 25 percentage point response on public local expenditure to alterations in state
and federal aid to ten urban governments. More detailed literature reviews on this period
may be found in Hines and Thaler (1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1998).
Winer (1983) considered a dynamic speci￿cation of the model, but these results did
not di⁄er from its static counterpart, and he concluded that public expenditure in Cana-
dian provinces experience an increase slightly higher than the increase in grants perceived,
therefore rejecting the crowding-out hypothesis.
5We regress ￿Gsubsidized+Gnonsub
Y on (1 ￿ ￿)Gsubsidized
Y : For the policy maker it must be relatively easy
to observe the impact of (1 ￿ ￿)Gsubsidized on ￿Gsubsidized, and, therefore, obtain conclusions about the
crowding-out e⁄ect of (1 ￿ ￿)Gsubsidized on ￿Gnonsub: We ignore the output elasticities of the capital sub-
sidized through the Structural Fund, so we are not able to identify Gsubsidized with either G1 or G2 in this
model.
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Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) estimated the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect of federal grants on US
states in a study in which the main target was to analyze ￿scal policy interdependence
among states. They setup their model as a standard "￿xed e⁄ects" linear panel data model
in which they introduced common random shocks among neighbors. They also included
among the explanatory variables decisions about public expenditure taken by the neighbor
states.
They estimated the e⁄ect of federal grants on state spending between 0.014 (for "State
Administration") and 0.278 (for "Health and human services " expenditure). However, their
estimated e⁄ect was much closer to 1 in the models that included total public expenditure.
These results should be treated with scepticism. Firstly because the results are obtained
using very heterogeneous de￿nitions of the weighting matrix used to de￿ne "neighborhood
". Apart from physical distance they also consider per capita income and the proportion
of the population that is black. Secondly, the results regarding our variable of interest,
federal grants, are too volatile. One possibility might be that the absence of some relevant
variables provoke both the high level of ￿scal interdependence among states as well as the
high variance of the results regarding the e⁄ects of public grants.
The accuracy of the Case et al. (1993) estimations was soon questioned. Becker (1996)
used two main arguments. The ￿rst regarded the feasibility of estimating a linear model,
while proposing a logarithmic form. The second issue concerned the assumption of the
exogeneity of grants received by states with respect to the dependent variable, local and
state public expenditure. She estimated a residual response of public expenditure in the US
states to external aid of around 2.2 percentage points. The estimation only includes lags
of the dependent variable, income per capita and tax prices as explanatory variables. This
leaves open the possibility that her results may have been in￿ uenced by the omission of other
factors usually included in related studies, especially demographic variables.
The paper by Bailey and Connolly (1998) included an interesting extension of those
critiques applied to previous literature, putting emphasis on the use of inappropriate variables
and on the use of an inappropriate functional form as the main types of errors identi￿ed in
previous studies.
Besley and Case (2000) explore the use of di⁄erent methods for estimating policy inci-
dence when there is a concern about policy endogeneity. Based on their results, most of the
previous related regressions might be biased since grants allocation may be considered an
endogenous variable in a legislative bargaining model, correlated to preferences for public
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goods. The Literature on grant policies would need to take into account the possibility of
the presence of endogenous variables, in particular the possibility that the distribution of
grants and the public expenditure policies are somehow driven by a common preferences
pattern. Besley and Case (2000) proposed the use of IV estimation as an alternative to
control for endogeneity. They illustrate their conclusions with an example of State policy on
workers ￿compensation bene￿ts in which the women￿ s political involvement works as a valid
instrument of the public policy.
Knight (2002) studied the response of state expenditure on public highways to grants
provided by the Federal aid highway program. His interpretation is that the target of this
Federal grants program is to enlarge public expenditure in a determinate area by the same
amount as the grant received or even more.6 He takes endogeneity into account by using
instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations, which are corre-
lated to the actual distribution of grants. He ￿nds that federal grants do signi￿cantly crowd
out state expenditure on highways.
Gordon (2004) estimates the e⁄ect induced by US federal grants to elementary and sec-
ondary education. She uses IV,7 since she ￿nds that the amount of these grants (called
Title I) are computed partially based on former public expenditure on education per pupil.
She uses as instruments the set of remaining variables actually used to allocate grants and
estimates one to three year ￿rst di⁄erenced data from 7047 school districts. Her results are
very interesting, since she ￿nds a one-to-one short-term e⁄ect of federal grants on instruc-
tional expenditure, but in the long term the districts "accommodate " their budgets to the
grants that crowd out public expenditure and produce a decreasing e⁄ect on local revenues
(probably because of decreasing taxes).
Probably because of the di⁄erent political settings, there has been little work with Euro-
pean data. A notable exception is the work by Pallesen (2006), in which the author estimates
the e⁄ect of a change from matching grants to unconditional lump-sum grants from the cen-
tral government to Danish local government. He shows how for almost all the policy areas
the use of lump-sum grants does not seriously alter the pattern of public spending.
6According to this interpretation, when the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect covers less than the grant received we can
consider that there is a "crowding-out " e⁄ect from the grant on this category of public expenditure.
Identically, a ￿ ypaper e⁄ect higher that the grant would mean that the grant perceived "crowds-in " public
expenditure on this policy area.
7However, her results using OLS do not throw signi￿cant di⁄erences.
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Table 1: Selected literature review.
3.4 The European Cohesion Policy.
In this section we describe the system of grants introduced in the European Union
through the Cohesion Policy. This Cohesion Policy involves the development of certain
projects determined by the European Council and the European Commission called Struc-
tural Actions, which are partially ￿nanced by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund.
There are four Structural Funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which
is intended to ￿nance large infrastructure projects and has the largest weight in the bud-
get; the European Social Fund (ESF), which is the main ￿nancial instrument allowing the
Union to realize the strategic objectives of its employment policy; the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF - Guidance Section), which contributes to
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the structural reform of the agriculture sector; and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG), which is the speci￿c Fund for the structural reform of the ￿sheries sector.
These Structural Funds, in particular the ERDF, and the Cohesion Fund (CF), are the
main target of our study, since they are intended to promote public investment, not only by
the EU, but also by the member countries that receive them, through a system of matching
grants that we introduce later.
3.4.1 Evolution of Structural Actions
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Union has declared the
harmonious development of the economies of the member states as one of its main objectives,
by reducing the di⁄erences existing among the various regions and the backwardness of the
least favoured regions. The initial plan put a lot of emphasis on the development of a common
agricultural policy. The creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in
1975 represents the beginning of an active cohesion policy. Starting in the European Council
in Brussels in 1988, the provision and allocation of the Structural Funds (then referred to
as Solidarity Funds) is intended to be overhauled periodically by the Council every ￿ve to
seven years. The ￿rst allocation was negotiated for the period 1989-1993.
Cohesion policy became specially reinforced after the acceptance of the Treaty of the
European Union in 1992 that established it as one of the main objectives of the union, and
created the Cohesion Fund to support projects in the least prosperous Member States. The
distribution of resources accorded in the Edinburgh European Council in 1993, for the period
1994-1999, allocated one third of the Community budget to cohesion policy, almost three
times the sum negotiated for the period 1989-93.
The European Council of Berlin in 1999 reformed the Structural Funds for the period
2000-2006 with a budget similar to the period before but with a reorganization of the ob-
jective regions into three groups instead of the seven existing before. The main principals
regarding objectives, namely procedure, co￿nancing rates and supervision remained almost
unchanged. The European Council and the European Parliament have approved the reform
of cohesion policy for the period 2007-2013 ( European Union. Regional Policy (2006)), with
a substantial increase in the budget due to the entrance of the new member states into the
EU.
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3.4.2 The European Regional Development Fund in the budget of the EU
In 2005 Agricultural policy represented approximately half of the total expenditure in
the budget of the European Union.8 The structural actions represented approximately 34%
of the budget, allocated among Structural Funds (31.7%) and Cohesion Funds9 (2.3%). More
than a half of the Structural Funds corresponded to the ERDF and the rest to the other
structural funds.
Source: European Commision (2005a), Report on the Structural Funds 2004
100.00% 1.78% 10.06% 30.71% 57.46% Total objectives
11.51% 0.48% 0.95% 13.16% 2.89% Obj. 3 and out.
10.79% 0.00% 0.00% 1.10% 9.68% Objective 2
71.73% 1.30% 9.11% 16.44% 44.88% Objective 1
Total SF FIFG EAGGF ESF ERDF
Source: European Commision (2005a), Report on the Structural Funds 2004
100.00% 1.78% 10.06% 30.71% 57.46% Total objectives
11.51% 0.48% 0.95% 13.16% 2.89% Obj. 3 and out.
10.79% 0.00% 0.00% 1.10% 9.68% Objective 2
71.73% 1.30% 9.11% 16.44% 44.88% Objective 1
Total SF FIFG EAGGF ESF ERDF
Table 2: Allocation of Structural Funds by Fund and Objective areas.
More than two thirds of the structural actions and ERDF were invested in Objective 1
regions (Objective 1 and 6 in the plan for the period 1994-1999), which are those with a lower
per capita income in the EU.10 The emphasis of the ERDF in those regions is to promote large
infrastructure projects, particularly in the context of trans-European networks: transport,
telecommunications and energy as well as any other productive activities. In Objective 2
regions (objective 2 and 5b in the plan for 1994-1999) the e⁄orts are focused on diversi￿cation
of economic activities, rehabilitation of industrial sites and infrastructure on a local scale
and ￿nally, for the rest of the regions the ERDF acts through the initiatives Interreg III and
urban II.11 (European Commission (2006))
8More precisely, the execution of the EU expenditure budget in 2005 allocates 48 465.8 million Euro to
Agriculture, 30 526.5 mill. E. to Structural Funds, 2 228.9 mill. E. to Cohesion Fund, 7 520.8 mill E to
Internal Policies and the rest to other categories, to reach the total sum of 104 835.2 million Euro. (European
Commission (2006))
9Intended to ￿nance Transport and Environmental projects in member countries with levels of per capita
income below 90% of the EU-average.
10Below 75% of the average of per capita GDP of the European Union.
11Interreg III is intended to support inter-regional cooperation, specially integrating remote regions and
those that share borders with candidate countries. Urban II is the initiative for substainable development
in the troubled urban districts of the EU.
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*Objective 3, fisheries outside objective 1 and Community Initiatives.
Source: Annex to the Report on the Structural Funds 2004
100.00% 17.93% 11.17% 70.90% Total
3.14% 0.98% 0.57% 1.58% Miscellaneous
8.70% 0.39% 1.62% 6.68% Other
5.15% 0.12% 0.45% 4.59% Environmental Infrastructure
0.84% 0.04% 0.10% 0.70% Energy
3.22% 0.29% 0.36% 2.57% Telecommunications
14.51% 0.37% 0.65% 13.49% Transport
32.42% 1.20% 3.18% 28.03% Basic Infrastructure
30.92% 13.24% 1.18% 16.50% Human Resources
4.74% 0.14% 1.11% 3.49% Research
3.42% 0.25% 0.99% 2.18% Tourism
12.91% 0.37% 3.85% 8.69% Large, SMEs and craft sector
6.01% 1.15% 0.26% 4.61% Development of rural areas
6.42% 0.59% 0.03% 5.80% Agr. Forestry and Fisheries
33.52% 2.50% 6.24% 24.78% Productive Environment
Total Obj. 3/other* Objective 2 Objective 1
*Objective 3, fisheries outside objective 1 and Community Initiatives.
Source: Annex to the Report on the Structural Funds 2004
100.00% 17.93% 11.17% 70.90% Total
3.14% 0.98% 0.57% 1.58% Miscellaneous
8.70% 0.39% 1.62% 6.68% Other
5.15% 0.12% 0.45% 4.59% Environmental Infrastructure
0.84% 0.04% 0.10% 0.70% Energy
3.22% 0.29% 0.36% 2.57% Telecommunications
14.51% 0.37% 0.65% 13.49% Transport
32.42% 1.20% 3.18% 28.03% Basic Infrastructure
30.92% 13.24% 1.18% 16.50% Human Resources
4.74% 0.14% 1.11% 3.49% Research
3.42% 0.25% 0.99% 2.18% Tourism
12.91% 0.37% 3.85% 8.69% Large, SMEs and craft sector
6.01% 1.15% 0.26% 4.61% Development of rural areas
6.42% 0.59% 0.03% 5.80% Agr. Forestry and Fisheries
33.52% 2.50% 6.24% 24.78% Productive Environment
Total Obj. 3/other* Objective 2 Objective 1
Table 3: Use of Structural Funds in the 2000-06 period by Objective and ￿eld of
intervention.
Table 2 shows this functional allocation of the ERDF and the other structural Funds.
The ESF is invested in enhancing Human Capital, through Educational and Labor Market
policies. The EAGGF and FIFG are in the ￿rst two subcategories of productive environment,
while the ERDF includes all the basic infrastructure plus other productive expenditures
a⁄ecting private sector reconversion, Tourism and Research and development.
As for the Cohesion Fund, it ￿nances projects regarding environmental policies (focusing
particularly on waste management, waste water treatment and water supply) and transport
(therefore it would ￿t in the category "Basic Infrastructure" in the table above). It is in-
vested in the least wealthy member states (Greece, Portugal and Spain. Ireland until 2003.
Ten new members since 2004). In 2004, around 51.8% of the CF was invested in Transporta-
tion projects while the remaining 48.2% was devoted to environmental investment.12
122 889 and 2 685 million Euro respectively (European Commission (2005b)).
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3.4.3 Matching Grants
The grants are not distributed unconditionally among states. In fact, there is quite a
long administrative process before the Funds are e⁄ectively paid. They are allocated accord-
ing to action programmes whose priorities are identi￿ed in cooperation with the European
Commission. The choice of measures and the practical projects is the sole responsibility of
the Member States.
The European Council decides following a proposal from the European Commission on
the budget of the Structural Funds, the rules governing their use and the allocation country
by country and by priority objective. The approximate allocation of the Funds to be received
by every Member Country and Objective area for a period of six to eight years is, therefore,
the result of tense negotiations between the Member States.
Following certain common thematic guidelines proposed by the Commission, each Mem-
ber Country has to negotiate with the Commission on the concrete plans. From this point
onwards, national and regional authorities are responsible for the plani￿cation and imple-
mentation of concrete programmes, about which the European authority make a prelimi-
nary control to check that they ￿t in the plan before the implementation, and supervise the
progress of the programmes.
The Structural Fund contribution never ￿nances the whole cost of the program, but only
a part of it.13 The amounts negotiated by each Council are therefore conditional on the
performance of the national and regional authorities that have to run the speci￿c projects.
3.4.4 The Performance of the Member Countries
3.4.4.1 Previous evaluations of the e⁄ectiveness of the Cohesion Policy
The map of the geographical areas that are the target of structural actions in the sev-
eral programs run by the EU, has remained unchanged through the several programs.14 It
13The General ceilling is a maximum of 75% of the total cost of the project (85 % for areas covered by
the Cohesion Fund) in objective 1 areas and 50% in the rest. Those ceilling are revised when the project
includes investment in ￿rms (35% in Objective 1 areas and 25% in Objective 2) or with regard to investment in
infrastructure generating substantial revenue (50% under Objective 1 and 25% under Objective 2) (European
Commission (1999)).
141994-1999 and 2000-2006. The regulations for the period 2007-2013 are already aproved.
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therefore becomes di¢ cult to interpret the extent to which these structural actions have
been useful for the achievement of the desired catching-up e⁄ect, especially since most of
the policies might only show their e⁄ects on the long run. Studies trying to evaluate the im-
pact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 regions are not in general very optimistic.
Dall ￿ Erba and Le Gallo (2003) use a model that controls for spatial spillover e⁄ects among
regions, since they detect the presence of a growth di⁄usion process, especially on the core
regions of the EU. They suggest that the small extent of spillover e⁄ects in peripheral regions
could be an explanation of their backwardness, and that even greater targeted funds do not
allow spillovers in periphery. Rogr￿guez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) use panel data analysis to
identify the lack of upward mobility of assisted regions and the absence of regional conver-
gence. They think that the failure of the EU Structural policy may come from the excessive
skewness towards infrastructure and business support of development strategies in Objective
1 regions.
There are also some more optimistic results, especially in studies focused on particular
member countries. Percoco (2005) analyses the e⁄ect of the Structural Funds on the economic
growth of the Italian Objective 1 regions. He ￿nds that induced growth rates vary highly
across regions. He argues that is because regions that decide on their public investment
based on the estimated marginal productivity of the investment projects are the ones that
experience best performance in terms of output increase. The results in De la Fuente (2003)
for the Spanish regions are even more optimistic. Using a similar framework, he suggests
that the impact of the Structural Funds in Spain has been quite sizable, adding around a
percentage point to annual output growth in the average Objective 1 region and 0.4 points
to employment growth.
3.4.4.2 The Performance of Public Investment
In this paper we look into the public response to the Structural Funds as an intermediate
stage to understand the e⁄ectiveness of the Cohesion Policy. The question of whether the
structural actions are reinforcing the investment policies run by member states and their
regions, or whether on the contrary, they are substituting their own resources with those
from the EU might help us to yield conclusions about whether the European policies are
properly designed to reach the desired catch-up e⁄ect.
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In appendix I we show a detailed analysis of the evolution of public expenditure in two
groups of countries. On the one side are the four countries that have been the main ben-
e￿ciaries of the Structural Funds- Greece, Ireland Spain and Portugal. On the other side
are the ￿ve countries that have received fewer Funds in per capita terms- Denmark, France,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden. The joint analysis of per capita public expen-
diture for some speci￿c functional categories is shown in ￿gure 2. This reveals that while
most of the categories of public expenditure that could be considered public consumption
(health or education, for example) have maintained their relative di⁄erences among both
groups of countries, the gap for public expenditure in "Economic A⁄airs" has been con-
siderably reduced for the time period considered. The group of Structural Funds receivers
could have partly reduced this gap on spending in￿ uenced by the matching-grants received.
"Economic A⁄airs" includes most of the "productive" activities, such as infrastructures in
transport, communication or energy. One could expect that most of the activities ￿nanced
by the Structural Funds, concretely by the ERDF and the CF, will be included under this
denomination.
Attending to the economic classi￿cation of public expenditure we look at public invest-
ment. Public investment includes public expenditure devoted to any functional category, but
exclusively spending on gross ￿xed capital formation. This covers in particular machinery
and equipment, vehicles, dwellings and other buildings. These are precisely the target of
the main ￿nancing projects included in the Social Cohesion policy (with the exception of
the ESF). We show in ￿gure 3 in Appendix II how in our sample period the di⁄erences in
public investment per capita have slightly decreased between the two groups of countries.
We could even infer some preliminary conclusions about the simultaneous behavior of the
gap in public investment per capita and Structural Funds expenditure. The gap seems to be
reduced in the periods in which the amount of Funds increases and remains steady in those
periods in which the expenditure of Structural Funds per capita decreases.
3.5 Data and variables
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3.5.1 Dependent Variable. Increase in Public Investment
Our sample uses data from the 15 oldest member states of the European Union15 for the
period 1993-2005. We use the ￿rst di⁄erence of Public Investment as the dependent variable,
expressed in millions of Euro. This is obtained from Eurostat, in which it is de￿ned as public
expenditure on gross ￿xed capital formation, consisting of net acquisitions of ￿xed tangible
or intangible assets. This covers, in particular, machinery and equipment, vehicles, dwellings
and other buildings. It also includes certain additions to the value of non-produced assets
realized by productive activity. This covers mainly improvements to land, such as draining
of marshes.
3.5.2 Explanatory Variables. Determinants of Public Investment
The main variable, EUSF, includes the increase in payments of transfers from the Euro-
pean Union budget to the member states under the concept of any of the Structural Funds
or the Cohesion Fund. We have seen in tables 2 and 3 that the main focus of the Structural
Actions is to promote public expenditure in capital formation, with the important exception
of the European Social Fund which promotes expenditure in education policies. The ESF is
therefore subtracted from our variables, leaving the other Structural Funds (ERDF, EAGGF
and FIFG) plus the Cohesion Fund.
The rest of the control variables have been selected on the basis of previous studies
determining the main forces driving public investment. The degree of population density
or of urbanization has been shown to be an important determinant of the necessities of
public investment for middle and low income countries (Sturm (2001), Randolph, Bogetic
and He￿ ey (1996)). However in our panel of European countries there are no signi￿cant
shifts of this variable among units, and its inclusion would not add useful information to the
panel. But we have included Population growth among our control variables as a determinant
of public investment. A growing population would naturally increase its demand for some
selected categories of public investment, in telecommunications for example. Simultaneously,
the scale e⁄ects of some other categories of investment, like infrastructures, could imply that
15Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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per capita necessities decrease as population grows. We do include population ( in ￿rst
di⁄erences, population growth) in our set of control variables.
The actual stock of public infrastructure is a natural determinant of current infrastruc-
ture expenditure needs. Assuming diminishing returns to public investment the level of
stock of public capital would a⁄ect negatively the demand for additional investment, al-
though it should be taken into account that due to depreciation there would be an addi-
tional demand for public expenditure to replace existing infrastructures. The ￿nal e⁄ect is
not clear and depends upon the relative strength of opposite forces (Randolph et al. (1996)).
Time-independent variables, such as initial level of GDP per capita or education level, can
accounted for by the unit speci￿c term, so we do not have include them explicitly.
Eurostat % GDP
Net borrowing (+)/net lending (-) of general government is the
difference between the revenue and the expenditure of the
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Table 4: Variables and data sources.
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The rate of production growth is traditionally included as a determinant of public ex-
penditure.16 It has been argued that the income elasticity of the demand of some public
goods could a⁄ect the allocation of public expenditure as growth rates ￿ uctuate. (This is
a version of Wagner￿ s Law) It could also take cyclical factors into account, especially when
there is no other variable attached to the business cycle in the model.
Restrictive ￿scal policy measures may also be induced by high levels of budget de￿cits
or government debt. Roubini and Sachs (1989) show that capital expenditures su⁄er more
drastically under the implementation of these restrictive ￿scal policies. This is a consequence
of the fact that very often this kind of expenditure is less rigid than other public expenditure
categories(De Haan et al (1996)). More recent results by Mehrotra and Valila (2006) using
cointegration techniques support this hypothesis.
The results in Kneller et al. (1999) suggest that we should also include a variable to
account for the public spending not devoted to investment. Increases in the level of public
consumption and in general, in the spending possibilities of the country should naturally
have an e⁄ect on Public Investment. We consider Public Consumption as an indicator of
the variations of the spending capacity in the budgets of the public bodies of the country.
The inclusion of private investment among the set of explanatories has been inspired
by the results in De Haan et al. (1996) and Sturm (1998). They estimate a rage of model
speci￿cations using panel data for 22 OECD countries for the period 1980-1992, concluding
that movements in public investment tend to follow those in private investment.
There have been several studies trying to link political variables to the tendency to alter
patterns of public spending. The political variables that could a⁄ect government spending
might be the kind of party in power, the kind of government (coalition, majority government
or minority government) and the political in￿ uences of lobbying. The more conclusive results
have been found in studies that link the in￿ uence of political variables on the level of public
spending (Roubini and Sachs (1989)) or debt-related issues.17 However, studies focused on
public investment have not been able to ￿nd any signi￿cant link of the current level of public
investment with political variables. We recall here the results in Sturm (2001), for non
OECD countries, De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996), for OECD countries, and Mizutani
16See for example Miller and Russek (1997), Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) Bose, Haque and
Osborn (2003),
17De Haan and Sturm (1997), see Sturm (2001) for a detailed literature review
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and Tanaka (2005), who use regional data from Japan prefectures. Therefore, we do not
include any political variable among our set of controls.
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Table 5: National Data. Summary Statistics
3.6 Empirical Model and Results
3.6.1 Econometric model
To test the hypothesis that public investment may be a⁄ected by European Structural
Funds ￿grants, we have constructed a model in which the dependent variable is the public
investment made by the consolidated government, including central, regional and local gov-
ernments as well as social security funds, Iit: The set of explanatory variables (Xit) includes
our main variable of interest, EU Structural Funds allocated to the member country "i "
in the current year "t ", sit: We have also introduced in the model other control variables:
GDP, population, public balance, public consumption and private investment, included in
the vector cit.
Iit = ￿1sit + ￿2cit + ￿i + uit (3.2)
Xit = fsit;citg ￿ = f￿1;￿2g
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The coe¢ cient ￿1 representsin the extended model of our neoclassical framework pre-
sented in section 2 and Appendix I the increase in public investment compresed the grant
(￿(gsub +gnonsub)+(1￿￿)gsub ) in relation to the increment on the grant (￿(1￿￿)gsub). In






￿rst braket represents the (crowding-in) e⁄ect in the subsidized capital while the second
braket includes the (crowding-out) e⁄ect on non subsidized capital.
All variables have been included in ￿rst di⁄erences to avoid the probable nonstationary
behavior of many of them. We also suspect a serially correlated error term, due to the nature
of the variables and the length of the time dimension of the sample. T-statistic to control for
￿rst-order autocorrelation of the error term are reported in next subsection. This motivates
the inclusion of an autocorrelated error in model (3.2):
uit = ￿uit￿1 + "it where "it~N[0;￿e]
The original model in equation (3.2) has been estimated in the presence of serially
correlated errors, but under the assumption of strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables,
i.e.
E[x0is;uit] = 0 t;s = 1;2;:::T:
This assumption may be considered too strong for our model. Especially after the results
in Knight (2002), the allocation and execution of the structural funds may be thought to
respond to some unobserved necessities and conjuncture that simultaneously drives decisions
on public investment.
The immediate solution to the problem would be to ￿nd some instrumental variables
correlated to structural funds but orthogonal to public investment. Alternatively, we can
use lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as instruments. The GMM estimation
method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) relies on the orthogonality of the depen-
dent and explanatory variables with the ￿rst di⁄erences of the error component in lagged
periods. This method allows us to include endogenous and predetermined dependent vari-
ables. These GMM methods construct moment conditions that re￿ ect this orthogonality,
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under assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks, error components and predetermined ini-
tial conditions (E[￿i] = E[uit] = E[￿iuit] = 0; E[uisuit] = 0 for s 6= t and E[yi1uit] = 0 for
t = 2;:::T:respectively.). The problem would be, therefore, that we have previously admitted
the possibility of the existence or AR(1) errors in the original model [3.2], which implies that
lagged values of iit and xit are correlated with past shocks and the moment conditions that
should be used, E[iit￿s￿uit] = 0 for t=3,...T and s￿ 2 and E[xit￿s￿uit] = 018 are no longer
valid.
But we can still transform the static model (3.2) to obtain a dynamic representation
with serially uncorrelated shocks.
Iit = ￿1sit + ￿2cit + ￿i + uit where uit = ￿uit￿1 + "it
￿Iit￿1 = ￿￿1sit￿1 + ￿￿2cit￿1 + ￿￿i + ￿uit￿1
Iit = ￿iit￿1 + ￿1sit ￿ ￿￿1sit￿1 + ￿2cit ￿ ￿￿2cit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿i + "it (3.3)
This is a dynamic model with serially uncorrelated shocks that we can estimate using
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panels. The explanatory variables
are correlated with the individual e⁄ects and are predetermined or endogenous with respect
to the serially uncorrelated shocks "it. Note that the original betas are still the long-run
relationship if we assumed long-run stability, with iit = iit￿1, sit = sit￿1 and cit = cit￿1
as we did in the ￿rst chapter to compute the long-term relationship of public expenditure
composition with economic growth.
3.6.2 Estimation results
We consider two alternative sets of explanatory variables. Columns [1] to [3] show the
results in the model with GDP growth, public consumption and private investment while
columns [4] to [6] include in addition population growth and public balance. Columns [1] and
18t=3,...T and s￿ 2 if xit contains endogenous variables. If they are predetermined or strictly exogenous
there would be a larger set of moment conditions available.
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[4] show the results for the ￿xed-e⁄ects model while columns [2] and [5] are the random-e⁄ects
coe¢ cients.
The di⁄erence between both, ￿xed-e⁄ects and random-e⁄ects estimation models are al-
most imperceptible. In fact, when we run the Hausman test to both estimators, we cannot
reject the null of no systematic di⁄erence in coe¢ cients in both cases.19 We therefore expect
correlation between the individual speci￿c e⁄ects and the error term not to be problematic
in our model. Also as expected, random-e⁄ects estimation yield narrower standard errors.
Both static models include autocorrelated errors, since the results of the Baltagi-Wu
test and the modi￿ed Durbin-watson test proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982) suggest the
presence of autocorrelated errors. The results of the F-test allow us to reject the null of no
signi￿cant di⁄erence among the group e⁄ects.
(6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
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Table 6: EU Structural Funds Crowd-out. National-level data: EU 15, 1993-2005.
Columns [3] and [6] report estimation results for the dynamic model (3.3), estimated
using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. Again, the di⁄erences in the results
19The test-statistic takes a value of 7.72 for the ￿rst model and 3.46 for the second.
GONZÁLEZ ALEGRE, Juan (2008), The Distribution of Public Expenditure in Europe 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/22383.6. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 115
are not dramatic in comparison to those obtained previously. Endogeneity thus seems not to
be a problem in our case, in contrast to Knight (2002). This may be related to the di⁄erent
decision processes in the allocation of aid. Knight (2002) is able to describe how, for his
data, State governments have a certain level of in￿ uence in the Federal Highway program
grants ￿allocation, so that states with a higher preference for investment in highways would
be able also to push harder in the committee that allocates the grants.
Our case is slightly di⁄erent. The broad numbers are negotiated in the European Council
for a long period, according to general rules of identical application to all member countries in
accordance with their economic, social and geographical situation. But the actual application
of the policies is supervised by the European Commission. The bargaining power of member
states to get additional resources at this stage is practically non-existent.
The results from our regressions are also quite di⁄erent from Knight (2002) and reason-
ably consistent with a large part of the literature. Unlike him, we reject the total crowding-
out hypothesis and conclude that endogeneity is not as problematic as he claimed. Obviously,
the main explanation for this disagreement is the di⁄erent nature of the data and the polit-
ical economy environment from which they come. The discussion about the endogeneity of
the allocation of grants in the case of the Federal Highway program might be related to the
decision to consider them lump-sum grants instead of matching grants, as long as they are
highly correlated to the preferences of the state governments.
In general, the results concerning our variable of interest, EUSF, do not di⁄er among
regressions. The inclusion of population and public balance among the set of explanatory
variables, although suggested by the literature, do not add much relevant information in our
case. On the contrary, in the dynamic model the Sargan test reports a rejection of the null of
the validity of the instruments used as a consequence of the inclusion of these two variables.
We can conclude that we do not have total crowding-out from Structural Policies. Mem-
ber countries increase their public investment around 60 percent of the received funds. How-
ever, with these results we cannot say that there is absolutely no deviation of public expen-
diture, since the estimated coe¢ cients are also smaller than one.
If we interpret these results using the theoretical framework described in Section 2,
we can say that the matching process established by the European Commission after the
negotiation in the European Council works reasonably well, so that member states do not
consider the Structural Funds as unconditional grants, even if the amount allocated has
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already been decided previously. If those funds were considered by subsidized governments
as lump-sum transfers, we would expect a negative coe¢ cient associated with the variable
EUSF, although a perfect matching system should yield a coe¢ cient larger than one. In
addition, also according to the theoretical model, this result does not tell us whether to
ensure that the type of capital subsidized is more e⁄ective in terms of enhancing economic
growth.
3.6.3 An alternative view: Implementation on Spanish regional data
In the second chapter of this thesis we have showed how regional governments are more
reluctant to invest. One could be suspicious whether the EU Funds work with the same
e⁄ectiveness when they are allocated to regional governments. That is the reason why in
this subsection we will run an almost identical regression to the one above with regional
data from the same sample of seventeen Spanish regions (NUTS 2) analyzed in the second
chapter.
We have already seen in chapter 2 how there is a contrast between poorer southern
regions which perceive an important amount of Structural Funds (many of them are among
the Objective 1) while the northern regions are in general richer. Table 7 describes the
variables used in the regression. Their de￿nition is very similar to the variables for national
data.
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Table 7: Variables and Sources of Regional Data.
The model has been slightly accommodated to the regional data. The main di⁄erence
with the one used for the country-level data is the elimination of the variable "Public
balance" and the inclusion of "Central Government Capital Expenditure". The inclusion
of indicators of public de￿cits would not add relevant information since sub-national levels
of government are usually quite constrained in terms of incurring de￿cit. Alternatively, as
suggested by our ￿ndings on chapter 2, the behavior of the central government as an investor
could in￿ uence the policies run by sub-national governments regarding public expenditure.
The ￿scal variables included exclusively concern regional governments. We rely on fewer
observations than in the regression with national data, due to the reduced number of years
for which the variable EUSF is available and to the lack of data for private investment before
1995. The summary statistics describing the variables are in Appendix III.
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Table 8: EU Structural Funds Crowd-out. Regional Data: Spain, 1994-2001.
We have to be prudent while interpreting the results, especially taking into consideration
the reduced length of the sample. Some of the speci￿cation tests yield adjusted test-statistics
(in particular, the second order autocorrelation test in column 3). The estimation of the
e⁄ects of EUSF are almost identical among models. The estimated e⁄ect is also very close
to the one estimated with the country-level data, although we have to keep in mind the
di⁄erence in the de￿nition of the variables. It looks like regional governments in Spain do
accommodate their budgets to the income from the Structural and Cohesion Funds in a
similar way to our sample of European nations.
Regarding the rest of the explanatory variables, we can also check how the Spanish data
replicate quite accurately the results obtained with national data, except the coe¢ cients
estimated for Public consumption. We ￿nd this coe¢ cient insigni￿cant for Spanish regions
while it is an important determinant of public investment at the national level. The inter-
pretation for this it not straightforward. Given that this variable is an indicator of the public
budget or the "availability of funds", it might be that regional governments ￿nd themselves
less constrained to enlarge their investment. As for "GDP" and "Private Investment", the
results are quite similar to those estimated with national data and reveal how the public
administration tries to compensate for the lack of private capital.
These estimations imply that the larger propensity to consume of regional governments
shown in chapter 2 does not a⁄ect their reaction towards EU grants. In other words, the
matching grants system run by the European Commission works with the same e⁄ectiveness
at this level of the public administration.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the response of public governments to EU Cohesion policy. In
particular, we estimate the impact of Structural and Cohesion Funds on public expenditure,
and conclude that member countries increase their public investment around 60 percent of
the new Funds received. Therefore, there is a small crowding-out e⁄ect of those funds on




public investment. The system of "matching grants" used by the European Commission
to allocate the funds seems to work reasonably well. We describe in the paper how the
European Commission has developed a system in which grants are given conditional on
public investment made by the public governments. This system of matching-grants has
partly succeeded in enhancing public investment in less developed countries inside the Union.
With the help of a simple version of a neoclassical growth model, we interpret the coef-
￿cient estimated as an indicator of the e⁄ectiveness of the matching grants system designed
for the Funds. According to our model, the estimated coe¢ cient should be larger than one if
the Funds were completely administered as matching grants, while it would take a negative
value if they were considered unconditional transfers. Taking into account the bargaining
process in the European Council according to which the Funds are distributed, it would not
be surprising that the majority of these Funds were considered by subsidized countries as
lump-sum transfers.
The relevant literature developed since the early seventies, especially that using US data,
forecast similar reactions to federal grants. However, more recent studies have questioned the
validity of these results by suggesting the necessity of taking into account the possibility that
the variables that de￿ne the allocation of grants are endogenous. We estimate the e¢ ciency
of to the particular case of the Structural Funds, setting up a dynamic model estimated using
the GMM Arellano-Bond estimator for panels that takes into account for the possibility of
endogeneity.
The paper also investigates whether more disaggregated levels of data might reveal deeper
information. In particular, the fact that regional governments could have a di⁄erent pattern
of behavior towards the grants. We showed in chapter 2 that regional governments are sen-
sitive to their level of autonomy regarding the distribution of their public expenditure. In
this case we cannot identify a di⁄erent response from the regional administrations to the EU
Structural Policy. However, more investigation needs to be done with regional data to ￿nd
out whether there are substantial di⁄erences in the behavior of public expenditure towards
EU Structural grants among countries.
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3.8 Appendix I Public Grants in a neoclassical growth model
3.8.1 Basic framework, the model without grants
For simplicity, we choose to set up a discrete-time model with a unique ￿nal good. We
consider a single, in￿nitely lived representative household. Aggregate output, Y, is produced
with private physical capital, K, public infrastructures services, G, using a Cobb-Douglas






where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿, and A > 1:
Thus, production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors. There is total depre-
ciation in both inputs.
The behavior of the representative consumer





where ct represents private consumption in period t. The consumer ignores the present
and future decisions of the public government about g1, g2 and g3. He faces the budget
constraint:
(1 ￿ ￿)Yt = Ct + Kt+1 (3.6)
The maximization problem yields the Euler equation:
Ct+1
Ct
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Which we expect to be constant in the steady state.
The behavior of the government.
The government is able to observe the behavior of the consumer. However, it does
not internalize the consumer￿ s problem,20 but seeks to maximize the utility received by the






Production is taxed at the rate ￿ 2 (0;1):The government distributes the public budget
among public consumption, Gcons and public capital accumulation for next period, Gt:Thus,
its budget constraint will be:
￿Yt = Gt+1 + Gcons;t (3.9)
3.8.2 Matching grants to public capital
Let us assume now that an external agent, a higher level of government, for example,
is interested in boosting economic growth by subsidizing the purchase of public capital to
the public sector through a matching grant. The matching grant would be transcribed in
our model as a change in the relative price of public capital in the budget constraint of the
public sector. Equation (3.9) would then become:
￿Yt = ￿Gt+1 + Gcons;t (3.10)
20Identically to the second chapter, we introduce this assumption for simplicity, since it is equivalent to
assuming a model with public policy decided by a representative consumer applying median voter theory,
in which the utility function includes private consumption and public services additively separable, in line
with Agenor (2007), Ganelly and Tervala (2007) and Van der Ploeg and Bovenberg (1994), among others.
We recall again the analysis by Djajic and Maximilians (1987) that includes an interesting analysis of the
implications of alternative assumption concerning the relationship between public and private consumption
in the utility function.
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where ￿ 2 (0;1) represent the share of cost that the public sector has to pay on the
purchase of public capital, G, after the implementation of a matching grant system. The
subsidizer would pay the remaining (1-￿)G. The parameter ￿ would take the value 1 if G is
not subsidized or 0 if public investment is fully subsidized.
The government maximizes the discounted present value of lifetime utility,(3.8), subject











It is easy to check that this economy will ￿nd its equilibria where the growth rates for
consumption and public expenditure are identical, ￿g = ￿c = ￿. We can then substitute
and work out the constant growth rate in equilibrium:
Ct+1
Ct





As long as ￿>1, there is a constant rate of consumption growth, which is entirely in-
dependent of the level of capital stock per person. This will also imply that there are no
transitional dynamics in this model. Starting from any level of initial wealth the economy
will immediately start growing at a constant rate. We assume A to be large enough to ensure
positive economic growth.
We can now derive the relative amounts of the production factors used in equilibrium:
Kt+1
Yt







and the relative amounts of consumption goods:
Ct
Yt
= (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿);
Gcons;t
Yt
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
Although the relative amount of wealth devoted to private capital remains unchanged21,
21This is a consequence of our constant elasticity of substitution production function.
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the actual proportion of production allocated to it is slightly smaller since production grows
faster than in the situation without grants. Private capital decrease because of the wealth
e⁄ect produced by the increase of income in the public sector.
Public capital will experience an increase in its relative share of wealth. It is also a⁄ected
by the wealth e⁄ect induced by the faster growth, but the crowding-in provoked by the
decrease in the relative price of the factor will always be larger.
The following equation de￿nes the response of public expenditure to the grants policy,
￿G
Y , exclusive of the granted amount, which is also invested: According to this de￿nition,
there is crowding-out of a matching-grant policy on public investment when the value of











1￿￿ ￿ 1) (3.13)
Where ￿o represents the constant growth rate of the economy before the implementation
of the matching-grants system, i.e. the equivalent to equation 3.11 with ￿ = 0: This expres-
sion will always be positive regardless and allow us to summarize the impact of matching
grants to public capital in our neoclassical growth model in proposition 1: "In our model
neoclassical technology, a matching-grant to public capital will always induce a crowding-in
e⁄ect onto public investment. This means that there will be a positive increase in ￿nal public
investment higher than the amount granted as a reaction to the transfer".
Later we will see that the result in this proposition holds also in the presence of two
types of public capital, one of which cannot be subsidized by the matching grant.
3.8.3 Lump-sum grants
In this subsection we analyze the alternative situation to the matching grant in which the
government receives in stead a lump-sum grant.22 Let us assume that the government receives
no grant until period s, and that at that time it is announced that it will start receiving a
22Given that there is perfect mobility among both categories of public expenditure, we could also assume
that the lump-sum transfer is of any kind of public good.
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permanent lump-sum quantity L from period s+1 onwards. Until period s, equation (3.12)
(with ￿ = 1) de￿nes the constant growth rate in equilibrium for all variables. But in period
s+1 the budget constraint (3.9) changes to:
￿Ys+1 + L = Gs+2 + Gcons;s+1 (3.14)
This implies that in period s, in order for equation (3.11) to hold, Gt+1 should decrease
to anticipate some public consumption from the future increase in public wealth. This will




= ￿gS = ￿￿￿
Ys+1
Gs+1
From this moment onwards
Gcons;t+1
Gcons;t will start to decrease and converge to the value
that it used to have before s. Parallelly, Gt
Yt will also increase to converge gradually to their
previous value, or immediately if the grant were retired. The e⁄ect of the introduction of a











The value of this expression will always be negative since ￿gS > ￿o: Therefore, the
introduction of the lump-sum grant not only does not induce an increment in public invest-
ment larger than the sum of the grant received, as happens with the matching grants, but
conversely withdraws resources from public capital. This happens because the government
anticipates public consumption in period S from the increase in wealth in S+1 induced by
the transfers, which pushes down public investment for period s+1 (decided on period s).
The level of production of the economy will also decrease.
This result drives proposition 2: "In our economy with neoclassical technology and a
￿xed tax-rate, a lump-sum transfer to the government from an external agent will induce a
deviation of public resources from public investment towards public consumption such that the
government will increase public consumption by a quantity higher than the transfer received.
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Therefore, there will be a negative increase in ￿nal public investment as a reaction to the
transfer ".
We could de￿ne the result of a lump-sum transfer of capital described in proposition 2
as a situation of total crowding-out, because we have a negative increase in total public in-
vestment. This result justi￿es many ￿ndings of the ￿ ypaper literature summarized in section
3. The assumption of ￿xed tax rate has consequences for the relationship between public
and private consumption, but the main mechanism is driven by the decrease in marginal
utility of consumption induced by the grants, which pushes down the equilibrium amounts
of production factors.
3.8.4 Extension: Subsidized and non subsidized public capital
Finally we will analyze an extension of the basic model that will include interesting
additional conclusions to the analysis above. We will assume now that there are two types of
public capital instead of one. In this new framework we will examine the role of the elasticity
of substitution of the public production factor, ￿, in the response of the granted government
towards the grant. This new view will let us understand better how the granting authority
would optimize its policy when it has to decide between several types of public investment
to allocate the grants.
We consider now that aggregate output, Y, is produced with private physical capital,
K, and two types of public infrastructure services, that we will call G1 and G2, using a








where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2, ￿1 > ￿2; and A > 1:
Thus, production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors. There is total depre-
ciation in all three inputs. We include two types of public capital, assuming larger output
elasticity in one of them (G1) with the purpose of examining the implication of subsidizing
with a matching grant public investment on any of them, and the role played by the output
elasticities (￿1 and ￿2).
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The behavior of the representative consumer does not change with respect to the basic
model, it maximizes the discounted stream of future utility represented by equation 3.5,
facing identical budget constraint 3.6 and yielding the Euler equation described by equation
3.7.
The government also behaves identically to the basic model, but faces a distribution of
the public budget among public consumption, Gcons;t and two types of public capital goods
accumulation for next period, G1t and G2t:Thus, its budget constraint will be:
￿Yt = G1t+1 + G2t+1 + Gcons;t
We have included two types of public capital to be able to compare the di⁄erent response
of public expenditure when either of them is subsidized. Now the external agent willing to
give a matching grant, a higher level of government, for example, has to decide on which of
the types of public capital will subsidize through this grant. The external agent is interested
in boosting economic growth by subsidizing the purchase of one of both types of public capital
to the public sector through a matching grant. The matching grant would be transcribed in
our model as a change in the relative price of public capital in the budget constraint of the
public sector. Equation (3.9) would then become:
￿Yt = ￿1G1t+1 + ￿2G2t+1 + Gcons;t (3.17)
where ￿1 and ￿2 2 (0;1) represent the share of cost that the public sector has to pay on
the purchase of both types of public capital, G1 and G2 respectively, after the implementation
of a matching grant system. The subsidizer would pay the remaining (1-￿1)G1 and (1-￿2)G2:
The parameters ￿1 and ￿2 would take the value 1 if either G1 or G2 are not subsidized
respectively.
The government maximizes the discounted present value of lifetime utility,(??), subject
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And the new equilibria where the growth rates for consumption and public expenditure
are identical, ￿g = ￿c = ￿ :
Ct+1
Ct












The relative amounts of the production factors used in equilibrium will be:
Kt+1
Yt












While the relative amounts of consumption goods remains unchanged to that of the
basic model. The relative reasoning driving Proposition 1 in the basic model remains in the
extended version. If one of the public goods is subsidized with a matching grant represented
by a parameter ￿; the following equation de￿nes the response of public expenditure to the
grants policy, ￿
Gsub+Gnonsub




















Where ￿0 represents again the constant growth rate of the economy before any grants
system is implemented. The ￿rst term inside the brackets represents the increment in the
share of Gsub on production, due to the decrease of its relative price. The second term is
negative, since ￿
￿1
1 < 1; and represents the decrease of the share of Gnonsub on production
induced by the faster growth (wealth e⁄ect). The e⁄ect on the subsidized type of capital is
larger than the negative wealth e⁄ect on non-subsidized capital. This expression will always
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be positive regardless of the values taken by ￿sub;￿nonsub; and ￿: the total increase on public
investment will always be larger than the grant perceived by the subsidized government,
which yields proposition 1:
Now we want to turn to examine how the e⁄ects of the matching grants policy depend
on the relative coe¢ cient ￿ associated to the subsidized capital, that represents also the
relative amount used of this type of capital in equilibria and its output elasticity. We will
do comparing the e⁄ects of allocating a determined matching grant to either one of the
types of public capital in two alternative environments. First we will compare the e⁄ect of
allocating the same ￿ to any of both, G1 and G2; and later we will compare the results of
allocating a grant ￿1 to an alternative grant ￿2; when both of them imply an equivalent cost
to the subsidizer. Finally, we will examine brie￿ y also the case of an unconditional lump-sum
transfer.
3.8.4.1 Case A, an identical grant to each type of capital
First we will compare the di⁄erent response of public expenditure to alternatively sub-
sidizing G1 or G2 with a matching grant of identical value. That is, the subsidizer has to
choose between the alternative of establishing ￿1 = ￿ or ￿2 = ￿:
If the external agent chooses to subsidize G1, the new constant growth rate would be ￿
￿￿1

















1￿￿1 ￿ 1) + ￿2(￿
￿1 ￿ 1)] (3.19)
If the external agent chooses instead to subsidize G2 through an identical matching grant,
the alternative constant growth rate would be ￿
￿￿2 and the increment of public investment
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For our range of possible values for the parameters, the value of equation (3.19) will
always be larger than equation (3.20). The increment in economic growth will also be larger
in the case of the matching grant to the ￿rst type of public capital G1. This result lead
us to proposition 3 that stands: "The response of a public authority to a matching-grants
policy on a certain kind of public investment run by an external institution depends on the
relative amount of this kind of public investment used previously (i.e. its output elasticity).
The higher the output elasticity of this kind of public investment with respect to the other
production factors, the higher the increase in public expenditure induced by the grant".
3.8.4.2 Case B, a grant with identical cost to each type of capital
The case discussed above includes two options that are not perfectly comparable from
the point of view of the subsidizer, since he would have to face a higher cost if he attached
the matching grant to the more productive capital G1 in comparison to the alternative of
granting G2. Alternatively, we may want to compare the outcome of allocating a grant to
each one of the types of public capital that would imply an equivalent cost to the grant
subsidizer. For that we have to choose ￿1 and ￿2; so that the cost of granting either G1 or








We will denote any pair of coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 for which equation (3.21) holds as ￿ ￿1 and
￿ ￿2: In that case, the e⁄ect of implementing the grant system for each one of the alternatives
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It is easy to show that for any pair ￿ ￿1 and ￿ ￿2 the outcome from equations (3.22) and (3.23)
will always be identical. Therefore, we expect an identical e⁄ect on total public investment
from either of the alternatives: implementing a grant ￿ ￿1 to the purchase of g1 or alternatively
implementing a grant ￿ ￿2 to g2, provided that the relationship between ￿1 and ￿2 comes given
by (3.21).
However they do not induce an identical e⁄ect on growth. The new constant growth








if the grant is attached to G2: Given
￿1 > ￿2; ￿ ￿
￿1
1 will always be smaller than ￿ ￿
￿2
2 ; therefore, the new growth rate would always be
larger under a matching grant ￿ ￿1 attached to the ￿rst type of public capital, G1, than under
an alternative matching grant with value ￿ ￿2 attached to G2. The provider of the grant would
share the same cost under both alternatives, but the ￿rst option would be more e¢ cient in
terms of growth-enhancement.
Proposition 4 characterizes this result: "The cost to the subsidizer of running a matching
grant policy with the purpose of reaching a predetermined increase of public investment does
not depend on the output elasticity of the subsidized type of public investment. However, the
higher this elasticity of the public investment, the higher the increase in economic growth
induced by the reallocation of factors ".
3.8.4.3 Case C. Lump-sum grants
Finally we have to mention that in the alternative case in which the government does
not receive a matching grant, but a lump-sum grant, the results remains unaltered when
there are two types of public goods. The new governments budget constraint for period s+1
changes to:
￿Ys+1 + L = G1s+2 + G2s+2 + G3s+1 (3.24)
And the equivalent equilibrium growth rate ￿gS :
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Gcons;s+1
Gcons;s








Gcons;t will start to decrease and converge to the value that it used




Yt will also increase to converge gradually to their
previous value, or immediately if the grant were retired. The e⁄ect of the introduction of a











which is negative since ￿gS > ￿0: As in the basic model, there is a situation of total
crowding-out, because we have a negative increase in total public investment. T
3.9 Appendix II
Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland are clearly the main bene￿ciaries of the Structural
Funds. Figure [1] shows the allocation per capita of the Structural Fund for the 15 European
countries in our dataset. The allocation to Greece or Portugal is clearly above 200 Euro per
capita while richer countries hardly reach 50. In 2005 these four countries received 45% of
the total budget of the Structural Funds.23
Self elaboration from data on Eurostat.

























Figure A.1: Per capita allocation of SF by member country.
23approximately, 14030 out of 3853 million Euro. They count with approximately 17% of the population
over the total sample of 15 countries.
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We want to evaluate the relative changes in the pattern of public investment that the
Structural Funds may have induced in our sample. In ￿gure [2] we show the evolution of the
public expenditure on some keys functional categories for two sub-groups of our sample.24 On
one side we have aggregated data for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS), the four
main receivers of Structural Funds. In the other group we included the ￿ve countries that
receive the fewest Funds per capita, namely Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and Sweden (DFLNS). The ￿rst group includes approximately 68 million people, while the
second around 93.
SGIP stands for Spain, Greece Ireland
and Portugal, while DNLFS means
Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
France and Sweden.
All figures in per capita Euro.
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Figure A.2: Analysis of the evolution of public expenditure by functional categories and
groups of countries.
24The rest of functional categories of public expenditure not included in the ￿gures are "General public
services", "Defence", "Public order and safety", "Environment protection", "Housing and community ameni-
ties" and "Recreation, culture and religion". They have been omitted in the analysis since their examination
would not include additional information relevant for our purposes.
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In the period considered, the SPIG group has reduced very slightly the gap of public
expenditure per capita in comparison with the DFLNS group. This change has not a⁄ected
homogeneously all the categories of public expenditure, but has served to reduce the gap in
the category "Economic A⁄airs and Services", which is the one precisely oriented towards
reducing the production di⁄erences.25 In the meanwhile, other categories like "Social Secu-
rity", "Education" and "Health" have maintained almost steady the gap between these two





































Eu structural funds GISP Eu structural Funds DFLNS
SGIP stands for Spain, Greece Ireland and
Portugal, while DNLFS means Denmark,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Sweden.
All figures in per capita Euro.
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Figure A.3: Analysis of the evolution of public expenditure by economic categories and
groups of countries.
25The gap has been reduced in 365 Euro per capita, while the di⁄erence in total public expenditure per
capita has decreased 288 Euro.
26In particular, the gap for those three categories of expenditure has increased approximately 124, 44 and
8 Euro per capita in the period considered in the ￿gures.
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3.10 Appendix III
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Table A.1: Spanish Regional Data: Summary Statistics.
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